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SUMMARY 
 
This study examines 1) whether the different expenditure mechanisms used by the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) invite different sources of influences on the budget 
process and thus on the expenditure outcomes and 2) whether the frequent use of 
omnibus appropriations bills since 1996 has changed budget levels of the institutes under 
the NIH. The NIH uses two major expenditure mechanisms with very different 
beneficiary groups: the principal investigator-initiated Research Project Grants and 
Intramural Research. Drawing on theories of motivations of public officials and of 
political clout of agency heads and considering empirical studies of the effect of omnibus 
legislation, this study reveals the following: 1) directors with more public service 
experience are more successful in securing a higher budget for their institutes; 2) while 
the directors are  found to be driven by public service motivation, when it comes to 
expenditure allocation between two different mechanisms, they behave in a self-
interested manner, representing the interests of the institutional sectors where they have 
developed close relationships; 3) with ever-increasing budgets between 1983 and 2005, 
the institute directors have chosen to seek higher budgets rather than merely avoid the 
risk of budget cuts; 4) although the advisory boards are purportedly used to seek private 
input for the priority setting, they tend to increase intramural more than external research 
project grant expenditures; 5) the practice of omnibus appropriations bills significantly 
benefits the institutes under the NIH such that with omnibus legislation the institutes’ 
total expenditures have more than doubled controlling the other factors; and 6) there are 
significant differences in the effects of the director’s public experience and the number of 
advisory boards and their membership both (i) between disease-focused institutes and 
nondisease institutes and (ii) with and without omnibus legislation. The effects of the 
director’s public service experience and the advisory boards have more budgetary impact 
 vii
in the general science-focused institutes than in their disease-focused counterparts. The 
influence of the advisory board and of the institute director’s public service experience on 
the individual institute’s expenditure level is significantly diminished by the frequent use 
of omnibus appropriations bills. 
The findings of this study provide a link between the literature of decision-making 
for distributive policy and studies of research and development policy.  
 viii
 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“It would be appropriate for the new Administration and the leading professional 
groups to reconsider … the basis of the division of NIH-supported research among 
government laboratories, universities, other research institutions, and the for-profit 
sector.” – Alan N. Schechter (1993) 
Research Questions 
Public budgeting is political since it is ridden with incremental bargaining, 
interest group influence, and decision-making (Rubin, 2006; Wildavsky & Caiden, 1997; 
Meyers, 1995). However, the political nature of public budgeting of Research and 
Development (R&D) expenditures has not been seriously examined, especially when an 
agency uses multiple expenditure mechanisms to support research performed by scientists 
in different institutional settings. The prime question this study tries to answer is: do 
different mechanisms of R&D expenditures invite different influences from the leadership 
of an agency, congressional members, and the targeted beneficiary groups?    
 This study provides a link between the literature of R&D policy and that of public 
expenditure of distributive programs by focusing on the characteristics of R&D 
expenditure decision-making at the agency level with the case of the expenditure 
mechanisms of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). While the literature of decision-
making of distributive programs deals largely with their efficiency issues, R&D policy 
studies are concerned primarily with innovative potentials of R&D as it relates to the 
economy. As such, the theoretical treatment of R&D programs pays little attention to the 
issues of their distributive political characteristics. 
 The NIH, as the nation’s prime engine of medical research, supports a variety of 
research and training activities performed by universities, intramural laboratories, and 
nonprofit institutions. Research supported by the NIH is recognized as being “at the 
1 
pinnacle of success” (IOM, 2004), and the discovery and innovation powered by the NIH 
have improved health in America and around the world. To fund medical research, the 
NIH uses multiple expenditure mechanisms, including competing or noncompeting 
grants, research centers, cooperative agreements, and contracts. Depending on various 
funding mechanisms, the NIH classifies its expenditures into Research Project Grants 
(RPGs), Research Centers, Other Research, Training, R&D Contracts, Intramural 
Research, Research Management and Support, Cancer Control, and Construction.1
 Aware of NIH’s success, Congress has been persistently vigilant of the relative 
vitality of NIH research activities that are supported by different mechanisms (IOM, 
1988, 1998, 2004; EAC, 1994; Klausner, 1992; NRC & IOM, 2003). Congressional 
interests in NIH funding and its priority settings are apparently motivated by efficiency 
considerations, as in the Senate amendment to the Muscular Dystrophy Community 
Assistance, Research and Education Amendments of 2001.2 One of the amendment’s 
specific charges upon the Institute of Medicine was to consider “the current areas of 
research incorporating Centers for Excellence and the relationship of this form of funding 
mechanism to other forms of funding for research grants, including investigator-initiated 
research, contracts, and other types of research support awards.” The report by NRC and 
IOM (2003) was also initiated by the congressional mandate to examine “whether the 
structure and organization of NIH are optimally configured for the scientific needs of the 
twenty-first century” (p. 2, emphasis added). 
 An assumption of these evaluation reports is that the process and structure of the 
NIH support mechanisms and their respective expenditure amounts should be determined 
in the most efficient manner by their relevant participants, whose interests may not be in 
                                                 
 
 
1  A more detailed description of these expenditure mechanisms is provided in Chapter 2. 
2  The amendment required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to organize a study “on the impact 
of, need for, and other issues associated with Centers of Excellence at the National Institutes of Health” 
(IOM, 2004, p. 21). 
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line with each other’s. Each of the NIH funding mechanisms represents a specific type of 
government policy tool that in turn involves a different group of participants (Salamon, 
2002). There are at least seven types of interested constituents in the process of research 
priority setting and funding decisions: extramural research scientists, clinicians, 
organized voluntary groups and individuals with regard to specific diseases, 
organizations and individuals representing population groups, members of Congress, the 
media (IOM, 1998), and intramural scientists. Given these diverse constituent groups and 
the consideration that R&D programs are also an example of distributive policy (Lowi, 
1964; Meier, 1993), it would be naïve to expect these different constituent groups to 
cooperate with each other to find the most efficient allocation of R&D funds through 
different expenditure mechanisms. 
 In addition to the efficiency question, an alternative empirical question about the 
funding mechanisms of the NIH would concern how each of its constituent groups 
influences the processes of budgeting and expenditure decisions. How do different 
incentives and institutional practices influence expenditure decisions on the multiple 
mechanisms of the NIH research funding? With a unique set of expenditure beneficiaries, 
each of the expenditure mechanisms represents the different interests of the different 
groups. An understanding of R&D budgeting and expenditures would be furthered by an 
analysis of institutional and actor dimensions—such is the purpose of this research. 
 The first research question this study examines is what and how much impact do 
the different participants in the budgeting process of the NIH research funds have on the 
expenditure structures of  the different funding mechanisms? Specifically, how are 
funding decisions made between intramural and private principal investigator-initiated 
research? The main argument to be made and tested regarding this question is that NIH 
funding decisions are a function of political factors among directors of the component 
institutes, interested parties including advisory boards, and members of relevant 
congressional committees.  
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 The second question to be investigated in this study is does a change in 
appropriations practice affect R&D expenditure outcomes by changing the incentives of 
relevant actors? The possible effect to be examined is that of the frequent use of omnibus 
appropriations bills on the dynamics of R&D budget appropriations and thus on R&D 
funds expenditures of the institutes under the NIH. While omnibus continuing budget 
resolutions were frequently used in the 1980s, the utilization of omnibus “appropriations” 
bills is relatively new, first used in Federal Fiscal Year (FFY) 1996. If the impacts are 
substantial, the NIH may lead to higher levels of uncertainty in the funding streams 
because of tougher competition from non-R&D programs, which impose an additional 
burden on researchers in both public and private institutions. The findings are expected to 
shed new light on current dynamics of federal R&D funding and provide a contribution to 
the legislative decision-making literature. 
 These two questions aim to uncover political dynamics of R&D expenditure 
decision-making at the congressional as well as at the agency level. The decentralized 
system of R&D budgeting3 does not mean that appropriations and expenditure decisions 
on R&D programs have no unique features distinct from other distributive programs. To 
the contrary, the decentralization in R&D budgeting provides all relevant actors 
opportunities to be engaged with the process. This research shows that the dynamics of 
R&D budgeting is closely intertwined with the unique nature of R&D activities as well as 
the institutional practices of Congress and executive agencies. 
                                                 
 
 
3 The decentralized system of R&D budgeting refers to the following factors: first, there is no central body 
to deal with science and technology policy issues, and second, budgets for R&D are handled by a variety of 
committees in Congress.  
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New Focus on the R&D Programs as a Distributive Policy 
 Confronted with increasingly tough competition from abroad and multiple 
warnings from indicators of R&D activities (CSEPP, 2006; Bonvillian, 2004), U.S. R&D 
investment draws increasing attention from policymakers as well as R&D insiders. While 
organizational and procedural reforms (Carnegie Commission, 1994) in R&D budgeting 
processes are as much of an issue as more spending and priority adjustments, the political 
nature of the decision characteristics of R&D budgeting and expenditures have gotten 
short-shrifted in the literature of R&D policy except when consideration is given to 
tracking annual trends of R&D budgets for federal agencies. On the other hand, some 
studies of legislative behavior that focus on congressional committees and subcommittees 
(Sheplse & Weingast, 1987; Weingast & Marshall, 1988), amendment rules (Baron & 
Ferejohn, 1989; Fréchette et al., 2003; Primo, 2003) and distributive politics (Weingast et 
al., 1981; Denzau & Munger, 1986; Baron, 1991; DelRossi & Inman, 1999), and 
relationships between budget processes and levels of spending (Ferejohn & Krehbiel, 
1987; Dharmapala, 2006) examine the implications of the distributive program as  “a 
political decision that concentrates benefits in a specific geographic constituency and 
finances expenditures through generalized taxation” (Weingast et al., 1981, p. 644). The 
main argument from the legislative decision-making studies with respect to levels of 
spending on distributive programs is that, regardless of the specified nature of 
congressional decision-making in terms of universalism4 and reciprocity (Mayhew, 1974; 
Weingast, 1979; Weingast et al., 1981), majoritarian minimal winning coalitions (Riker, 
1962; Baron, 1991, 1993), or log-rolled super-majorities (Groseclose & Snyder, 1996), 
                                                 
 
 
4 According to the universalism norm, benefits are distributed to most, if not all, of the geographic districts, 
as opposed to only the districts of the winning coalitions. 
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the members of Congress demand more distributive projects to be financed by general 
taxation, causing too much spending and inefficiency (DelRossi & Inman, 1999). 
 However, a specific focus on R&D budgets is missing, with the notable exception 
of Gist (1981), who tackled the impact of changes in budget authorizations on military 
R&D appropriations. As a result of this deficit, things get complicated when applying 
these arguments from legislative decision-making studies, especially those with 
implications of spending on distributive programs, to the analysis of public R&D 
expenditures. Categorized as a distributive policy (Lowi, 1964; Meier, 1993)5, public 
R&D programs are distinct from and much more subtle than other locally beneficial 
projects.6 Knowledge from pure sciences has the nature of non-excludability and 
nonrivalry (Nelson, 1959). The most prominent characteristic of R&D outputs is 
spillovers benefiting those other than conductors and supporters of R&D. Accordingly, 
R&D expenditures benefit not only the direct recipient of public money, who may be 
either special interests or a district, but also the economy as a whole (Boskin & Lau, 
1992, 1996; CBO, 2005; Griliches, 1988, 1994; Jorgenson & Griliches, 1967; Mansfield, 
1980; Scherer, 1983; Solow, 1957; Terleckyi, 1974). These characteristics of R&D 
programs are not captured by formal models of geography-based representative 
legislature. For example, in building a politicians’ objective function of a distributive 
program, Weingast et al. (1981) and Shepsle and Weingast (1984) treated benefits and 
                                                 
 
 
5 While citing Lowi (1964) in a discussion of policy typology, Weingast et al. (1981) did not mention 
defense R&D as an example of a distributive policy, implying that classification of R&D programs into a 
specific policy type could be tricky. 
6 According to scholars such as Becker (1983), McKean (1965), Wintrobe (1987), and Wittman (1989, 
1995), this does not represent a problem at all because, it is argued, the political market clears itself, with 
both pork-barrel projects and R&D programs being funded at the socially optimal level. On the other hand, 
Coates and Morris (1995) argue that under the conditions of imperfect information on the part of voters 
about both public projects and politicians, politicians may want to use inefficient public projects over cash 
transfer to benefit special interests for fear of reputational penalty.  
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costs flowing to other districts as politically irrelevant, with the conclusion that a 
distributive policy intervention is not necessarily a Pareto-improvement. 
 Into this junction comes the need for an independent focus on budgeting and 
expenditure decisions of R&D programs, which is justified by both the need for 
theoretical treatment of the implications of the nature of R&D activities in the distributive 
policy process and the practical need for more informed decisions. This new theoretical 
interest will direct our attention to the characteristics of R&D expenditure decisions at the 
various levels of government, with special focus on the political incentives of the 
participating actors and the institutional structure of the decision-making processes. 
 Given that various units of the government are engaged in R&D funding decisions 
in the U.S., this study focuses on two distinct but interrelated dimensions. The first 
dimension is the characteristics of the institutional framework of R&D budgeting and 
expenditure decisions where the most political factors are commingled. Especially in the 
U.S., the R&D budgeting process is a decentralized one in which a wide range of R&D-
related agencies and congressional actors are involved without a centralized coordinating 
body. There are multiple sources of influences in effect, including bureaucrats from 
executive branches, presidential staff, and members of Congress, especially those of the 
Appropriations Committees and committees with jurisdictions over science and 
technology. The second dimension is the decisions made by the individual agencies. At 
the agency level, funding decisions regarding specific research projects involve multiple 
parties from the government and private industries.  
 The theoretical as well as practical implications of the dimension of institutional 
characteristics are of critical importance to the understanding of the actor incentives 
dimension. The level of public involvement in R&D is dependent on the institutional 
arrangements through which public demand for R&D is aggregated and incentives for 
public and private actors are provided. Institutional settings condition how politicians and 
bureaucrats act with respect to public demand for R&D. The behaviors at the agency 
 7
level are also structurally constrained and/or encouraged by incentive structures under 
specific institutional settings (North, 1990). Thus, institutions and actors jointly explain 
the level of public involvement in R&D. 
 Funding decisions at the NIH exemplify how much the decisions could be 
complicated among multiple actors: the NIH not only commands intramural laboratories 
but also extensively funds private research. To support research at private settings, the 
NIH uses multiple mechanisms as described in Chapter 2, including principal 
investigator-initiated RPGs, Research Centers, and R&D Contracts. Each of these 
different funding mechanisms invites unique profiles of participant groups with their own 
interests and incentives, providing a test bed to examine hypotheses about relationships 
between specific factors of institutional arrangements and participants and expenditures 
through the mechanisms. The test bed aspect of these public R&D expenditures is why 
this study analyzes factors involving expenditure decisions of research funding by this 
agency. 
Scope of Research 
 This study analyzes expenditures by 18 institutes of the NIH between FFY1983 
and FFY2005. The main explanatory variables are proxies for influences of various 
sources including politically appointed institute directors, private beneficiaries in the 
medical research community, and congressional actors in the appropriations 
subcommittees that deal with NIH budgets. 
 The NIH uses specific labels to refer to its grant programs, such as P01 (Program 
Projects), R01 (RPGs), R15 (Academic Research Enhancement Award), R21 
(Exploratory/Developmental Grants), U01 (Research Project Cooperative Agreements), 
etc. This study is limited to expenditure data that are grouped into the aforementioned 
expenditure mechanisms and is not concerned with the specific grant programs. 
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 This study likewise is  not concerned with  the types of research funded by the 
institutes. The NIH supports both basic and applied research, about 55% and 40% of its 
total expenditures, respectively, as of FFY 2006. The NIH tracks its expenditures on 
research by specific diseases or areas, including aging, AIDS, and Alzheimer’s disease. 
For example, expenditures on aging issues are largely undertaken by the National 
Institute on Aging (NIA). This study does not address these different classifications of the 
NIH expenditures, in part because of data availability and in part because they are 
dependent on specific institutes.  
 The study is organized as follows. The second chapter provides an overview of 
the NIH and its expenditure mechanisms using a framework based on the R&D policy 
tools approach. Chapter 3 focuses on theoretical issues in government R&D expenditures 
and provides testable hypotheses followed by a discussion of the methods used to test the 
hypotheses. Chapter 5 reports and discusses the analytical findings. Chapter 6 concludes 
with discussions of this study’s contributions, the limitations of the study, and further 
research agendas. 
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CHAPTER 2 
R&D TOOLS AND NIH EXPENDITURE MECHANISMS  
 
Tools of R&D Policy 
 Lowi (1964, 1972) discusses how policies affect political results. The choice of a 
policy is inevitably inseparable from the choice of a policy tool. Therefore, characteristics 
of the tools selected make a difference in the political process regarding the policy. 
Despite its theoretical importance, only RAND (2001)7 has studied tool choice in the 
R&D policy area at the agency level. In the R&D policy area, a wide range of tools are 
utilized to promote R&D activities in the economy. Accordingly, the literature has paid 
substantial attention to how each of the tools for R&D encouragement affects the 
behaviors of individuals and the economy. However, the empirical studies on how a 
R&D policy tool contributes to the innovative capacity of an economy begs the question 
of how the tool is selected to begin with. What is missing from the perspective of policy 
process is an empirical analysis of politics through which R&D policy tools are selected 
and implemented.  
 The U.S. government uses multiple tools to promote R&D activities: it has 
directly funded roughly 700 federal laboratories, about 100 of which are large enough to 
influence the U.S. capacity of innovation and economic competitiveness (Crow & 
Bozeman, 1998). The government also supports about 14,000 industrial laboratories 
                                                 
 
 
7 If there is no effective market providing certain types of R&D activities, the federal government may set 
up R&D labs to do such research. This is true for the cases of National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and Department of Defense (DOD). For the U.S. Army, the RAND Arroyo Center 
recommends intramural R&D if, for a certain technology, there is high Army-specific utility. On the other 
hand, if there are both high Army utility and market potential, it is better to pursue collaborative R&D 
(RAND, 2001). 
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through research grants and tax credits. As of FFY 2004, federal obligations to university 
R&D amounted to $27.3 billion. Considering this profile of federal R&D involvement, 
the policy tools that can intervene in the nation’s R&D efforts could be divided into two 
types: 1) establishment and management of governmental labs and 2) tools that aim to 
influence the incentives that private actors may have in R&D investment.8
 More specifically, four policy tools with budgetary implications are easily 
identified in the R&D area: 1) direct performing of R&D by federal research agencies 
such as NASA or NIH,  which could be termed government-owned, government-operated 
laboratories (GOGOs); 2) government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories 
(GOCOs); 3) government grants to finance private research in universities and firm 
laboratories; and 4) tax incentives to private firms. Of the $105 billion federal R&D 
obligations9 in FFY 2004, $37.7 billion was channeled into industrial laboratories (NSF, 
2005). Among the federal R&D obligations to industrial R&D are tax incentives (tax 
deductions and tax credits): “[T]he research and experiment tax credit represents a small 
fraction of federal R&D expenditures, about 2.6 percent of total federal R&D funding 
and about 6.4 percent of federal R&D for industry” (Audretsch et al., 2002). Table 1 
illustrates the major policy tools to engage R&D activities in a nation. 
                                                 
 
 
8 In addition to the tools that have direct budgetary implications, the government can affect scientific and 
technological activities in a society through various institutional supports, such as intellectual property 
protection policies including the patent policy, technology transfer, antitrust regulations, etc.  
9 In this case, obligation means “binding financial commitment in a congressional budget appropriation” 
and includes “contracts, staff employment, and purchases of goods and services” (NIAID, 2007).  
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Table 1. Types of R&D Policy Tools 
Direct Å-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Æ Indirect 
GOGO GOCO 
Research Grants to 
Universities, Nonprofits, 
and Industrial Firms 
Tax Incentives to 
Industrial Firms 
 
 
These budget-related tools could be assessed in terms of directness of tool 
dimension (Salamon, 2002). The GOGO labs are the most direct form of policy 
intervention, while tax incentives to private firms for R&D are the most indirect form of 
support. This typology need not be based on a rather naïve concept of R&D laboratory 
systems that “universities are seen as the bastion of fundamental research, industry as 
home of commercially-related applied and development work, and … governmental labs 
… as sites for supporting national research missions, especially in weapons, energy, 
space and agriculture” (Crow & Bozeman, 1998). This typology is irrelevant to what 
types of research the entities are conducting, focusing instead on how each of the tools 
works and who controls the money and research topics. However, what types of R&D are 
to be encouraged is critical when considering which types of tools to choose. For 
example, if the government wants to promote basic research, GOGO labs or grants to 
universities can be a better option than tax incentives to firms. This typology provides a 
sense of main beneficiaries of each type of tools. Budgets for the most direct form of 
GOGO labs support primarily government bureaucracies and public scientists. Private 
firms are the main beneficiaries of tax expenditures because they seek research issues of 
their best interests without crippling governmental interventions. 
Intramural research (in GOGO labs) is an example of direct government support 
in the tools approach. The defining feature of direct government support is “the use of 
bureaucracy to mobilize resources and to carry out decisions” (Salamon, 2002). 
According to Leman (2002), the following situations may require the use of direct 
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government involvement: 1) “where the exercise of legitimate force is involved,” 2) 
“where performance cannot easily be left to chance,” 3) “where equity considerations are 
especially important,” and 4) “where the maintenance of some government capability is 
essential” (pp. 61–62). In such cases, direct government involvement may provide more 
flexibility and responsiveness since it saves transaction costs with private actors and must 
adjust to changes only internally. From these rationales, intramural research by the NIH 
may be justified by the fourth reason: through this direct involvement, the agency retains 
the internal capacity to set priorities and evaluate the results of extramural scientists, 
which allows them to continue to conduct state-of-the-art research without relying on or 
being imposed upon by external factors. 
The utility and rationale of each tool provide us with an explanation of why the 
government uses them. However, they do not answer the question of why some tools are 
utilized more extensively than others. A government agency could exercise the same 
function both directly and indirectly (Leman, 2002): the NIH both conducts state-of-the-
art biomedical research through its in-house laboratories and funds university research 
more extensively in terms of expenditure amount. Why this arrangement and specific 
profiles of tool combinations at the NIH’s individual institutes level? This question will 
be addressed through an analysis of factors involving expenditure decisions by multiple 
mechanisms of the NIH. 
Overview of the National Institutes of Health 
The NIH originated from the Laboratory of Hygiene, established at Marine 
Hospital in Staten Island, New York, in 1887 to conduct research on cholera and other 
infectious diseases. In 1930, Congress renamed the Laboratory of Hygiene as the 
National Institute of Health and authorized the creation of the National Cancer Institute 
(NCI). In 1948, Congress combined the NCI, National Heart Institute, National 
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Microbiological Institute, Experimental Biology and Medicine Institute, and National 
Institute of Dental Research to create the National Institutes of Health. 
The medical research organized by the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD) under Dr. Vannevar Bush during the World War II period was a 
driving force in the establishment and expansion of the NIH. After the war, Bush drafted 
a report envisioning a post-war scientific landscape where the government should support 
research in various settings, including universities, with the purposes of combating 
disease, of national security, and of public welfare (Bush, 1945). The report specifically 
emphasized the need for government involvement in medical research given its 
contribution to reducing the death rate during the war and to increasing life expectancy of 
the American people. 
Since World War II, the NIH has experienced a dramatic expansion in its budgets, 
organizational units, and number of supported scientists (see Table 2 for the 
organizational units and their FFY 2005 expenditures). The agency has added new 
institutes to its profile responding to newly emergent research needs. Currently the NIH 
houses 19 institutes, six centers, and one library. Various institutes and centers focus on 
specific diseases (e.g., NCI for cancer, NIDDK for diabetes and kidney disorders, NIMH 
for mental health, and NIDA for drug and alcohol abuse), specific organs (e.g., NHLBI 
for heart, lungs, and blood and NIE for eyes), or specific population groups (e.g., NICHD 
for children and NIA for the elderly) (NRC & IOM, 2003; Morris 1984). Other institutes 
focus on specific fields of science or professions or technologies: NHGRI for human 
genome research, NIEHS for environmental health sciences, and NIGMS for general 
health sciences. In FFY 2004, the agency employed 18,394 persons and had an annual 
appropriation of $27.9 billion (NIH Almanac, 2005). In FFY 2005, the NIH supported 
more than 58,000 research grants and 2,000 research contracts. It also funded more than 
16,000 training positions in universities, medical schools, and other research institutions.
FFY 2005 Expenditures 
 (in $ million) 
 
Institutes/Centers 
 
Establishment 
Total RPGs (%) Intramural 
Research (%) 
NCI   National Cancer Institute 
NEI   National Eye Institute 
NHLBI  National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute 
NHGRI National Human Genome Research Institute 
NIA   National Institute on Aging 
1937 
1968 
1948 
1989 
1974 
4,798 
665 
2,923 
486 
1,045 
2,192 (45.7) 
423 (63.6) 
2,042 (69.9) 
125 (25.7) 
704 (67.4)  
711 (14.8) 
67 (10.1) 
166 (5.7) 
98 (20.2) 
103 (9.9) 
NIAAA National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism 
NIAID National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease 
NIAMS National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases 
NIBIB             National Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering 
NICHD National Institute of Child Health and Human Development 
1970 
1948 
1986 
2000 
1962 
436 
4,276 
508 
296 
1,262 
265 (60.8) 
2,201 (51.5) 
338 (66.5) 
234 (79.1)  
700 (55.5) 
45 (10.3) 
528 (12.3) 
51 (10.0) 
4 (1.4) 
159 (12.6) 
NIDCD  National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders 
NIDCR National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research 
NIDDK National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases 
NIDA  National Institute on Drug Abuse 
NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 
1988 
1948 
1948 
1973 
1969 
392 
389 
1,703 
1,000 
720 
282 (71.9) 
243 (62.5) 
1,165 (68.4) 
592 (59.2) 
279 (38.8) 
34 (8.7) 
58 (14.9) 
165 (9.7) 
79 (7.9) 
165 (22.9) 
NIGMS National Institute of General Medical Sciences 
NIMH  National Institute of Mental Health 
NINDS National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke 
NINR  National Institute of Nursing Research 
NLM   National Library of Medicine 
1962 
1949 
1950 
1986 
1956 
1,932 
1,403 
1,530 
137 
n/a 
1,379 (71.4) 
813 (57.9) 
1,108 (72.4) 
102 (74.4) 
n/a 
2 (0.1) 
158 (11.3) 
135 (8.8) 
2 (1.5) 
n/a 
 CIT  Center for Information Technology 
 CSR  Center for Scientific Review 
 FIC  John E. Fogarty International Center 
 NCCAM National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine 
 NCMHD National Center on Minority Health and Health Disparities 
1964 
1946 
1968 
1999 
1993 
n/a 
n/a 
66 
121 
195 
n/a 
n/a 
16 (24.2) 
72 (59.5) 
6 (3.1) 
n/a 
n/a 
0 (0.0) 
7 (5.8) 
0 (0.0) 
 NCRR  National Center for Research Resources 
 CC  NIH Clinical Center 
1962 
1953 
1,108 
n/a 
73 (3.1)  
n/a 
0 (0.0) 
n/a 
Table 2. Organizational Profile of the National Institutes of Health (source: Office of Budget, National Institutes of Health) 
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NIH Budget Process and Key Actors 
The statutory authority of the NIH budget comes from the Public Health 
Service Act (PHSA) of 1944, as amended thereafter. While its budget is subject to 
annual time and dollar authorization, the most recent budget authorization was the  
NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 (IOM, 2003). The NIH budget process is particularly 
complex. It begins when investigators and institutions submit their grant applications 
to be reviewed by the Center for Scientific Review (CSR). Institutes and centers 
working with NIH directors use their peer reviews to prepare budget requests under 
guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS). Then, the Secretary of the HHS submits the NIH budget 
to the President. The NIH budget is primarily appropriated through a mechanism 
budget (IOM, 2003). Budgets for individual institutes and centers are appropriated 
according to specific expenditure mechanisms. Therefore, “there is a natural focus on 
the allocation of funding among institutes and centers because each receives its own 
appropriation from Congress” (IOM, 1998, p. 16). 
The nature of the budget process of the NIH allows three distinctive actors to 
play critical roles. First, institute directors can exert considerable discretion in seeking 
a higher budget for specific expenditure mechanisms in spite of their division 
directors’ own budget priorities. Second, members of congressional appropriation 
subcommittees can influence the NIH budget obligations due to the relative absence 
of significant role of authorization committees and the President. Third, the NIH 
maintains considerable mechanisms of inputs from medical research communities 
through its advisory boards. 
Institute Directors 
The duties and authorities of institute directors come from Title 42 of the 
PHSA. The institute directors are appointed by either the President (NCI) or the 
Secretary of the HHS and report directly to the director of the NIH. Their duty is to 
“encourage and support research, investigations, experiments, demonstrations, and 
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studies in the health sciences” (PHSA, §284). Although the division directors in the 
institute develop the details of the institute’s budget, the responsibility of the institute 
director as related to the institute’s appropriations is considerable across different 
expenditure mechanisms. 
First, each institute has separate divisions for intramural and extramural 
research programs. For example, the NCI has five divisions for supporting extramural 
research and four comparable units for intramural research purposes.10 The institute 
director coordinates the programs and activities initiated by divisions and centers 
under his/her command in various ways. The institute director appoints 
division/center directors consistent with his/her own research agenda and preferences. 
There might be a tug of war among division directors seeking higher budgets for the 
divisions during which division directors would try to gain support from the institute 
director and the constituent groups. Having said that, the director may have her/his 
own agenda that differs from the division directors or have preferences for programs 
offered by specific divisions. 
Second, the external medical research communities at the institute level direct 
their inputs mainly to the institute directors. The scientific advisory boards appointed 
by the Secretary of the HHS make their recommendations to the institute director. 
They can establish their own technical and scientific peer review groups and appoint 
members. The directors have a good deal of discretion in seeking and implementing 
advice from external groups selectively.  
Third, the institute directors coordinate their institutes’ programs and activities 
with those in other institutes, federal agencies, and private entities. An institute 
director also has legal authority to “cooperate with the directors of the other national 
                                                 
 
 
10 Extramural research support divisions are Division of Cancer Biology, Division of Cancer Control 
and Population Sciences, Division of Cancer Prevention, Division of Cancer Treatment and Diagnosis, 
and Division of Extramural Activities. Intramural research divisions/centers are Center for Cancer 
Research, Branch, Lab, and Program Index: Center for Cancer Research, Division of Cancer 
Epidemiology and Genetics (DCEG), and DCEG Research Interests. 
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research institutes in the development and support of multidisciplinary research and 
research that involves more than one institute” (PHSA, §284). 
Fourth, the institute directors represent their institute before Congress, 
especially in the appropriations subcommittees. Each institute prepares a 
congressional budget justification (CJ) detailing accomplishments of the preceding 
year, current initiatives, and plans (IOM, 2003). The director presents the CJ to the 
appropriations subcommittees. Although Congress allows the NIH to exert 
considerable discretion in its budget, it is interested in NIH fund allocations both 
across expenditure mechanisms and across different diseases, as is evidenced by 
congressionally mandated studies of NIH research fund mechanisms (IOM, 1988, 
1998, 2004). The institute directors emphasize some funding mechanisms over others 
in congressional testimonies. They also provide testimony to other related committees 
such as the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on 
Science and Technology. 
All of these factors point to the critical role of institute directors in the budget 
process, as appropriate to the purposes of this study. These possibilities create an 
arena of discretion and strategic action on the part of the institute directors. Thus, 
allocation of research funds across different mechanisms, not programs, could not be 
the realm of bureaucrats at the division level, but of the leadership of the institute and 
its relationship with Congress and extramural constituent groups. 
Medical Research Communities and Patients/Advocacy Groups  
The NIH commands a broad base of constituents its research funds support, 
including research scientists in medical schools and universities, clinicians who apply 
knowledge from research to disease treatment, patient and advocacy groups, and the 
general public. Each constituency has its own interest in securing research funds 
regardless of whether it is for their own research or for addressing specific diseases. 
For example, the scientific community in universities and medical schools has played 
an important role in increasing NIH budgets through the Ad Hoc Group for Medical 
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Research Funding.11 There are two distinct channels through which the NIH priority-
setting process incorporates these interests. 
 First, specific-disease patients and advocacy groups tend to exert their clout 
via congressional actors. They argue that NIH funding for research into the diseases 
of their interest is not sufficient compared to the costs and burdens of the diseases 
inflicted upon the population. For example, AIDS advocacy groups lobby members of 
Congress to earmark funding for HIV/AIDS-related research or mandate special 
programs for their purpose. Members of Congress try to comply with such requests by 
intervening in the priority-setting process in the NIH, which may lead to distortions in 
exploiting opportunities for scientific progress.12  
Second, the NIH maintains input channels from the outside scientific 
community. Since a great majority of research funds are for extramural purposes, the 
NIH seeks advice from the medical scientific community in reviewing grant 
applications, especially through Integrated/Initial Review Groups and Special 
Emphasis Panels. These groups are housed either in the CSR or in each of the 
institutes and centers under the discretion of their directors. External advisory groups 
can provide recommendations to the institute directors with regard to program 
development and implementation, evaluations, and other issues important to 
achieving institute missions and goals (IOM, 2003). This is the role of National 
Advisory Councils and Boards, whose members are appointed by either the President 
or the Secretary of the HHS. By channeling inputs from the scientific community and 
the general public, the advisory committees and boards enable the NIH to be more 
aware of and responsive to medical research communities, research opportunities, and 
health needs. 
                                                 
 
 
11 The Ad Hoc Group has affected the NIH funding of biomedical research since 1982. Currently, the 
Ad Hoc Group is comprises about 350 organizations of the American Association of Medical College’s 
medical schools, research universities, professional societies, and other advocacy groups.  
12 According to the IOM (1998), these disease-specific advocacy groups have avoided open 
competition for higher budgets for diseases of their own interest but have sought a higher total NIH 
budget. Through such a strategy, all of the organizations could benefit.  
 19
Members of Congressional Appropriations Subcommittees 
 Three types of congressional committees are important: the Authorizations, 
Appropriations, and Budget Committees in each house. While budgets for NCI, 
NHLBI, NIA, and NIMH are subject to annual “time-and-dollar limits” set by the 
Authorization Committees, nearly half of the NIH funds are unauthorized since 1996. 
Congress has not reauthorized the NIH budget since 1993. Under these circumstances, 
the role played by the Authorization Committees for the NIH budget is not as 
conspicuous as for other discretionary budgets. The guidance about NIH funding is 
provided by the Appropriations Committees in their legislation and report language 
(IOM, 2003). As such, the most critical role is played by the Appropriations 
Committees, especially the Labor, HHS, and Education Subcommittees. 
 The extent to which Congress is specific about NIH priority setting and 
funding has been a key issue in the budget process between Appropriations committee 
members and NIH leadership. Members of Congress tend to think about NIH research 
funding in terms of “a correlation between the research funding by disease and the 
distribution of disease burdens and costs in the population” (IOM, 1998, p. 24). 
Disease-specific interest groups lobby Congress to obtain higher research funds 
targeting the diseases of their interest. Accordingly, members of Congress seek higher 
links between NIH funding and social costs by disease by mandating new programs 
and/or the use of particular funding mechanisms and by earmarking funds for specific 
purposes. The mechanisms most vulnerable to congressional influence are Other 
Research, R&D Contract, and Research Centers.13 In response, the NIH director and 
institute directors have tried to persuade congressional members that congressional 
effort to micromanage NIH programs distorts NIH priority setting with the result of 
lost opportunities for scientific progress (IMO, 1998). 
                                                 
 
 
13 A description of these expenditure mechanisms is provided in the next section.  
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 Congress has consistently increased NIH funding, from $6.7 billion in FFY 
1983 to $37.7 billion in FFY 2005, with an annual rate of 8.7%, doubling the NIH 
budget between 1998 and 2003. The NIH is said to be an agency “captured by 
Congress,”  a “special charge of the legislative branch” (Greenberg, 2001, p. 196) 
since the U.S. President plays only a minor role in increasing NIH budgets. The White 
House usually requests a small increase in the NIH budget, but Congress increases it 
much more.  
 Key congressional members strongly support more NIH funding out of 
personal beliefs about benefits from biomedical research as well as because of 
political advantages. Some of the notable supporters of higher NIH research funding 
are Senators Mark O. Hatfield, Arlen Spector, Connie Mack, and Orrin Hatch and 
Representatives John Porter, Robert Walker, and Henry Waxman. Senators Mack and 
Hatch have been enthusiastic about the NIH because of their personal experiences or 
their family members’ experiences with diseases. Senator Spector supported NIH 
funding mainly because universities in his district in Pennsylvania have been a big 
beneficiary of NIH research grants. These congresspersons have played a critical role 
in times of budgetary uncertainty: for example, Greenberg (2001) argued that Senator 
Hatfield, as chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Representative Porter, 
as chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, jointly thwarted the balanced 
budget amendment by Newt Gingrich, which would have reduced the NIH budget 
(pp. 437–441). 
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Major Expenditure Mechanisms of the NIH14
 The NIH uses multiple fund mechanisms such as RPGs and Intramural 
Research, among others, to support extramural and intramural research. For most 
extramural research grants, individual investigators in universities, medical and dental 
and nursing schools, and nonprofit organizations initiate the process by submitting 
grant applications. Review panels (or study sections)15 in the CSR composed of 
nongovernmental scientists with relevant knowledge in a research area provide the 
first round of peer review (NIH, 2005). The review is based on “the importance of the 
problem or question; the innovation employed in approaching the problem; the 
adequacy of the methodology proposed; the qualifications and experience of the 
investigator; and the scientific environment in which the work will be done” (NIH, 
2005). The national advisory council/board provides the second-level reviews of the 
extramural research applications. 
RPGs 
 To fund all types of medical research from basic life mechanism at the 
molecular level to application of basic knowledge to treatments of human diseases, 
the NIH uses two kinds of grant awards: the most commonly used R01 supports “a 
single project with a principal investigator.” The program project (P01) aims to 
support interdisciplinary projects with many investigators working on “various 
aspects of a specific major research objective or theme” (NIH, 2006a, p. 4). Under the 
RPGs mechanism, the NIH utilizes some specific awards for certain purposes such as 
Method to Extend Research in Time (MERIT) Awards (R37), Academic Research 
Enhancement Award (AREA) (R15), Exploratory/Developmental Grants (R21), and 
Small Grants (R03). RPGs are awarded for an average of four years. In FFY 2005, 
                                                 
 
 
14 This section is largely informed by the descriptions of the mechanisms by NIH (2006a). 
15 Currently there are about 125 study sections. 
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about 30% of extramural RPGs were to support new projects; the remaining 70% was 
for continuing projects. In FFY 2005, RPGs take up about 46.5% of the total NIH 
budgets. 
Intramural Research 
 Through intramural research, the NIH can focus on “specific health problems 
of special concern to a particular institute and basic research that may not target a 
specific disease, but relates to the overall mission of the institute” (NIH, 2005). The 
intramural programs undergo peer review by a Board of Scientific Counselors, which 
provides advice to the institute director. The intramural programs are also subject to 
review by the national advisory councils and sometimes by additional panels of 
nongovernmental experts. Though the research is intramural, the provision of research 
funds is not entirely determined internally. Besides the communication between 
members of Congress and the directors, patient advocacy groups and other interested 
parties can be engaged in the decision-making process through the national advisory 
councils and other NIH advisory committees. As of FFY 2005, 5.4% of total NIH 
expenditures were spent by intramural laboratories. 
Other Expenditure Mechanisms 
 In addition to RPGs and Intramural Research, the NIH uses many other fund 
mechanisms, such as Research Centers, Other Research, Research Training, and 
Research and Development Contracts to support research. Research Centers focus on 
“long-term, multidisciplinary programs of medical research.” Through the Research 
Centers mechanism, the NIH supports “the development of research resources, aimed 
to integrate basic research with applied research and transfer activities, and promote 
research in the areas of clinical applications with an emphasis on intervention” (NIH, 
2006a, p. 5). Characterized by multi-investigators, research centers have been 
increasingly used to encourage collaboration among scientists on a broad-based 
research program of common interests (IOM, 2004). As of FFY 2005, 1,333 Research 
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Centers grants had been awarded; the share of expenditure through this mechanism is 
about 7% of total NIH expenditures.  
 Other Research takes care of issues such as provision of career opportunities 
to scientists with potential, clinical research collaboration among researchers from 
multiple institutions, pilot studies, support of minority biomedical research scientists, 
and the like. As of FFY 2005, more than 13,000 grants had been awarded through this 
mechanism, which consumes about 12.4% of total NIH expenditures.  
 Research Training awards grants to individuals and institutions of medical 
schools and universities to support students at the predoctoral or postdoctoral levels. 
As of FFY 2005, the NIH spent about 2.7% of its total expenditures through the 
research training mechanism, supporting more than 16,000 trainees. R&D Contracts 
are used to utilize “advances in knowledge and technology to search for solutions to 
specific questions” and are usually awarded to nonprofit and commercial 
organizations (NIH, 2006a, p. 8). To solve specific questions, the NIH issues a 
Request for Proposals or an Invitation for Bids stating the work to be done or the 
problem to be solved. In FFY 2005, more than 2,000 contracts were awarded with 
expenditures at about 7.6% of total NIH budgets.  
 The mechanisms of Research Centers, Other Research, and R&D Contracts 
support more directed research and reflect the supporting institute’s mission (IOM, 
1998). Applications for support through these mechanisms are usually solicited by the 
institutes and are reviewed by peer-review committees in the institutes, not in the 
CSR. As such, institute staff can have more influence on the nature of the supported 
research. At the same time, the directness of the supported research often encourages 
Congress to specify its supporting mechanisms in legislation or report language (IOM, 
1998).              
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Composition of Expenditure Mechanisms 
 Why do some institutes utilize RPGs more intensively than others? Why do 
some institutes get less dependent on RPGs through time, expending more budgets 
through R&D Contracts? The “tools approach” literature (Peters, 2000; Salamon, 
2002) asserts that the selection of a tool from the repertoire of a wide range of 
government tools represents a unique profile of politics. In terms of the tool 
dimension of directness,16 which measures “the extent to which the entity authorizing, 
financing, or inaugurating a collective activity is involved in carrying it out” 
(Salamon, 2002, p. 27), intramural research represents a highly direct government 
charge, while support of extramural research invites private researchers to play the 
main role of conducting research. Different in the degree of directness, each tool 
involves its own stakeholders. 
 The many different mechanisms of research support may focus on different 
types of research, and the influences exerted in the decision-making process are also 
different. For the absolute size of an institute’s budget, the private interests, including 
the medical scientific communities and the institute leadership, may have a common 
interest: they want bigger research expenditures. However, while trying to increase 
R&D appropriations, they have to make a decision on the relative distribution of the 
research funds between the intramural and extramural research. For intramural 
research, the interests of the institute directors, whose utility is argued to depend on 
budget size and organizational control, might loom large, as implied by budget-
maximizing (Niskanen, 1971) and bureau-shaping bureaucrats (Dunleavy, 1986, 
1991). On the other hand, private interests and their lobbying activities to the institute 
leadership and bureaucrats and members of Congress would be important in the 
                                                 
 
 
16 Salamon (2002) discusses four dimensions of policy tools: degree of coerciveness, directness, 
automaticity, and visibility. Along the changing role of government in society, the directness 
dimension draws attention from policy students more than the other dimensions do. 
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provision of extramural research funding. If the leadership of an institute prefer 
budgets for their own laboratories to budgets they can ultimately control but that are 
distributed to university researchers, it would be the case that the director of an 
institute would want increased funding for intramural rather than for extramural 
research. The opposite will apply to the private medical research communities. 
However, according to public service and mission motivation perspective (Perry & 
Wise, 1990; Perry, 1996, 2000; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999; Wilson, 1989), this may 
not be the truth. If the directors are driven by public service or mission motivation, 
they may not necessarily pursue higher intramural budgets for themselves but higher 
total research funds regardless of intramural or extramural designation. With such 
motivations, the issue of who performs the research would be irrelevant to public-
service–motivated directors as long as the research contributes to public values. 
 The combination of different support mechanisms could be understood as a 
determination of relative political influences between the leadership of an institute 
and private grant beneficiaries. Theoretically, both the leadership at the institute and 
the private (potential) beneficiaries are assumed to prefer a higher level of total 
research expenditure. On the other hand, whether to spend a specific portion of the 
budget on intramural research or on extramural research is an issue that involves the 
relative resources of the two types of actors. Each may seek influence through 
relevant congressional committees: public officials may have informational 
advantages over the committees, and private beneficiaries can muster or withdraw 
support of members of Congress. Therefore, how the tripartite politics are waged will 
determine the relative allocation of research funds across different expenditure 
mechanisms. Here comes the competition. The intramural labs in principle have to 
compete with nonpublic researchers. Faced with competition from government 
researchers, private researchers and their interest groups may provide exact cost 
information of research to the members of Congress. However, since the leadership of 
an institute and private parties have a common interest in increasing overall NIH 
funding, the incentives for private parties to provide complete cost information to 
 26
members of Congress would be limited. The influence function from these various 
resource bases could be expressed as: 
 
f = f [Experience of Directors, Number of Advisory Boards and their 
Memberships Representing Private Interests, Experience of Members of 
Congress and their Interest Group Affiliations, Institutional Arrangement for 
Budget Process, Controls] 
 
The following chapter provides a theoretical consideration of how these diverse 
factors are churning into the process of budgeting for the NIH expenditures and the 
determination of expenditures through specific mechanisms.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Public R&D and Its Economic Impact 
According to market failure theorists, the government intervenes in the 
economy to correct market failures arising from such factors as imperfect 
competition, public goods problems, externalities, incomplete markets, and 
information failures (Stiglitz, 2000). The market failure rationale “centers on 
questions of externalities or ‘spillover’ effects” (Bozeman, 2000, p.146). As early as 
the end of World War II, Vannevar Bush (1945) recognized the importance of R&D 
in economic welfare and argued for organized public support for R&D activities from 
the experience of the OSRD. Nelson (1959) theoretically addressed the nature of pure 
science as “likely to generate substantial external economies” and argued that for-
profit firms are not likely to perform basic research to a socially desirable level (p. 
302).17 Externalities make it difficult to establish property rights on outputs of basic 
research, causing a typical systematic market failure problem (Dasgupta & David, 
1984). 
That public R&D activities is a way of correcting market failure in private 
R&D is one thing, and how and at what level the government should engage in R&D 
activities are another. The utility of the traditional benefit-cost analysis is severely 
undermined in the determination of public R&D support because of the very nature of 
R&D activities themselves and their problematic relationship to economic impacts. 
Causal relationship between R&D investment and its output and impacts is unclear, in 
part because the process of knowledge production is influenced by factors that are not 
                                                 
 
 
17 On this point, see also Griliches (1960) and Arrow (1962). 
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directly controllable by the government, such as the dynamic interactions of various 
actors (Gibbons et al., 1994; Rogers & Bozeman, 2001; Bozeman & Rogers, 2002; 
Nelson & Nelson, 2002). Moreover, the collective nature of knowledge production is 
so integrated in the utilization of such knowledge that the government cannot a priori 
designate a causal path from research to productivity increase. The process from R&D 
to impacts depends on various factors, such as institutional arrangements for 
technology transfer, entrepreneurship, and market demands. One line of effort to 
explain the role of institutional factors is a diverse array of innovation systems 
approaches. The concepts of innovation systems are trying to capture whatever 
institutional arrangements that would be relevant facilitators of, or obstacles to, 
innovative activities at the regional (Acs, 2000), sectoral (Malerba, 2004), or national 
level (Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992). Lastly, externalities (spillovers) in R&D 
benefits are prevalent,18 and thus the social rate of return diverges from the private 
rate of return. Because of these factors, it takes considerable time for R&D investment 
to yield economic effects: about 7 years between academic publication and citations 
by industrial patents (Gellman, 1976; Mansfield, 1991, 1998), 8 years of time lag 
between scientific publication and citation of the publication by industry patents 
(Branstetter, 2005), and 20 years between publication of research output and its effect 
on industry productivity (Adams, 1990).19  
In spite of these complicating characteristics on the road from R&D to 
economic benefits, a considerable number of economists have tried to examine private 
R&D effects on productivity at the firm (Griliches, 1980, 1986; Cuneo & Mairesse, 
1984; Jaffe, 1988; Mansfield, 1988; Griliches & Mairesse, 1990; Hall & Mairesse, 
1995), industrial (Telecky, 1974, 1980; Griliches & Lichtenberg, 1984; Griliches, 
1994; Jones & Williams, 1998), and national (Nadiri, 1980; Lichtenberg, 1992; Coe & 
                                                 
 
 
18 For a summary of literature on R&D spillover effects, see Audretsch et al. (2002, p. 171). 
19 The time lag appears to have narrowed recently (NSF, 2002, p. 5–44). 
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Helpman, 1995) levels.20 The estimated R&D elasticity of productivity growth ranges 
from 0 to as high as 0.82 (Patel & Soete, 1988). At the same time, a considerable 
number of studies examine the effects of public R&D expenditures on private R&D 
investment. Some intensive empirical efforts have been made to test whether public 
R&D spending crowds out private R&D investment (Lichtenberg, 1987; Robson, 
1993; David et al., 2001).21 Another area of scholarly interest is the effects of R&D 
tax credits, the empirical evidence generated being mixed. Some researchers report 
failures in finding statistically significant evidence that tax credits increase private 
R&D expenditures (Mansfield, 1986; GAO, 1995), but others provide substantial 
positive evidence (Czarnitzski et al., 2005; Russo, 2004; Hall & Reenan, 2000). 
Recently, Wilson (2005) questioned the assumptions of the cost differentials between 
in-state and out-of-state firms from state R&D tax credits and found that “the 
external-cost elasticity is positive and significant, raising concerns as to whether 
having state-level R&D tax credits on top of federal credits is socially desirable” (p. 
1). 
On top of these studies, a substantial portion of studies of government R&D 
policies has centered on institutional arrangements other than levels of R&D 
expenditures; national (Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992) and other innovation systems 
(Acs, 2000; Malerba, 2004), patent laws (Jaffe, 2000; Coriat & Orsi, 2002), 
institutional settings for particular industries (Giesecke, 2000; Lehrer & Asakawa, 
2004), specific program-level activities (Dohse, 2000), and technology transfer from 
government and university labs to industries (Mowery et al., 2001; Di Gregorio & 
Shane, 2003; Siegel et al., 2003; Chapple et al., 2005). 
What is largely missing from this previously mentioned literature is how 
specific actors in the process of the R&D budgeting process impact the expenditure 
                                                 
 
 
20 CBO (2005) summarizes this literature succinctly, focusing on econometric issues.  
21 Findings of these studies are not definitive, as they utilized different models and provide mixed 
results.   
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amount of public R&D programs. What are the relative roles of public officials, 
congressional members, private scientific communities, and interest groups in the 
determination of specific levels and performers of government R&D? If a research 
agency maintains a variety of R&D programs of differing natures, as in the case of the 
NIH, do these different participants in the process care about different types of R&D 
programs? These questions are to be answered in the next section, which discusses 
theoretical discussions of incentives of participating actors and the institutional 
arrangement of the R&D budgeting process.  
Framework for Understanding R&D Expenditures in a Democracy 
This section provides a theoretical basis for understanding the research 
expenditure mechanisms of a government agency that supports R&D performed by 
researchers in different institutional settings. There are largely two types of factors, as 
illustrated in Figure 1: internal and external. Internal factors include leadership styles, 
input mechanisms from external scientific communities and research advocacy 
groups, and organizational characteristics. External factors refer to the political 
environment of the agency, such as political control of the presidency and Congress, 
the ideological orientation of the appropriations committee members, and competition 
from the other agencies. 
Of these diverse sources of influence on the R&D expenditures of an agency, 
this section focuses on mainly three factors. First, the motivations and incentives of 
the leadership of the institutes are critical in determining how much R&D and which 
performers are to be supported. Second,  the mechanisms of input into Congress from 
the public and interest groups are important in determining levels of public R&D 
activities. Third,  the institutions for the budget process provide incentives to the 
participants and structure the way they interact. These are the foci in the subsequent 
subsections.    
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Figure 1. Framework of Determination of NIH Research Expenditures 
 
Public Officials and R&D Expenditures 
Self-Interested Bureaucrats 
 With critical views of the public bureaucracy by Parkinson (1958), Tullock 
(1965), and Downs (1967), public choice theorists have tried to understand public 
officials as bureaucrats who are primarily self-interested. Bureaucratic self-interests 
may be either in the form of bigger total budgets, of bigger discretionary budgets 
(Migué & Bélanger, 1974), or of shaping organizations (Dunleavy, 1986, 1991). The 
idea of the bureaucrat as a “self-interest maximizer” is an assumption about the 
incentive structures of public sector employees enjoying the monopoly status of 
public service provision. The most powerful and frequently cited work in this line of 
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thinking is Niskanen’s (1971) Bureaucracy and Representative Government.22 With 
an assumption of budget-maximizing bureaucrats, Niskanen argued that bureaus over-
supply public service.  
 A critical assumption of the Niskanen model is that the interaction between 
Congress and the bureaus is such that “A bureau offers a promised set of activities 
and the expected output(s) of these activities for a budget” (Niskanen, 1971, p. 25). 
The relationship between the two entities is a “bilateral monopoly,” and the offer by 
the bureau imposes “take-it-or-nothing” choice upon Congress. Bendor (1988) 
characterized this assumption as “authority-based agenda control” rather than 
information-based control (p. 356).  However, Niskanen (1971) made it clear that 
bureaucratic power of negotiation comes from the fact that “a bureaucrat will know a 
great deal more about the factor costs and production process for the bureau’s services 
than will the officers of the sponsor organization” (p. 29). Under this asymmetrical 
advantage over politicians, bureaucrats will try to maximize their utility functions, of 
which salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, and output 
of the bureau are integral parts (p. 38). Niskanen assumes that all of these factors are 
modeled as a monotonic function of positive total budget of the bureau. Therefore, 
bureaucrats, Niskanen argued, are maximizers of their bureau budget.  
 With the criticism by Migué & Bélanger (1974),  the argument was modified 
such that bureaucrats maximize discretionary budget rather than total budget 
(Niskanen, 1975), but the basic thrust of budget-maximizing bureaucrats has not 
changed. However, there have been substantial challenges from empirical testing. 
Some studies have addressed the assumption of budget-maximizing bureaucrats—
with mixed results. Lewis (1990), using nationwide survey data of the general 
population, showed that bureaucrats are “no more likely than the general public to 
                                                 
 
 
22 A cited reference search on the Web of Science data base resulted in about 1,700 citations. Between 
1994 and 2006, Niskanen (1971) was cited 534 times in journals in English, with an annual average of 
44 excluding 2006. 
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favor raising government spending” (p. 221). Dolan (2002) found that the spending 
preferences of the members of Senior Executive Service are below the general public 
on most spending categories. Jacobsen (2006) , using data on 30 Norwegian 
municipalities, compared relative importance between bureaucrats and politicians in 
government growth and found that government growth is attributable more to 
politicians than to bureaucrats. On the other hand, Garand et al. (1991) found that 
government employees are more supportive of increased government spending than 
private employees. Sigelman (1986), elaborating on the job characteristics of 
bureaucrats, reported that there are differences in the preferences for budget 
expansion between bureaucrats with high professional commitment and those with 
managerial or policy development interests: professionally committed bureaucrats are 
likely to seek budget expansion, while those with managerial or policy development 
interests do not necessarily prefer higher budgets. 
 While these studies provide mixed results of the budget preferences of 
bureaucrats, other studies have focused on the bureaucrats’ political power to explain 
ever-increasing size of the public sector. Building upon Niskanen (1971), Tullock 
(1974) and Buchanan & Tullock (1977) attributed the rapid rise in the salaries of 
public employees to their self-interested political power since “the votes of 
bureaucrats would be partially directed toward expanding the size of their agencies 
and partially toward raising their own salaries” (p. 148). Bureaucratic power as 
modeled by Niskanen has been argued to increase the size of government 
(Borcherding et al., 1977; Legrenzi & Milas, 2002). Berry & Lowery (1984) refuted 
this hypothesis, showing that relatively slow productivity growth in the public sector 
(Baumol, 1967) better explains the increase of the public sector than bureaucratic 
power does. Responding to Berry & Lowery’s (1984) argument that price effects 
dominate the effects of bureaucratic power, Ferris and West (1999) furthered the 
theory of bureaucratic power, stating that informational advantage enables 
bureaucrats to capture “government rents” that are newly generated through lower 
welfare costs of tax collection (Kau & Rubin, 1981). Another source of bureaucratic 
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power is unionization, through which bureaucrats play the role of demander as well as 
supplier of public goods/services (Marlow & Orzechowski, 1996). 
 The implication of these studies is that public services are over-supplied or 
supplied inefficiently. Mueller (2003) summarized 71 empirical studies that compared 
public and private sectors in the provision of similar goods and services. In only 5 of 
the 71 studies, public provision was more efficient than private provision.23 But, there 
is also empirical evidence that tells a very different story. Ruttan (1980, 1982), 
reviewing three dozen empirical studies on the effects of agricultural R&D programs, 
found that the annual rate of return on R&D investment ranged between 30% and 
60%, which is, he interpreted, very high compared to the private rate of return. Even 
after factoring in deadweight loss in rising taxes for R&D programs, Yee (1995) 
reported a 43% rate of return on public agricultural R&D investment. The evaluation 
studies on the Advanced Technology Program24 also reported as high as an 80% 
social rate of return (Bingham et al., 1998; Austin & Macauley, 2000; White & 
Gallaher, 2002). These findings could be regarded as indicating an undersupply of 
public R&D programs, which is squarely at odds with Niskanen’s implication. Ruttan 
(1980, 1982) and Yee (1995) made a strong case that Niskanen’s work essentially 
ignores the rich differences across different agencies that provide different services. 
Public Service Motivation and R&D Expenditures 
 The collection by Blais & Dion (1991) revealed that the picture of budget-
maximizing bureaucrats is empirically much richer than it appears at a first glimpse. 
Since bureaucrats may or may not seek a budget-maximizing strategy under the 
circumstances of different benefits and costs, it is difficult to a priori specify such 
                                                 
 
 
23 Wintrobe (1987) pointed out that these empirical studies take no account of institutional differences 
between private markets and political markets. While firms in the private markets are themselves 
entities on their own, bureaus in political markets are “merely parts of a larger organization and 
responsive to demands originating from the whole organization” (p. 446). 
24 The Advanced Technology Program was established by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988 to “support R&D on high-risk, cutting edge technologies with broad commercial and societal 
potential” and provided more than $14.7 billion to more than 6,900 proposals between 1990 and 2004.  
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circumstances (Lynn, 1991), rendering this an empirical question. Moreover, benefits 
to bureaucrats from a larger budget seem to be small (Young, 1991). However, as 
Kiewiet (1991) argues, budget-maximizing bureaucrats are as much an approximation 
as profit-maximizing firms (p. 144), and “there is ample evidence that bureaucrats 
systematically request larger budgets” (Blais and Dion, 1991, p. 355). That said, 
public employees’ motives are not limited to mere self-interests but encompass other 
factors (Wise, 2004; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999; Hill, 1991; Kelman, 1987). Hill 
(1991) argued that the public choice approach to bureaucracy, assuming self-
interested bureaucrats, fails to recognize “the richness of the interaction and the 
diversity of the values pursued” (p. 290) by public officials. 
 However, the extant literature on the behavior of public officials lacks a 
coherent theory of behavioral motivations comparable to the budget-maximizing 
bureaucrats in the public choice school, although there have been some recent efforts 
to build such a theory (Bowling et al., 2004; Wise, 2004; Hill, 1991). Among these 
efforts, Bowling et al. (2004) and Wise (2004) clearly utilized two typologies of 
public employees: Pitkin (1967) and Downs (1967). According to Pitkin (1967)25 and 
Eulau (1962), bureaucrats as well as legislators, representing the public, could be 
viewed as either delegates, trustees, or politicos. A delegate represents constituents, 
pursuing policies that are preferred by those whom he or she identifies in terms of 
social origins or group affiliations. Dolan (2002) contrasts this type of bureaucrats26 
with the self-interested ones assumed by Niskanen (1971) and Downs (1967). On the 
other hand, a trustee, as a free agent, seeks the best interests of the public, and a 
politico combines the role of delegate and trustee depending on the issue being 
addressed. The politico is more flexible and sensitive to conflicting alternatives and 
less dogmatic (Eulau, 1962). Wise (2004) matched these types of bureaucrats to her 
four postures of bureaucracy: Weberian/responsible (delegate), representative (trustee 
                                                 
 
 
25 The current discussion of Pitkin (1967) is largely dependent on Wise (2004). 
26 For empirical studies in this view of bureaucrats, see Dolan (2002, p. 43). 
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or delegate), public service motivation (trustee or politico), and public choice 
(politico). Tracing expansion preferences of state agency heads between 1964 and 
1998, Bowling et al. (2004) developed a typology of expansion preferences27 and 
related them to Downs’s (1967) typology of bureaucrats,28 treating administrative 
preferences (motivations) as antecedents to behaviors in budgetary requests. A 
climber, one of Downs’s purely self-interested officials, is matched with an 
aggrandizer (budget maximizer), and the conserver, another purely self-interested 
type, with an abider. 
 An implication that could be drawn from these empirical as well as theoretical 
studies is that the picture of bureaucratic behavior in budget requests cannot be 
painted by a single brush of self-interested budget maximization (Niskanen, 1971, 
1975). While cited as a prime example of taking the self-interest assumption, Downs 
(1967) actually presented a variety of factors by which bureaucrats might be 
motivated, such as security, personal loyalty, pride in high performance, public 
interests, and commitment to specific programs as well as power, monetary income, 
prestige, and convenience. Although Downs (1967) emphasized the pressures from 
personal goals or from bureaus much more than the pressure of being a representative, 
it might still be the case that commitments to factors other than self-interest have a 
positive association with budget size. This may explain why public officials 
systematically request larger budgets even though they receive no or only minor 
benefits from increased budgets (Blais & Dion, 1991, p. 357).  
                                                 
 
 
27 Depending on their attitudes toward the expansion of their own agencies in terms of programs, 
activities, expenditures and overall state, the agency heads are classified as abiders (minimizers), 
altruists, advocates, and aggrandizers (maximizers) (Bowling et al., 2004). 
28 As purely self-interested officials, climbers regard power, income, and prestige very highly, and 
conservers regard convenience and security highly. There are also mixed-motive officials—“zealots are 
loyal to relatively narrow policies or concepts,” “advocates are loyal to a broader set of functions or to 
a broader organization than zealots,” and “statesmen are loyal to society as a whole, and they desire to 
obtain the power necessary to have a significant influence upon national policies and actions” (Downs, 
1967, p. 88). 
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 Some dimensions of behavioral motivation other than self-interest could be 
public service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999). Pubic 
service motivation (PSM) is defined as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to 
motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions” (Perry, 1996, p. 6) and 
involves affective, normative, and rational dimensions of human needs (Wise, 2004; 
Perry & Wise, 1990). Perry (1996) constructed six dimensions of PSM including 
commitment to the public interest, self-sacrifice, compassion, and attraction to policy-
making .29 Depending on concepts of PSM, individuals could be Samaritans (helping 
others), Communitarians (committed to civic duty and public service), Patriots (caring 
about the good of the public), or Humanitarians (concerned with social justice and 
public service) (Brewer et al., 2000). People with high PSM are more likely to work 
in the public sector (Houston, 2000; Wise, 2000; Crewson, 1997; Perry & Wise, 
1990) since government service provides “the unique vantage point … for making the 
world a better place” (Kelman, 1987, p. 92). Even though empirical evidence on the 
relationship between PSM and organizational performance and productivity is not 
conclusive yet (Alonso & Lewis, 2001; Gabris & Simo, 1995; Naff & Crum, 1999), it 
has been found that PSM is positively related to civic involvement (Brewer, 2003), 
whistle-blowing (Brewer & Selden, 1998), and charitable contributions (Houston, 
2006). 
 The question then becomes how could PSM be incorporated into the objective 
function of bureaucrats or public officials for that matter? In this regard, the attempt 
made by Mueller (1987) to incorporate ethical considerations of voters in their voting 
behavior is useful, where the objective function (Oi) of the voter i is defined as 
follows: 
Oi = Ui + θ i Σ Uj,  
                                                 
 
 
29 Through a confirmatory factor analysis, the dimensions of social justice and civic duty were found to 
be collapsed into commitment to the public interest.  
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where i ≠ j and Ui and Uj refer to the utility functions of the voters i and j, 
respectively. If θ i = 0, the voter i is purely self-interested; if θ i = 1, the voter i is as 
much self-sacrificing as self-interested. As such, rational voters maximize a weighted 
sum of their own utility and that of others (Mueller, 2004).30 This type of objective 
function could be utilized in incorporating the diverse dimensions of the behavioral 
motivation of public officials. In such an application, Ui will be the bureaucratic 
utility function of self-interests and Uj the utility function of individuals of the general 
public or the group the agency serves. Uj may be a positive monotonic function of 
benefits that they get from government expenditures and a negative function of tax 
burden they have to bear to finance public programs. The value of θ i may be different 
according to both individual officials and agencies. Ui and Uj now include as a vector 
the budget size of the individuals’ agency. From the literature discussed previously, it 
is reasonable to assume that Ui is a positive monotonic function of budget size, while 
the total and marginal effect of budget size on Ui may not be as great as assumed by 
Niskanen (1968, 1971, 1975). On the other hand, Uj may or may not be a positive 
monotonic function of budget size. If a larger budget is negatively related with the 
total utility of the public, the program may benefit well-organized small groups at the 
expense of disorganized consumers or the public. 
 This formulation provides an interesting insight into the R&D expenditures of 
different support mechanisms of the NIH. First, even though the causal path from 
R&D investment to economic productivity increase is not clearly explained yet, it is 
widely accepted that the path exists. On top of the competitiveness rationale, a high 
degree of the public nature of R&D, with its non-excludability and spillovers, may 
motivate an institute’s leadership with high PSM to aggressively pursue a higher level 
of R&D programs, activities, and expenditures. In such a case, this will not lead 
automatically to an oversupply of R&D activities as shown by Ruttan (1980, 1982) 
                                                 
 
 
30 Mueller (2004) discussed the objective function operationalized in this way in a more general 
context, labeling it behavioral economics as an alternative to neoclassical economics.   
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and Yee (1995). If coupled with problems of political expression of public demand of 
R&D activities, the institute directors seeking a higher R&D budget may be a case of 
Pareto-improvement. Second, the formulation above indicates that self-interested 
motivation could co-exist with PSM. In such a case, if public officials seek a higher 
budget, it might be because of self-interests, not PSM. The case of the NIH provides 
an opportunity to test the hypothesis of the budgetary effect of PSM in a way that 
controls the effects from self-interestedness because it extensively funds private 
research in addition to conducting R&D with its own in-house laboratories. While 
both the intramural and extramural funding represent a contribution to the public 
interest, public officials with high PSM at the institutes may not discriminate between 
intramural research funds and extramural research funds. 
Risk-Averse and/or Mission-Oriented Bureaucrats and R&D Expenditures 
 Mueller (1989) points out that along with X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966; 
Vanagunas, 1989),31 risk aversion seems to be “the most plausible addition to the list 
of possible bureaucratic goals” (p. 257). Bureaucrats, being risk-averse, may value 
security as highly as larger budgets, leading them to try to boost rather than maximize 
their budgets (Blais & Dion, 1990). If bureaucrats are risk-averse, the marginal utility 
from increasing budgets would be lowered, in which case the oversupply of public 
service may not be as serious as modeled by Niskanen (1971). Risk-averse 
bureaucrats care more about avoiding budget cuts than about getting ample budget 
increases (Blais & Dion, 1991). Moreover, risk aversion may encourage bureaucrats 
to avoid risky and less visible/measurable projects (Gist & Hill, 1981; Lindsay, 1976; 
Mueller, 1989). Leyden and Link (1993) also found that risk-averse bureaucrats prefer 
                                                 
 
 
31 X-inefficiency refers to factors internal to the organization such as quality of workers and 
management that cause suboptimality in production (Vanagunas, 1989). It is argued that inefficiencies 
result from behavioral characteristics in addition to the external market structure, such as a monopoly.    
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cost-plus contracts with private sector firms when they outsource services if the firms 
are also risk-averse. 
 Risk-averse bureaucrats at an institute under the NIH may want to prevent 
budget cuts in tight budget situations. One strategy to avoid large budget cuts would 
be to diversify research support through multiple mechanisms. If expenditures are 
concentrated on one or two mechanisms, the expenditures would be more vulnerable 
to reductions. This implies that bureaucrats at an institute may want to increase 
expenditures outside of the major RPGs mechanism. 
 The nature of research supported through other expenditure mechanisms 
provides another theoretical reason that may prompt bureaucrats to seek higher 
expenditures through Intramural Research, Research Centers, Other Research, and 
R&D Contracts: they address research areas that are closely related to the missions of 
the institutes. The mission of an agency is defined as a single culture “broadly shared 
and warmly endorsed” (Wilson, 1989, p. 109). Mission motivation refers to the 
development/inculcation of missions within an agency. The leader of an agency could 
develop “a sense of mission” among its members through goal setting and other 
symbolic actions (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999, pp. 25–26). While PSM is externally 
oriented vis-à-vis the public agency, mission motivation is in relation to the missions 
of the agency. The identification of the mission by the agency members enhances the 
sense of importance of their jobs (Wright, 2007), encouraging them to pursue 
accomplishing their organizational mission. In examining the self-interest assumption, 
Lynn (1991) and Campbell and Naulls (1991) found that bureaucrats may be 
motivated by missions. If bureaucrats are motivated by missions, they would act in 
line with what the leadership of the agency wants them to do. Thus, institutes at the 
NIH may have incentives to seek R&D activities that are specifically targeted toward 
achieving organizational goals out of mission motivation rather than more broadly 
defined research issues that could be addressed by investigator-initiated research.  
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Political Clout of Institute Directors 
 Although public officials prefer larger budgets, they do not request as much as 
they want because of strategic reasons (Wildavsky, 1964). Most of all, the 
relationship between agency heads and congressional members of appropriations 
subcommittees in the budget process forms “reciprocal expectations that lead to self-
fulfilling prophecies” (Wildavsky & Caiden, 1997, p.50). For example, if the agency 
requests too much and gets a relatively small portion of what it requested, it will lose 
credibility among the appropriations committee members. This is a simple indication 
that the agencies use budget strategies to seek higher budgets. These strategies are 
“the links between the intentions and perceptions of budget officials, and the political 
system that both imposes restraints and creates opportunities for them” (Wildavsky & 
Caiden, 1997, p. 57). Public officials develop budget strategies based on their 
expansion preferences (Bowling et al., 2004) and, as such, different agencies adopt 
different strategies to achieve their respective goals in the budget process 
(Sharkansky, 1968). 
 Wildavsky and Caiden (1997) illustrated basic strategies  for agency officials 
in the budget process, some of which are “Be a Good Politician” and “Building 
Confidence” (pp. 52–67). Being a good politician requires active clientele groups, 
development of confidence among other government officials, and skills in following 
budget strategies. Agency heads may want to use budget structure32 tactics, and it is 
critical to find “tactical opportunities” for budget increase. Identifying tactical 
opportunities is complicated, requiring special skills and technical expertise (Meyers, 
1994). 
                                                 
 
 
32 The budget structure for an individual program has four components: method of accounting, decision 
procedure, policy design, and perceived effects (Meyers, 1994). Expectations for the budget process 
lead to a specific form of budget structure under which agency heads and the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) develop strategies for achieving their relevant goals. 
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 How strongly the agencies seek strategies for budget increase could be 
understood as agency assertiveness. Agency assertiveness might be manifested in 
various aspects of the budget process, including the formulation of annual requests 
(Ryu et al., 2006). The agencies may use innovative promotional devices and 
techniques and be more skillful in seeking greater discretion in spending (LeLoup & 
Moreland, 1978). LeLoup and Moreland (1978) argued that agency assertiveness is a 
function of the agency head’s values, attitudes, and orientation as well as its external 
support and environmental constraints. 
 All of this leads up to the importance of the political clout the agency heads33 
have accumulated as well as the political clout the agency enjoys because of its 
organizational characteristics.34 The political clout of the agency heads comes from 
two sources: confidence from government officials, clientele groups, and members of 
appropriations committees and technical skills and knowledge. Their role in the 
budget process is especially important in terms of their relationships with the OMB 
and the appropriations subcommittees. For example, in the initial process of executive 
budget formulation, the OMB issues guidelines (OMB Circular A-11) to the agency in 
the spring, setting ceilings for the dollar amount and full-time equivalent employees 
of the agency. During the summer, these ceilings are negotiated between the agency 
head and the OMB, which is a testament to the test of the agency head’s political 
clout. Internally, the agency head invents and operates the budget strategies, as has 
been pointed out by Meyers (1994) and Wildavsky and Caiden (1997). For example, 
while serving and expanding the agency’s clientele groups, the agency head can 
promote feedback from these groups and leverage their influence in the budget 
process.   
                                                 
 
 
33 Agency heads are the heads of either departments or agencies, but for the purposes of this study, 
institute directors of the NIH could be treated as such.  
34 Slaughter (1986) uses an agency’s size and age and the campaign contributions of the agency’s 
clientele group to measure its political clout.  
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 However, it requires time, energy, and intuition to develop political clout 
among government officials and appropriations subcommittees since the political 
clout is to be exerted through relationships with other participants in the budget 
process. The interactions in the budget process are typically repeated ones, and the 
best strategy in such circumstances is to gain confidence (Axelrod, 1984). Therefore, 
to push its budget request, the agency first needs to develop trust among the OMB and 
the appropriations subcommittee members. Additionally, to effectively put the budget 
strategies into effect, the agency heads need to acquire technical knowledge and skills 
of the budgetary process and budget structures. These skills include accounting rules, 
government decision procedures, and policy analysis and implementation (Meyers, 
1994). As time goes on, the agency heads develop more political clout and are likely 
to have learned which budgetary strategies are more effective for realizing their 
spending preferences. From these considerations, it is expected that agency heads 
with more political clout will be more successful in obtaining higher budgets than 
those with less political clout. 
 
Based on the behavioral motivations and political clout of public officials, this 
study presents its first set of hypotheses as follows:  
 
• Hypothesis 1: As an institute director’s public service experience (PSE) as 
measured in years increases, the institute’s total expenditures increase. 
• Hypothesis 2.1: If the Niskanen model of self-interested bureaucrats is 
correct, as an institute director’s PSE as measured in years increases, 
intramural research expenditures increase more than RPG expenditures 
do in percentage terms.  
• Hypothesis 2.2: If the model of PSM is correct, as an institute director’s 
PSE as measured in years increases, RPG expenditures increase as much 
as intramural research expenditures do in percentage terms. 
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• Hypothesis 3: As an institute director’s PSE as measured in years 
increases, the institute’s propensity to diversify its expenditures through 
various expenditure mechanisms as measured by a Herfindahl Index 
increases as well. 
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Benefits and Costs of Public R&D Expenditures 
Downs (1957, 1960) predicted that “the government budget is too small in a 
democracy” (p. 541) because of 1) the cost of getting information on what benefits 
and costs government activities involve and of 2) the difference between private and 
public transactions. In private transactions, the quid pro quo relationship provides 
accurate estimation of both costs and benefits, which is not available with public 
transactions. Because information is not costless, a certain level of ignorance is 
inevitable, and there are differences in the levels of information gained on benefits 
and costs of public transactions. While benefits from government actions tend to be 
more remote in terms of either time, space, or comprehensibility, costs involved in 
such benefits may not be equally remote (Downs, 1960). Having said that, party 
competition where political parties try to gain votes by promising more visible and 
immediate benefits would lead to too-small budgets for programs whose potential 
benefits voters are less aware of. Therefore, “a tendency toward elimination from the 
budget of all expenditures that produce hidden benefits” (p. 553) is probable. Downs 
also noticed that if voters see costs more clearly than benefits, the actual budget size 
would be smaller than the “correct” budget. Moreover, benefits from government 
programs are more likely to be uncertain than those from private transactions. Thus, 
the returns from public expenditures are to be discounted more heavily than private 
investments. Uncertainty involved in the calculation of the expected values of the 
benefits makes programs of high uncertainty not attractive to vote-seeking politicians, 
which means that a democracy would have a tendency not to spend a lot of money on 
uncertain programs.  
Downsian discussion of “too-small budgets” fits nicely with the nature of 
governmental R&D expenditures. It typically takes several years or decades for 
government expenditures on basic research to be used in practical applications. The 
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results of basic research utilizations are very difficult to note, which was evidenced by 
the experience of Project Hindsight35 (Sherwin & Isenson, 1967; Greenberg, 1968). It 
has been found that even for private R&D investments to yield visible economic 
outcomes it takes on average seven years (Mansfield, 1991). Furthermore, the 
uncertainty problem is prevalent such that the utilization of research results depends 
on a great number of contingencies: while the production of knowledge is 
increasingly dependent on dynamic interactions of various actors such as the 
knowledge value collectives (Rogers & Bozeman, 2001; Bozeman & Rogers, 2002), 
factors other than the knowledge itself are critical in the utilization and evolution of 
such knowledge (Nelson & Nelson, 2002). In a nutshell, what and how much the 
public will get from R&D programs are highly uncertain. The benefits from public 
R&D expenditures exemplify the characteristics of public transactions discussed by 
Downs. As such, public R&D budgets might be too small compared to their socially 
efficient level. 
Another argument of “too-small budgets” for R&D comes from theories of 
majority voting and log-rolling (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Tullock, 1959, 1970). 
Under the system of majority voting, log-rolling is justified at least in part by the 
consideration that the intensities of preferences would be taken into account. For 
example, a minority voter who opposes a government program very strongly would 
benefit from a transaction with a majority voter who slightly favors the program, 
where the former provides the latter compensation for changing his/her position 
(Tullock, 1959). This transaction would make both voters better off depending on the 
relative intensities of their preferences. Regardless of being positive or negative, vote-
trading involves externalities to the nontraders, and if they are negative and large, 
trading would result in an efficiency loss (Mueller, 1976). If the benefits from a 
                                                 
 
 
35 Project Hindsight was a Department of Defense evaluation study of contributions of scientific 
research to 20 weapon systems, conducted mainly by engineers in 1963. Of the 556 discrete, identified 
contributions to weapon systems, 92% were under the technology category and the remaining 8% were 
for applied research (Greenberg, 1968). Only 0.03% were for basic research.  
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program are highly concentrated on a small group but the costs are borne by the 
general taxpayers, log-rolling would make it possible for the program to be supported. 
This may lead to “overinvestment of resources” (Tullock, 1959, p. 573). Since interest 
groups have every incentive to propagate the merits of a program,36 the costs of 
getting information on such programs of highly concentrated benefits would be much 
lower than those of widely diffused benefits. This problem would look more serious, 
with a higher probability for voters to vote for candidates who support programs of 
narrowly concentrated benefits being than for candidates with more general interests 
(Olson, 1965; Mueller, 1976). This has implications on the level of government 
expenditure (Mueller, 1976): there are over-expenditures on special interest programs 
and under-expenditures on general interests.37, 38 Because of the high externality of 
R&D outputs, politicians may turn away from R&D expenditures, favoring special 
interest programs instead. 
Yet, does public R&D expenditure not serve special interests? The answer is 
not a straightforward one. Lowi (1964) and Meier (1993) designated R&D programs 
as distributive policies along with “most contemporary public land and resource 
policies; rivers and harbors (‘pork-barrel’) programs” (Lowi, 1964, p. 690). Moore 
(1997) accused the R&D expenditures through the Advanced Technology Program 
(ATP) under the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of being 
concerned with “corporate welfare” because its primary beneficiaries are large 
                                                 
 
 
36 Political competitors of the incumbents may have incentives to provide voters with information on 
the influence of special interests on the incumbents (Wittman, 1989, 1995). However, it may not 
necessarily be the case that the competitors are affected by the special interests, as in the case of 
campaign contributions from the American Rifle Associations to both Republican and Democratic 
Parties. 
37 While the implications of the theories of majority voting (and log-rolling) apply to both special 
interest programs and programs of general interest, public choice theorists tend to focus only on 
legislative voting with regard to special interests, ignoring cases of voting based on public interests 
(Orchard & Stretton, 1997). 
38 Applying Downs’s economic theory of democracy, Mayhew (1974), assuming politicians’ prime 
objective is reelection, argued that incentives for “credit-claiming” and “position-taking” force them to 
pursue particularized benefits (programs) and turn away from programs bereft of such benefits.   
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companies.39 The same is true of the federal R&D tax credits, where the main 
beneficiaries are high-tech companies and large manufacturing firms (OTA, 1995), 
since they undertake most of the private research activities. As for federal support of 
university research, during FFY1971–2000, “the research, doctorate-granting, and 
medical institutions” received more than 90% of federal R&D funds for university 
research (NSF, 2003, p. 15), with the funds concentrated in the top prestigious 
universities. These considerations indicate R&D expenditures do serve special 
interests, revealing that R&D expenditures are themselves an area of politics among 
interested parties, members of Congress, and the bureaucrats.  
It seems that government spending on R&D has generated a number of 
interested groups among the beneficiaries. While outputs from NIH-funded research 
have the nature of spillovers, it is also true that the NIH commands quite well-
developed interest parties in medical schools, universities, and patient groups. These 
groups have every incentive to push for increasing NIH budgets. The biomedical 
research community and health and disease-related advocacy groups are an ever-
growing presence in the NIH budget process (Strickland, 1972; IOM, 1998). One of 
the most prominent examples is the Ad Hoc Group for Medical Research Funding. 
The Ad Hoc Group has developed a close working relationship with members of 
Congress and NIH bureaucrats. If the presidential request of an NIH budget is not 
satisfactory to the Group, it initiates an intensive lobbying campaign for higher 
medical research funding, even directly criticizing the President (Greenberg, 2001). 
Moreover, each institute is required to establish and maintain a national advisory 
council/board to seek inputs from those interested groups. In addition, each institute 
has the discretion to establish multiple types of committees, boards, groups, and 
panels to get advice from the biomedical research communities and from the general 
                                                 
 
 
39 Corporate welfare is defined by Moore (1997) as “the use of government authority to confer 
privileged or targeted benefits to specific firms or specific industries” with an obvious adjudication that 
in this case the ATP is a special interest program. 
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public who are attentive to health issues. Some of them are to advise the institute 
directors, while others provide inputs for specific research programs. 
 
Drawing upon the discussion above, the following set of hypotheses aims to 
take into account that the influences of private interested parties may be different 
across different types of institutes and between RPGs and intramural expenditures.  
• Hypothesis 4: Research expenditures of specific disease-focused institutes 
are greater than those of their general science-focused counterparts. 
• Hypothesis 5: As the participation of private interested parties in the 
priority setting process increases as measured by either an institute’s 
number of advisory boards or board members, the institute’s total 
expenditures increase as well. 
• Hypothesis 5.1: As the participation of private interested parties in the 
priority-setting process increases as measured by either an institute’s 
number of advisory boards or board members, RPG expenditures increase 
more than intramural research expenditures in percentage terms. 
• Hypothesis 5.2: As the participation of private interested parties in the 
priority-setting process as measured by either an institute’s number of 
advisory boards or board members increases, research expenditures of 
specific disease-focused institutes increase more than their general 
science-focused counterparts in percentage terms. 
• Hypothesis 6: If the congressional members of the appropriations 
subcommittees with jurisdiction over the NIH are ideologically more 
favorable to special interest groups as measured by either the median vote 
ratings of the Chamber of Commerce and the National Taxpayers Union 
or their median years of congressional service, an institute’s RPG 
 50
expenditures increase more than intramural research expenditures in 
percentage terms. 
• Hypothesis 6.1: If the congressional members of the appropriations 
subcommittees with jurisdiction over the NIH are ideologically more 
favorable to special interest groups as measured by either the median vote 
ratings of the Chamber of Commerce and the National Taxpayers Union 
or their median years of congressional service, research expenditures of 
specific disease-focused institutes increase more than their general 
science-focused counterparts in percentage terms. 
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Appropriations Bills Structure and NIH Research Expenditures 
 The U.S. budgeting process for R&D activities is characterized as 
decentralized and complex. Without a centralized body for the coordination of 
authorization and appropriation of R&D programs, disjointed interactions among 
relevant congressional committees and executive departments/agencies are prevalent 
in the R&D budgeting process. In the House, jurisdiction over R&D-related 
legislation is dispersed across several committees, with no matching alignment in the 
Senate. While funds for government programs are appropriated currently by 12 
appropriations bills, funding for R&D faces a double-edged competition: it is 
addressed in each of the appropriations bills, and R&D programs compete with other 
R&D programs as well as non-R&D programs. There could be two types of 
competition under the current appropriations bills structure with the possibility of 
omnibus legislation. At the agency (department) level, R&D budgets have to compete 
with non-R&D budgets. This affects all of the agencies in one way or another. 
Additionally, there is interagency competition. R&D programs of civilian purposes 
have to compete with R&D programs in the other departments/agencies as well as 
defense R&D. In addition to these competitive factors, there is a further complicating 
factor of the R&D appropriations process: while the Senate and House Appropriations 
Bills for Defense and Energy departments usually pass the Congress free-standing, the 
other appropriations bills are frequently grouped together into one or more omnibus 
appropriations bills. Therefore, R&D funds that are appropriated by appropriations 
bills other than the bills of Defense and Energy and Water Development are more 
vulnerable to competition among research-supporting agencies under the same 
appropriations bill. The current structure of the appropriations bills requires the NIH 
research funding to compete with research activities by the Departments of Labor and 
Education and by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention of the HHS as well 
as non-research activities by these Departments. 
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 Against this background, this study considers the effect of the institutional 
arrangements of the appropriations process on NIH expenditures. The institutional 
arrangements include the frequent use of omnibus appropriations and the 
jurisdictional structure of the appropriations committees. An omnibus bill is 
“legislation that is hundreds or thousands of pages in length and which encompasses 
disparate policy topics” (Davidson & Oleszek, 2004, p. 190). In the same vein, 
Sinclair (1997) defined omnibus legislation as “legislation that addresses numerous 
and not necessarily related subjects, issues, and programs, and therefore is usually 
highly complex and long” (p. 64). Krutz (2000) uses a more operational definition: 
“any piece of major legislation that: (1) spans three or more major topic policy areas 
OR ten or more subtopic policy areas, AND (2) is greater than the mean plus one 
standard deviation of major bills in size” (p. 539). Omnibus bills have been a 
conspicuous phenomenon since the 1980s, during which fiscal deficits posed to 
Congress the difficult challenges of approving budgets within time constraints 
(Oleszek, 2001). The telltale example would be the experience of FFY 1986 and FFY 
1987, when all of the appropriations bills could not pass Congress and thus 
appropriations were put together into continuing resolutions. Given the theoretical 
interest this study has in the budgeting process, these omnibus continuing resolutions 
are not regarded as omnibus appropriations bills. It was not until 1996 that the 
appropriations bills for the new fiscal year were packaged into omnibus bills.40 
Appropriations bills covering the NIH have been put together with other bills eight 
times between 1996 and 2005. With the advent of bundling together several new 
                                                 
 
 
40 There is one exception: the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950, which was a one-time experiment. 
At that time, proponents argued that the Omnibus Appropriation Act would provide an opportunity to 
evaluate appropriations “by relative merits, importance, or cost in view of the whole fiscal situation” 
and allow for “greater care and attention in the appropriations process, discovery of conflicts and 
duplication, prevention of riders and logrolling, discouragement of deficit spending, completion of 
regular appropriations before the end of the fiscal year, and achievement of substantial economics as a 
result of these factors” (Nelson, 1953, pp. 276–77). There were objections, including fears that there 
would be a delay in appropriations, haste approval of a bill without adequate consideration, logrolling 
and weakening of congressional control over appropriations, and undermining presidential veto power.  
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appropriations bills since 1996, there may now be the expectation that each of the 
appropriations bills would be rolled into a mega-bill. This could pose a change in the 
incentive structures of members of Congress. 
 While understood as “an agenda-control and coalition-building tool” (Krutz, 
2000, p. 533), the omnibus bill has many reasons for its ascendancy in the latter half 
of the twentieth century. Simply incorporating several bills into one mega-bill can 
improve the chances of all of the bills being enacted into law. According to Krutz 
(2001), omnibus legislation changes the traditional legislative process, fast-tracking 
the mega-bill “through committees with less consideration than typical bills” (p. 210). 
These mega-bills also provide an alternative for policy entrepreneurs who push 
legislation, and omnibus bills may be strategically pursued to get through the 
labyrinth legislative process. Members of Congress may find political shelters in the 
omnibus bills since omnibus bills can relieve them of the burden of casting difficult 
votes (Davidson & Oleszek, 2004). By highlighting one part of the omnibus bill, 
political leaders can divert the attention of constituents from another part of the bill 
(Krutz, 2000). 
 Empirical research on omnibus bills has centered on the productivity of law-
making and on who benefits from such omnibus bills (Baumgartner et al., 1997; 
Krutz, 2000, 2001). Krutz (2000) examined the relationship between omnibus 
legislation and productivity of legislation, reporting a positive influence on legislative 
productivity. Krutz (2001) tried to answer the question of why leaders attach some 
bills but not others to an omnibus bill in terms of the relationships both between 
leaders and members and between Congress and the President. The finding was that 
“party leader and member incentives41 for omnibus use also significantly increase the 
chances that a bill will be attached to an omnibus package” (p. 218). 
                                                 
 
 
41 The incentives are party-agenda items and distributive measures. 
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 Krutz’s argument is compelling, but it lacks attention to the possibility that the 
content of each of the bills packaged into an omnibus bill could be changed from what 
was originally intended by the bill' sponsors. Theoretical interest in such a possibility 
is due to the consideration that the practice of omnibus legislation poses a change in 
the operation of the congressional standing committee system. According to the 
institutional formal theorists of rational choice, the standing committees monopolize 
jurisdictions through a system of property rights42 (Jenkins, 1998). Shepsle (1986) 
posits that the choice set X is “partitioned into what may be called jurisdictions over 
which property rights are assigned to organizational subunits” (p. 55). As such, a 
committee is a provider of proposals with monopoly power over its jurisdiction. In 
exchange for the monopoly on the legislative proposals of the areas that are most 
important to them, the committee members trade off influences in many other policy 
areas (Weingast, 1979; Shepsle, 1986). Decentralization and monitoring of the 
behavior of the committees comes with this arrangement.43
 The practice of rolling several appropriations bills into one mega-bill could 
change the incentive structure of members of Congress with the effect that, depending 
on their respective preferences over the combination of R&D and non-R&D funding, 
they have higher incentives to seek funding for their preferred programs. This would 
move the budget outcomes to the ones that are most preferred by only the dominating 
coalitions among legislators. If the members of the House Subcommittee on Labor, 
HHS, and Education, whose jurisdiction covers the NIH and the CDC, expect that the 
appropriations bills are to be packaged into an omnibus appropriations bill and if they 
are committed to increasing appropriations for these agencies, they may pursue more 
aggressively a higher level of funding for these agencies. However, in such a case, 
                                                 
 
 
42 For a political theory of the origin of property rights, see Riker & Sened (1991). 
43 Based on the understanding of the committee system as a property rights system, Jenkins (1998) 
examined the change in the House of Representatives from a system of channeling a majority of 
legislation through select committees to a system of standing committees in terms of establishment of 
property rights. 
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members of the subcommittees are more likely to pursue further funding of more 
preferred programs at the expense of less preferred ones. This is because if the bill is 
not able to pass Congress free-standing they expect it will pass packaged into an 
omnibus bill. On the other hand, if the subcommittee members care more about non-
R&D programs, the practice of omnibus legislation would militate against funding for 
these agencies. This reasoning is in line with Krutz (2001), who argued that ordinary 
members of Congress benefit from omnibus legislation in terms of distributive 
programs. 
 Considering that the NIH has enjoyed support from a wide range of 
congresspersons, including key members such as Senators Hatfield, Spector, Mack, 
and Hatch and Representatives Porter, Walker, and Waxman, this study hypothesizes 
that due to omnibus legislation, the institutes under the NIH have succeeded in 
securing higher budgets. Furthermore, it is expected that specific patient and 
advocacy groups seek even higher budgets by lobbying congressional leaders and key 
actors in the appropriations subcommittees. Thus, the expenditures of disease-focused 
institutes may have increased more than their non-disease counterparts. On the other 
hand, omnibus legislation may provide different incentives to institute directors: they 
may find an opportunity to increase their institute budget more than without omnibus 
legislation. In such a case, there might be a change in the effect of the director’s PSE 
on the institute’s total expenditures in a way that strengthens the importance of the 
institute directors in the budget process. 
• Hypothesis 7: With the practice of omnibus legislation, an institute’s total 
expenditures are greater after 1997 than before 1997. 
•  Hypothesis 8: With the practice of omnibus legislation, disease-focused 
institutes’ total expenditures have increased more than those of other 
institutes. 
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• Hypothesis 9: With the practice of omnibus legislation, as an institute 
director’s public service experience as measured in years increases, the 
institute’s total expenditures increase more rapidly than without omnibus 
legislation.  
 All of the hypotheses developed above have different foci. Some of them 
address the relationships between specific characteristics of actors and total institute 
expenditures, and others examine the actors’ relative influence on different fund 
mechanisms. Some hypotheses are concerned with institutional procedures and their 
budgetary impacts. The diversity of the hypotheses indicates the diverse influences at 
work in the complex process of budgeting for the institutes. As such, the testing of 
these hypotheses  requires a sophisticated research design, which is the topic of the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Measures of Key Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 This study uses two types of dependent variables, as describe in Table 3. The 
first type is log of total expenditures and those through the mechanisms of RPGs and 
Intramural Research. Because the expenditure amount can be as much as $4.8 billion 
for an institute, it is better to see the effects of independent variables not in dollars but 
in percentage terms. The second type of dependent variable is calculated from 
expenditure amounts through different sources. To examine the hypothesized 
differential effects of the independent variables between RPGs and Intramural 
Research, the percentage of Intramural Research in the sum of the expenditures on 
these two funding mechanisms is used. This study focuses only on the RPG and 
Intramural Research expenditure mechanisms. As described in Chapter 2, there are 
other expenditure mechanisms such as Research Centers, Other Research, Research 
Training, and R&D Contracts, on which both the institute leadership and the scientific 
communities have significant influence. Therefore, these are not good candidates to 
test different motivations of the institute leadership.  
 To examine the bureaucratic risk aversion and mission motivation hypotheses, 
a Herfindahl index44 of concentration of expenditures through different mechanisms45 
                                                 
 
 
44 The Herfindahl index is a measure of market competition, calculated as the sum of squares of the 
market shares of each component firms in a market defined by substitutability. Thus, it ranges between 
0 and 1. Being closer to 0 indicates that there are numerous small firms without pricing power. The 
Herfindahl index has achieved an unusual popularity because of its usability in a wide range of 
contexts (Rhoades, 1993) other than market concentration, such as party fragmentation and political 
strength (Borge & RattsØ, 2002), interest system diversity (Gray & Lowery, 1993, 2001; Lowery & 
Gray, 1998), congressional committee jurisdiction concentration (Hardin, 1998), concentration of a 
 58
was created. In calculating the Herfindahl index, all of the NIH expenditure 
mechanisms are utilized. If the index is closer to 0, it means that the institute 
diversifies its expenditures through multiple support mechanisms. 
Table 3. Dependent Variable Descriptions and Data Sources 
Variable Description Source 
lninstitotal 
lnpiinitiated 
 
lnintramural 
 
Log of an institute’s total expenditures in year i 
Log of expenditures through private PI-initiated RPGs in 
year i 
Log of expenditures on research by intramural laboratories 
in year i 
intraprop 
 
herfindahl 
The percent of Intramural Research in the sum of 
intramural and RPG expenditures in year i 
Herfindahl index of these different mechanisms in year i  
Office of 
Budget, NIH 
 
 
Key Independent Variables 
 The institute director’s PSE measured in years is used as a proxy of how 
much the director has absorbed the prevalent values of the institute and of how much 
political clout the institute director has developed. There are two components to this 
variable: PSE before being appointed as an institute director and PSE experience 
thereafter. The rationale of using this indicator comes from the theories of 
organizational socialization. While socialization is a process of one’s assimilation 
with the norms and values of a society, organizational socialization involves the 
process of acquiring the knowledge, skills, and values that are necessary to assume a 
role in the organization (Van Maanen & Schein, 1979), through which a newcomer 
adapts to be an integrated and effective insider (Cooper-Thomas & Anderson, 2006). 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
firm’s patenting across nations (Ahuja, 2000), and concentration of health-care bond issuers 
(Gershberg et al., 2000).  
45 To calculate the Herfindahl index of expenditures, this study uses the expenditure mechanisms of 
RPGs, Intramural Research, Research Center, Research and Development Contracts, Other Research, 
Research Training, Research Management and Support, Cancer Control, and Construction. 
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The domains of organizational socialization (performance proficiency, politics, 
language, people, organizational goals/values, and organizational history) (Chao et al., 
1994) indicate that through organizational socialization, the values, norms, and goals 
of the organization are transmitted to the newcomer (Fogarty & Dirsmith, 2001). 
 If the prevalent value of the institute is self-interest maximization via seeking 
bigger budgets (Niskanen, 1971), the longer the director works in the public sector the 
more likely he/she identifies his/herself with the values, norms, and politics of budget 
maximization. On the other hand, if the institute is brimming with PSM, the long-
served directors are likely committed to public values and public interests. Either way, 
as time goes on, the directors are expected to absorb practical knowledge for leading 
the institutes and steering through the complex and treacherous budget process. Such 
knowledge should help them get whatever they seek as institute directors. To allow 
for the possibility of a nonlinear relationship with years of the institute director’s PSE 
and the expenditure levels of specific mechanisms, a squared term was created. The 
possibility is such that the effect of the  director’s PSE on expenditure levels is 
increasingly stronger or weaker.   
 Numbers of advisory boards and their memberships are used as proxies of the 
influence of the private biomedical research community and advocacy groups.46 Each 
institute has four distinct types of advisory committees: integrated/initial review 
groups and special emphasis panels, which provide preliminary peer review of 
research grant applications; national advisory councils and boards, which conduct the 
second-level peer review as well as oversee intramural research; boards of scientific 
advisors, which review and evaluate research and programs of intramural laboratories; 
and program advisory committees for specific advice for research programs (IOM, 
2003). The influence of each type of committee on funding outcomes should not be 
                                                 
 
 
46 There may be an alternative proxy of interest group influence on the priority-setting process. In the 
initial stage of data collection for this study, information about organizations of health advocacy and 
medical research was collected. But it is truly difficult, if not impossible, to relate each organization to 
a specific institute.  
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equal, but without any consistent weighting scheme, each of the advisory committees 
is treated as equally affecting the decisions of research fund allocations; so is the 
number of their members. As in the director’s PSE, a squared term of the number of 
advisory boards was created. This squared term allows for the possibility that with 
more advisory boards the budgetary decision-making process may undergo either a 
type of nondecision-making or X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966). That is, as the 
number of advisory boards increases, it could be more difficult to decide on specific 
issues because of increased opinions and veto points. Alternatively, the marginal 
effect of increasing the number of advisory boards might be a function of a positive 
slope, indicating that the effect of one additional board may be bigger when the 
advisory boards are many than when there are only a few.  
 There was a break in the number of advisory boards both at the institute and 
the agency level, as indicated by Figures 2–5. figures 2 and 3 describe the ups and 
downs of advisory boards at the NCI and the NHLBI, both of which indicate a drastic 
change during the first half of the 1990s. After the change, the number of advisory 
boards remained stable through to 2005. Figures 4 and 5 show the trends of the 
advisory boards and their members at the agency level. Before 1994, both the 
numbers of advisory boards and their members rapidly increased. However, during 
1993 and 1994 there was a drastic reorganization of advisory boards and their 
membership. Since 1994, the numbers of both advisory boards and their membership 
have remained flat. 
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      Figure 3. Number of Advisory Boards for the Leadership of NHLBI 
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      Figure 4. Number of Advisory Boards for NIH Agency Leadership 
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   Figure 5. Members of Advisory Boards for NIH Agency Leadership 
 
The single most important reason driving such a drastic termination of 
advisory boards was Executive Order 12838 of February 10, 1999. In EO 12838, 
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President Clinton ordered each executive department and agency to “terminate not 
less than one-third of the advisory committees subject to Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (and not required by statute) that are sponsored by the department or agency by 
no later than the end of fiscal year 1993” (p. 1). This order also prohibits creation of 
an advisory committee unless the agency head finds it necessary to establish such a 
committee and receives approval from the Office of Management and Budget. 
Because of to this order, nonstatutory advisory committees such as peer review 
groups and program advisory boards were terminated between 1993 and 1994. This 
point was confirmed by personal communication with a NIH historian:   
The NIH response to Executive Order 93-10, Termination of Federal Advisory 
Committees, primarily involved peer review groups and program advisory 
bodies, with the single exception of the Advisory Committee to the NIH 
Director. I scanned the minutes and agendas of this body and found a 
disposition to press for expanded authority for NIH in 1992 to appoint public 
sector representatives to all 31 NIH advisory committees, but this was not 
adopted in the subsequent annual meetings. 
 
The medians of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (CC) and the National 
Taxpayer Union (NTU) voting scores of the NIH-related appropriations 
subcommittees members are used to measure how the subcommittee members’ policy 
preferences represent the extent of subcommittee members’ affiliation to special 
interest groups. In the literature, these measures are essentially measures of political 
ideology in the liberal/conservative continuum (Poole, 1981). The measures are used 
in this way because the CC and NTU ratings measure how much the members of 
Congress vote either in a pro-business way (CC) or in a manner that saves tax dollars. 
The difference between these ratings is that the CC vote ratings focus on economic 
matters whereas the NTU ratings track votes on bills with high price tags. However, a 
high CC voting score may indicate that a voter is more connected to well-organized 
private interests. On the other hand, the NTU rating refers to the spending preferences 
of the lawmakers, which may in turn indicate how they care about the general interest 
of taxpayers. These two ratings are not necessarily negatively associated: a pro-
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business congressman could also vote in favor of taxpayers. For example, the median 
CC rating of the House Appropriations Subcommittee with jurisdiction over the NIH 
is strongly correlated with the median NTU ratings (r=.833) in the dataset used in this 
study, as shown in Table 4. 
These ratings are used in various contexts, as surrogate measures for partisan 
and ideological effects (CC) (Bailey & Brady, 1998) and as spending preferences or 
preferences for deficit reduction (NTU) (Binder et al., 1999; Payne, 1991). In spite of 
their high acceptance as a proxy of ideology (Fowler, 1982; Poole, 1981), the interest 
group ratings have also been criticized as being biased (Fowler, 1982), shifting, and 
stretching. This is because these groups have to use different sets of votes to construct 
their ratings every year and because the underlying rating scales are different across 
chambers and time (Groseclose et al., 1999, p. 33). 
 
Table 4. Correlation among Vote Ratings and Years of Congressional Service 
        Senate                     House                Senate       House 
 
 CC           NTU         CC          NTU        Years         Years 
Senate CC    
Senate NTU   
House CC 
House NTU 
Senate Years 
House Years 
1.0000 
0.2462     1.0000 
0.8496     0.2445      1.0000 
0.7240     0.4362      0.8330     1.0000 
0.4270     0.1793      0.4179     0.4003      1.0000 
-0.6370    -0.3323     -0.7755    -0.7289    -0.0337    1.0000 
 
 
The median of years of congressional service of the NIH-related 
appropriations subcommittees members is also used as a proxy of how much the 
members represent special interests with regards to NIH-funded medical research. 
One pivotal argument for using years of congressional experience as a proxy of 
special interest affiliation is that as time goes on, members of Congress will nurture 
closer relationships with interest groups in their jurisdiction. It is a well-established 
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argument that the policy process of the U.S. federal government is dominated by 
relationships among congressional committee members, administrators (bureaucrats), 
and interested parties (Griffith, 1939; Hamm, 1983), regardless of how they are 
termed: iron triangle, issue network (Heclo, 1978), or advocacy coalition (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Under the subsystems of these three main actors, the influence 
of a congressional committee member vis-à-vis bureaucrats or other committee 
members tends to increase when he or she gets support from the interest groups or the 
public involved in the process (Freeman, 1955; Schattschneider, 1960). Moreover, 
with reelection in mind (Mayhew, 1974), congresspersons have more reasons to 
develop close relationships with interest groups within their jurisdictions. Because of 
their shorter election cycle, this tendency is expected to be greater for the 
Representatives than the Senators. Therefore, the more experienced congresspersons 
tend to develop more stable relationships with interest groups in the policy subsystem. 
Correlation coefficients between the CC and NTU ratings in and median years 
of congressional experience in Table 4 show that congressional service experience of 
the House Appropriations Subcommittee members is consistently negatively 
associated with CC and NTU ratings. On the other hand, years in Congress of the 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee members is positively associated with CC and 
NTU ratings. As an indicator of special interest affiliation, years of senatorial service 
of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee members does not work well with the 
concept. Rather, as congressional service years increase, Senators appear to care more 
about public interest. This may be because their election cycle is longer than their 
House counterparts. These points will be considered in the interpretation of the 
results. 
Omnibus is a dummy variable capturing new appropriations practice. It is 
coded as 1 for years between 1997 and 2005. While each of the institutes under the 
NIH focuses on particular medical research areas, about half of them are organized in 
the line of a specific disease around which patient and advocacy groups are well-
developed. To examine the differences between these two types of institutes, this 
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study incorporates a dummy variable, diseaseinst, coded as 1 for the institutes of NCI, 
NIA, NIAAA, NIAID, NIAMS, NIDCD, NIDDK, NIDA, NIMH, and NINDS. To 
examine whether these two dummy variables make a difference in the effect of the 
other independent variables, a series of interaction terms were created. A list of 
independent variables, control variables and their sources, and descriptive summaries 
are provided in the tables 5-7. 
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Table 5. Independent Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Description Data Source 
director 
directsq 
Institute director’s PSE measured in years–Squared 
term of director 
NIH Almanac 
1983–2005 
advboards 
 
advboardsq 
advmember 
 
Number of advisory boards/councils/committees of an 
institute  
Squared term of advboards 
Number of members of advisory 
boards/councils/committees of an institute 
Encyclopedia of 
Government 
Advisory 
Organizations 
1983-2005 
nihdirector 
nihdirectsq 
NIH director’s PSE measured in years 
Squared term of nihdirector 
NIH Almanac 
1983–2005 
nihadvboards 
 
nihadvboardsq 
nihadvmember 
 
Number of advisory boards/councils/committees at 
the agency level 
Squared term of nihadvboards 
Number of members of advisory 
boards/councils/committees at the agency level 
Encyclopedia of 
Government 
Advisory 
Organizations 
1983–2005 
ssubccus 
 
 
hsubccus 
 
 
Median voting scores by the CC of the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee members with 
jurisdiction of NIH 
Median voting scores by the CC of the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee members with 
jurisdiction of NIH 
ssubntu 
 
 
hsubntu 
 
 
Median voting scores by the NTU of the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee members with 
jurisdiction of NIH 
Median voting scores by the NTU of the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee members with 
jurisdiction of NIH 
ssubyos 
 
 
hsubyos 
 
 
Median years of congressional experience of the 
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee members 
with jurisdiction of NIH 
Median years of congressional experience of the 
House Appropriations Subcommittee members 
with jurisdiction of NIH 
Sharp (2006) 
president 
 
 
republican 
divided 
 
democrat 
omnibus 
 
 
diseaseinst 
 
 
 
dis*** 
***omni 
Republic control of the Presidency coded as 1 and 
Democratic control as 0 
Political control of the Congress:  
Republican control of both houses of Congress 
Mixed control of Congress between Democrats 
and Republicans 
Democratic control of both houses of Congress 
Dummy variable capturing a change in appropriations 
legislation: years between 1997 and 2005 coded 
as 1 and the others as 0  
Institutions focusing on specific diseases: NCI, NIA, 
NIAAA, NIAID, NIAMS, NIDCD, NIDDK, 
NIDA, NIMH, and NINDS coded as 1 and others 
as 0 
Interaction between diseaseinst and other variables 
Interaction between omnibus and other variables 
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Table 6. Control Variables and Their Descriptions 
Variable Description 
lninstitotal_1 
lnpiinitiated_1 
lnintramural_1 
intraprop_1 
lnpiinitiatednet 
 
lnintramuralnet 
 
One year lagged variable of lninstitotal 
One year lagged variable of lnpiinitiated 
One year lagged variable of lnintramural 
One year lagged variable of intraprop 
Total institute expenditures net of expenditures on PI-initiated 
RPGs 
Total institute expenditures net of expenditures on Intramural 
Research 
 
 
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
Variable Mean        Std. Dev.      Min       Max 
Director’s PSE 
Number of Advisory Boards 
Number  of Advisory Board Members 
NIH Director’s PSE 
Number of NIH Advisory Boards 
Number of NIH Advisory Board Members 
CC Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
CC Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of House Appr. Subcomm. 
17.07817       11.28461          1              51 
5.669192       3.948294          1              25 
417.553         444.1179          12            1758 
5.826087       3.034698          1             11 
71.21739       21.58481          49           111 
14537.57       1927.104         11710     16439 
55.8913         14.44641         33            84 
38.91304       10.77492         20            65 
19.73913       2.153788         14            24 
55.36957       27.22434         13            94 
37.93478       17.14196         17            80.5 
12.82609       4.233922         7              20 
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Data and Sources 
The datasets used for the dependent variables are from the Office of Budget of 
the NIH and are available on its website. The dataset breaks down an institute’s 
expenditures between FFY 1983 and FFY 2005 into multiple mechanisms of RPGs, 
Intramural Research, Research Centers, Other Research, Research Training, and R&D 
Contracts, as enumerated in Chapter 2. Since some institutes were established in this 
study period,47 the dataset is an unbalanced time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) 
dataset. The data-set does not provide any information on what type of research is 
supported in terms of specific disease types or basic versus applied research. On the 
other hand, it does give an idea of who are the main beneficiaries of the support and 
how the expenditure mechanisms are managed. For example, R&D Contracts are used 
to seek research agendas specific to an institute, with the initiative of the institute’s 
leadership to seek applications from commercial firms and nonprofit institutions. 
Thus, they are the main beneficiaries of this mechanism. The opposite is applied to 
the principal investigator-initiated RPGs, whose main recipients are scientists in 
medical schools and universities. 
Data on the independent variables were obtained from various sources, 
including the NIH Almanac 1983–2005 for the institute directors, the Encyclopedia of 
Government Advisory Organizations 1983–2005, and the Directory of Congressional 
Voting Scores and Interest Group Ratings (4th edition, 2006). Information on 
appropriation subcommittee members was obtained from the Congressional 
Directory. 
                                                 
 
 
47 Four institutes were established in this study period: National Human Genome Research Institute 
(NHGRI, 1989), National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Disease (NIAMS, 1986), 
National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders (NIDCD, 1988), and National 
Institute of Biomedical Imaging and Bioengineering (NIBIB, 2000).  
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Model Specifications 
 This study uses a TSCS dataset with observations of the 18 institutes 
established prior to 2000.48 Observations per institute are between 11 and 18, and the 
total number of observations is between 359 and 366, depending on the specification 
of models. Relying on Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression would be problematic 
because of its temporal and spatial properties (Beck & Katz, 1995): the typically 
observed phenomena of panel heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and 
serial correlation. In such a case, even if the estimates of the coefficients of the 
independent variables are consistent, the hypothesis tests might be misleading because 
of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. To solve these issues, Beck & 
Katz (1996) advise using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) while 
controlling temporal dynamics of serial correlation. While using OLS with PCSEs 
with panel-common first-order autocorrelation structure, the models specified in this 
study will include lagged dependent variables, which is a typical method of removing 
serial correlation in OLS with PCSEs. 
 However, including a lagged dependent variable in the model may pose a 
problem if either unobserved observation-specific effects or time-invariant 
explanatory variables are omitted in the specification of the model (Kristensen & 
Wawro, 2003). All of the four different models specified in this study do not include 
year or institute dummies since the independent variables explain about 94% of the 
residuals of the regression on total institute expenditures with only year and institute 
dummies. The last, but not the least, problem with the model specification is a 
potential endogeneity: the more successful directors may keep the position longer. 
Under tough competition among federal agencies for higher budgets, securing more 
budgets is one of the defining factors of success of an institute director. Additionally, 
                                                 
 
 
48 Since it was established in 2000, the NIBIB is not included in the analysis. 
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the institutes with more discretionary budgets can fund additional advisory boards. 
That is, there may be two-way flows of influence between the dependent and these 
two variables. Without a plausible instrumental variable for two-stage regression and 
limitations of the dataset, this study could not effectively resolve the endogeneity 
issue. This point will be discussed in the section of the study limitations in Chapter 6. 
 The basic model includes the independent variables described in the previous 
section without interaction terms. This basic model (model I) assumes that the effects 
of the major independent variables—director, advisory boards and their members, and 
congressional vote ratings and experience—are not different between 1) with and 
without omnibus legislation and 2) between disease-focused institutes and their non-
disease counterparts. To test whether the practice of omnibus legislation impacts how 
the other independent variables affect the dependent variable, interaction terms 
between omnibus and the other variables are included in the second model (model II). 
Since the main focus is on the leadership and input channels of the individual 
institutes and ideological orientation and interest group affiliation of members of the 
appropriations subcommittees, interaction terms are selectively used for only the 
variables measuring these factors. Model II, with interaction terms with only omnibus, 
eliminates the first assumption in model I such that the effects of the independent 
variables are different with and without omnibus legislation, whereas they are not 
different between disease-focused institutes and their non-disease counterparts. To 
examine differential effects between disease-focused institutes and other institutes in 
the independent variables, the interaction terms between diseaseinst and the other 
independent variables are included in the extended model (model III). Model III, with 
interactions with omnibus and diseaseinst, assumes that omnibus and diseaseinst 
independently make differences in the effects of the independent variables. Lastly, to 
consider a possibility that omnibus and diseaseinst jointly influence how the other 
independent variables affect the dependent variables, interaction terms among 
omnibus, diseaseinst, and the other independent variables are included (model IV). 
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Model IV considers an additional possibility that these two dummies interact with 
each other and jointly influence the effects of the other independent variables. 
 These basic and extended models are specified for the dependent variables of 
total institute expenditures, investigator-initiated RPGs, Intramural Research, percent 
of Intramural Research in the sum of Intramural and RPG expenditures, and 
Herfindahl index of different expenditure mechanisms. For the mechanisms of 
investigator-initiated RPGs and Intramural Research, the expenditure amount net of 
the designated mechanism is controlled. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ANALYTICAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 This chapter reports findings from the empirical tests of the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3. Determinants of an institute’s total expenditures are discussed 
first.  
Total Institute Expenditures 
Institute-Level Factors 
Effect of Institute Director’s Public Service Experience (PSE) 
 Since every institute has its own mission, history, leadership, size, 
organizational structure, and constituency groups, the priority-setting process 
involving the budget process varies across the institutes (IOM, 1998). The process of 
allocations for specific research activities is also unique to every institute. However, 
the primary participants in the process are the leaders of the institutes and the 
interested scientific communities. 
 The institute director’s PSE is the sum of the years the director has been in 
charge of the institute and his/her years in public service previous to the appointment 
of the institute. During those periods of public service, the researchers would absorb 
bureaucratic incentive structures, as posited by Downs (1967) and Niskanen (1971). 
Arguably, they might behave in a way to maximize their own private interests, 
including vying for larger budgets, more staff members, and bigger offices. 
Alternatively, they might insulate themselves based on their cherished values of 
serving the public. The organizational mission of the NIH is “science in pursuit of 
fundamental knowledge about the nature and behavior of living systems and the 
application of that knowledge to extend healthy life and reduce the burdens of illness 
and disability” (NIH, 2006b). A high interest in health issues may have helped NIH 
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officials identify themselves with their organizational mission. As a consequence, in 
the perspective of both bureaucratic maximization and PSM, as the director’s 
experience increases he/she is expected to seek higher budgets for his/her institute 
(Hypothesis 1). 
 The results of OLS regression with PCSEs on total institute expenditures are 
provided in Table  8. The coefficients on director and its squared term in all four 
models indicate that more years of PSE lead to higher institute budgets. The size of 
the coefficients appears small: for example, the coefficients on director and its 
squared term indicate that if the director’s experience increases from 1 to 2 years, 
total institute expenditures increase by 1.4%. However, it is misleading to regard this 
increase as minor, considering the size of the institute’s budget. Let us take the NCI as 
an example. In FFY 2004, its total expenditure was about $1,382 million. An 
additional year of experience from 1 to 2 years for the NCI director leads to an 
increase of $19.3 million in NCI expenditures. If the director has led the NCI for 10 
years and had 5 years of previous public service, the cumulative effects amount to 
$275 million, which is not negligible. 
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Table 8. Determinants of Total Institute Expenditures 
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
Director’s PSE 
(Director’s PSE)2
Number of Advisory Boards 
(Number of Advisory Boards)2
Number of Advisory Board Members 
NIH Director’s PSE 
(NIH Director’s PSE)2
Number of NIH Advisory Boards 
Number of NIH Board Members 
 
CC Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
CC Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of House Appr. Subcomm. 
 
Republican Control of Presidency 
Republican Control of Congress 
Mixed Control of Congress 
Omnibus Legislation (omnibus) 
Disease-focused Institutes (diseaseinst)  
Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
(Director’s PSE) *Omnibus 
(# of Adv. Boards) * omnibus 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*omnibus 
(CC Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(Senate Exp.)*omnibus 
(CC House Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU House Rating)*omnibus 
(House Exp.)*omnibus 
 
(Director’s PSE)*diseaseinst 
(# of Adv. Boards)*diseaseinst 
.01475*** 
-.00032***
.07326***
-.00253***
.00020***
.15476***
-.03254***
-.03254***
.00006 
 
-.00699**
.00271 
-.02434 
.00166 
.01324***
.23736***
 
.24193***
.36349***
.16952 
.05037 
.09925***
.74183***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.02505***
-.00048***
.07055***
-.00230***
.00005*
.25860***
-.02496***
-.02727***
-.00018***
 
.00375 
-.01069*
.21950***
.00188 
.00280 
.10754**
 
.07806 
-.09161 
-.13944 
3.07364***
.08147***
.75760***
 
-.00950***
-.01098*
.00024***
.01049 
.01353**
-.26547***
-.01247**
.01363*
.15882 
 
 
 
.02808***
-.00051***
.06146***
-.00112***
.00010**
.24974***
-.02418***
-.02650***
-.00017***
 
.00275 
-.01032*
.22488***
.00126 
.00275 
.10833**
 
.07591 
-.09759 
-.13709 
2.92510***
.89189***
.74340***
 
-.00816***
-.01063*
.00022***
.00991 
.01315**
-.25337***
-.01198**
.01334**
.15581 
 
-.00676***
-.02455***
.03074***
-.00056***
.06819***
-.00144***
.00002 
.23904***
-.02315***
-.02568***
-.00016**
 
.00356 
-.01098**
.24184***
-.00014 
.00319 
.10166**
 
.08049 
-.08683 
-.12497 
3.51396***
1.82718***
.73593***
 
-.01160***
-.01692**
.00048***
.00818 
.01397**
-.28543***
-.00862 
.01145*
.14938 
 
-.00810***
-.02465***
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Table  Continued. 
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*diseaseinst 
(CC Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(Senate Exp.)*diseaseinst 
(CC House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(House Exp.)*diseaseinst 
omnibus*diseaseinst 
 
(Director’s PSE) *ODª 
(# of Adv. Boards) *OD  
(# of Adv. Board Members)*OD 
(CC Senate Rating)*OD  
(NTU Senate Rating)*OD  
(Senate Exp.)*OD  
(CC House Rating)*OD  
(NTU House Rating)*OD  
(House Exp.)*OD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00001 
.00233 
.00044 
.03168***
.00176 
-.00087 
-.00763 
-.14373**
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00012**
-.00044 
.00418**
-.09484***
.00547***
-.00244 
.00371 
-1.72012 
 
.00392 
-.00172 
-.00030***
.00338 
-.00406*
.09272***
-.00663**
.00393 
.00700 
R-squared 
Rho 
.936 
.249 
.948 
.27 
.953 
.286 
.956 
.300 
• *** p<.01, ** p<05, * p<.10 
• a : omnibus*diseaseinst 
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The coefficients on director and directsq jointly indicate that as an institute 
director’s PSE increases up to about 23 years, its positive effect on total institute 
expenditures decreases. Of the 49 directors whose previous PSE records were 
obtained, 19 directors served the government on a full-time basis for more than 23 
years. This means that there is a negative relationship between the director’s years of 
PSE and the institute’s expenditures if the PSE exceeds 23 years. Above 23 years of 
experience, the length of government service adversely affects institute budgets. 
There could be multiple explanations for this effect. First, after working as institute 
directors, a majority of directors return to the academic institutions where they 
originally worked. If the directors expect themselves to work at an academic setting in 
the foreseeable future, they may want to distance themselves from the organizational 
norms, values, and cultures of the institutes. Second, if anticipating retirement, 
directors may find important or meaningful things other than running the institute or 
securing higher budgets.  
The coefficients on the interaction terms between omnibus and the director’s 
PSE in the extended models indicate that the effect of the director’s PSE is different 
with and without the practice of omnibus legislation. In model II, without omnibus 
legislation, the director’s PSE increases the institute’s total expenditures up to 26 
years; with omnibus legislation, the effect reaches its peak at 16 years of PSE. The 
coefficient on the interaction between omnibus legislation and the director’s PSE 
shows that the effect of an additional year of experience is smaller with omnibus 
legislation than without (Hypothesis 9). Models III and IV show that for the 
nondisease-focused institutes, their directors’ PSE increases the institutes’ total 
expenditures up until 27 years without omnibus legislation. With omnibus legislation, 
total expenditures of the nondisease-specific institutes increase as their directors’ PSE 
increases up to 17 (model IV) to 19 years (model III). 
The coefficients on the interaction terms between disease-focused institutes 
and the director’s PSE in models III and IV reveals that with omnibus legislation, the 
director’s PSE increases disease-focused institutes’ total expenditures only when it is 
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less than 13 years. Before 1997, when the omnibus appropriations bills were not used, 
the director’s PSE under 20 years tended to increase total expenditures of the disease-
focused institutes. This is summarized in Table 9. 
Table 9. Years of Positive Relationship between Director’s PSE and Institute 
Total Expenditure in Model III  
 Disease Institutes Non-Disease Institutes 
With Omnibus 
Legislation 
13 (17.3) 19 (17.6) 
Without Omnibus 
Legislation 
20 (17.5) 27 (16.2) 
• (   ): Mean years of the director’s PSE. 
 
Table 9 indicates that with omnibus legislation the importance of the director’s 
PSE in the budget process is exhausted more rapidly than without omnibus 
legislation, and its marginal effect is smaller with omnibus legislation. This finding 
may be explained by the consideration that omnibus legislation allows congressional 
committee chairs and key players in the appropriations subcommittees to play a 
bigger role. Alternatively, with omnibus legislation, organized interest groups such as 
the Ad Hoc Group may be encouraged to push their requests of higher budgets toward 
appropriations committee members. Another case made by Table 9 is that the positive 
effect of the directors’ PSE of the nondisease institutes lasts longer than that of the 
disease-focused institutes.This result indicates that, ceteris paribus, without much 
support from well-developed patients and advocacy groups, the leadership of the 
institute takes more responsibility to pursue research agendas. This finding may imply 
that the directors of these non-disease institutes are driven by PSM rather than self-
interests. This point will be discussed further in the subsequent sections. 
Advisory Boards and Their Members 
There are largely four types of advisory boards/committees/councils at the 
institute level. Some of them advise the institute director in the priority-setting 
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process, while others provide peer reviews. Some deal with issues of specific research 
programs, not with priority setting. As such, their engagement of the process of 
research fund allocation is inevitably unequal both across types of boards and across 
institutes. With this caveat, the resulting Table 10, with total institute expenditures as 
the dependent variable, shows that the number of advisory boards has a significant 
positive impact on total institute expenditures. For example, in the model I without 
interactions, a change in the number of advisory boards from 4 to 6 has about a 9.6% 
budgetary impact, holding all other factors constant. However, its impact is 
curvilinear so that as the number of advisory boards exceeds 14, an additional 
advisory board has a negative impact on the institute’s expenditures.  
The outputs from the extended models indicate that there is variation in the 
relationship between advisory boards and an institute’s total expenditures depending 
on omnibus legislation and institute types (Table 10). First, with omnibus legislation, 
the effect of advisory boards reaches its peak with a smaller number of boards. If 
there are more than 12 advisory boards at a disease-focused institute, an additional 
board tends to decrease total expenditures. The maximum number of advisory boards 
at the non-disease institutes that is beneficial to its total expenditures is 23. Without 
the omnibus practice, the budgetary effect of advisory boards increases at a 
decreasing rate up to 16 (disease institutes) and to 27 (non-disease institutes).  
Second, as the number of advisory boards increases, the effect of advisory boards at 
the disease institutes is exhausted more rapidly than that of the non-disease institutes, 
which is shown in Table 10. Its marginal effect is smaller for the disease-focused 
institutes than for their general science-focused counterparts. Given that the mean 
value of advisory boards is 5.7 and the maximum is 27, it seems that advisory boards 
all have positive impacts on the institute’s total expenditures. However, the effect is 
stronger when there is no omnibus legislation and for nondisease institutes. 
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Table 10. Number of Advisory Boards with Positive Relationship with Institute 
Total Expenditure in Model III  
 Disease Institutes Non-Disease Institutes 
With Omnibus 
Legislation 
12 (4.6) 23 (5.0) 
Without Omnibus 
Legislation 
16 (7.3) 27 (5.2) 
• (   ): Mean number of advisory boards 
 
It is found that in three of the four models the number of advisory board 
members has a positive effect on the institute’s total expenditures, as hypothesized. 
With omnibus legislation, the effect of advisory board members increases: in model 
III, one additional board member is associated with a 0.032% increase in total 
institute expenditures. On the other hand, in model IV, omnibus and diseaseinst 
interact with each other and jointly influence the institute’s total expenditures. While 
omnibus legislation in itself increases the effect of advisory board members, it 
increases the total expenditures of the nondisease institutes more than those of the 
disease institutes, as indicated by the coefficient on the interaction term among the 
number of advisory boards, omnibus legislation, and disease institutes, which is 
positive. 
These findings indicate that the advisory boards themselves may align the 
interests of institute directors’ expenditure preferences as well as those of well-
organized patients and advocacy groups. If the advisory boards serve the interests of 
patients and advocacy groups, their effect should remain positive as the number of 
advisory boards increases, and it does. However, it is not clear whose interests the 
advisory boards serve. There are good reasons that advisory boards may support the 
institute director’s budget preferences. The institute directors can exert a considerable 
amount of discretion in establishing advisory boards and appointing their members. 
Moreover, it might be the case that organized disease-related advocacy groups are not 
well represented in an institute’s input system. In most of the cases, the advisory 
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board members are from scientific communities in medical schools and research 
universities. The chances that representatives from disease-related advocacy groups 
join advisory boards are small. 
NIH Agency-Level Factors 
NIH Director’s PSE 
 The important finding for the NIH director’s PSE is that the magnitude of 
effects by agency-level factors is much greater than by the institute-level factors. In 
model I, as the NIH director’s PSE increases from 1 to 2 years, an institute’s total 
expenditures increase by 5.7%, compared with 1.4% of its institute-level counterparts. 
However, the positive effect of the NIH director’s PSE is exhausted in 2.4 years. As 
the NIH director’s PSE increases to more than 3 years, its impact becomes negative. 
In the extended models with interaction terms, total expenditures of an institute 
increase as the NIH director’s PSE increases up to 5 years. Beyond 5 years of tenure 
as the NIH director, his/her budgetary impact on total expenditures is negative. 
 There may be several explanations for this outcome. First, as mentioned by 
NIH (2006a), the role of the NIH director involves the whole of the NIH and is to 
provide leadership to all component institutes and centers. One step removed from the 
individual institute level detail, the NIH director pays more attention to shaping the 
agency and responding to emerging needs and opportunities. As such, the NIH 
director may “have much less to gain from increments and confront substantial 
advocacy costs in seeking to push through increases in the agency’s base budget” 
(Dunleavy, 1991, p. 208). Second, there are only two NIH directors who led the 
agency more than four years. One of these two agency directors is Harold Varmus, 
who led the agency between 1993 and 1999. During his tenure, Congress decided to 
double the NIH budgets. Varmus’s influence on the individual institute-level 
expenditures might be absorbed by the omnibus variable. 
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Advisory Boards and Their Members at the NIH Level 
 At the agency level, the NIH maintains more than 50 advisory boards to seek 
advice from the medical research community, patient advocacy groups, and the 
public. To explore new research issues that are not suitable for individual institutes, 
the NIH director also establishes advisory bodies.  
 The model I shows that one additional advisory board’s budgetary impact at 
the agency level is negative: one additional advisory board is associated with about 
3.25% of budget decrease, and its relationship is linear. The effect seems to get 
smaller when including interaction terms in the model. The figures in Chapter 4  
indicate that the number of advisory boards negatively affected individual institute 
expenditures between 1986 and 1993. Too many advisory boards may invite negative 
consequences in multiple dimensions in terms of decision veto points (nondecisions) 
and managerial inefficiencies. This negative effect might be one of the reasons 
driving the reorganization of the advisory boards. Another consideration about this 
negative relationship is that the advisory boards are intended to provide advice to the 
NIH director, who may not get substantial benefits from budget increases at the 
individual institute level. The NIH director may benefit more from establishing more 
advisory boards and securing discretionary funds than securing more budgets for 
component institutes.49
 With regard to the effect of advisory board membership, the basic model 
reports that the number of advisory board members at the agency level does not have 
a significant effect on the individual institute’s total expenditures. In the extended 
models with interaction terms, the relationship is found to be negative: one additional 
board member at the agency level leads to as much as a 0.016% decrease in the 
individual institute’s total expenditures.  
                                                 
 
 
49 As early as 1988, the need for increasing the NIH director’s discretionary funds was raised, and in 
FFY 2004 Congress allotted $44 million for the purpose of the NIH director’s discretionary use.   
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 These findings are noteworthy when compared to the relationship between 
advisory boards and their membership and the institute’s total expenditures. While at 
the institute level the number of advisory boards and their members has a positive 
relationship with the institute’s total expenditure, at the agency level the direction of 
the relationship is reversed. 
Factors with Respect to Appropriations Subcommittees with Jurisdiction of NIH 
The basic model shows (1) that the median CC ratings of the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee has a negative effect on an institute’s total expenditures 
and (2) that the median NTU rating of the members of the House Appropriations 
Subcommittee is positively associated with an institute’s total expenditures. 
According to these results, pro-business Senate Subcommittee members prefer lower 
institute expenditures, while their pro-taxpayer counterparts in the House 
Subcommittee want the opposite. While years of congressional service of the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee members does not seem to have a definitive impact on 
an institute’s total expenditures, years of House experience increase the institute’s 
total expenditures. 
However, the extended models provide richer relationships between 
characteristics of the subcommittee members and an institute’s total expenditures. If 
introducing interactions with omnibus and disease-focused institutes, it is found that 
CC ratings of Senate subcommittee members do not have a significant relationship 
with an institute’s total expenditures. The interaction terms also show that omnibus 
legislation makes no difference in the relationship between CC Senate ratings and the 
total expenditures of an institute. The interaction terms with disease-focused institutes 
indicate that the effect of CC ratings is not significantly different between disease and 
non-disease institutes. The coefficients on House NTU ratings report no significant 
relationship between the ratings and an institute’s total expenditures. 
The findings in the four models about the relationship between CC ratings and 
an institute’s total expenditures indicate 1) that the relationship, if any, is a weak and 
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minor one and 2) that the relationship is not significantly different (i) between 
disease-focused institutes and non-disease institutes and (ii) before and after 1997. 
Together with the findings about House NTU ratings, it is shown that the CC ratings 
of the Appropriations Subcommittee members with jurisdiction over the NIH are 
largely irrelevant on the levels of the institute’s total expenditures. This may be 
explained by the consideration that CC ratings primarily focus on firms in the 
business sector whereas the NIH research support involves institutions in the 
academies or in the nonprofit sector. 
Although Senate NTU ratings are not related to the dependent variable, their 
House counterparts indicate a considerable relationship. In the extended models, 
without the omnibus appropriations practice, Senate NTU ratings lower an institute’s 
total expenditures such that as the median NTU rating of the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee members increases by 10 points, an institute’s total expenditures 
decrease by 10%. This relationship turns to positive with omnibus legislation. A 10-
point increase in Senate NTU ratings is associated with a 2.2% increase in total 
expenditures. On the other hand, there is no difference in the effect of Senate NTU 
ratings between disease-focused and non-disease institutes. House NTU ratings are 
found to increase an institute’s total expenditures in model I. However, the extended 
models indicate that this relationship is mainly from the practice of rolling 
appropriations bills since 1997. These results indicate that while the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee members do not care much about NIH expenditures, 
their House counterparts do, and that with the omnibus practice, subcommittee 
members from both houses increase NIH’s individual institutes’ expenditures. That is, 
the more committed to the public interests and taxpayers’ money the members of the 
subcommittees are, the more likely they are to seek higher budgets for the NIH. It 
does make sense in that research activities supported by the NIH benefit the general 
public as well as the supported scientists and institutions. 
The coefficients on experience of the subcommittee members indicate that the 
NIH research supports still serve well-organized groups in the medical research 
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community. First, years of House experience does influence an institute’s total 
expenditure in the basic model, but Senate experience does not. However, the 
interaction terms reveal an interesting story: without omnibus appropriations, an 
additional increase in the Senate median years of experience leads to a 22% increase 
in total institute expenditure, and with omnibus legislation, a comparable increase in 
experience decreases the institute’s budget by 4.6%. While Senate experience seems 
to lead to higher expenditures for disease-focused institutes, it turns out that the 
omnibus legislation cancels out this effect such that interacting with omnibus and 
diseaseinst jointly, one additional year of median Senate experience increases an 
institute’s total expenditures by 9.3%, but it decreases a disease-focused institute’s 
expenditures by 9.5%. On the other hand, in the extended models, the effect of years 
of House experience does not change between disease-focused and non-disease-
focused institutes. There is no significant difference in the effect of House experience 
with and without omnibus legislation. 
The findings about the relationship between years of congressional experience 
and an institute’s total expenditures indicate that the representatives become more in 
favor of NIH spending as their experience as congresspersons accumulates than do 
their Senate colleagues. This indicates that NIH expenditures may be regarded as 
serving special interests. While a step removed from reelection considerations with 
longer tenures, Senators may care about programs of public interest that may not be 
sought by special interest groups. This point is comparable to the finding that the 
relationship between NTU rating and total expenditure is not as strong as the 
relationship between congressional experience and an institute’s total expenditures. In 
the budget process for NIH funding, consideration of the medical research 
communities and health advocacy groups may be taken more seriously than concerns 
for the improvement of the general public health. 
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Effect of Omnibus Legislation and Disease-Oriented Research 
This study hypothesizes that depending on the Appropriations Subcommittee 
members’ policy preferences, the practice of omnibus legislation will make a 
difference in the expenditure amount of NIH institutes and that such a difference 
would be positive. The simple model without interaction terms reveals that a frequent 
use of omnibus legislation does not directly affect an institute’s budget. However, this 
basic model assumes that the practice of bundling appropriations bills into a couple of 
omnibus bills does not affect actors other than the congressmen. If such a possibility 
is allowed by introducing interaction terms, the result changes dramatically: the 
regression coefficient on omnibus legislation is as much as 2.9. Since the coefficient 
refers to the difference the omnibus practice makes when we set the values of the 
other independent variables at 0, its practical meaning is limited. However, it is 
clearly indicated that the omnibus appropriations bills have made huge budgetary 
changes. It is not a surprise given that the NIH budget has doubled between FFY1998 
and FFY2003. This indicates that the NIH actually has won the battle for higher 
budgets against non-R&D programs in the Departments of Labor, Education, and 
HHS in the congressional appropriations process with strong supporters of NIH 
research.  
The frequent use of omnibus legislation is found to mediate the effects of the 
other determinant factors of institute expenditures. The extended models show that 
with the omnibus appropriations bills, the effect of an institute director has been 
weaker and  shorter on an institute’s total expenditures and that the effect of the 
median NTU ratings of the members of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee has 
increased since 1997. The omnibus legislation has also produced big winners among 
the institutes as indicated by the coefficients on interaction terms with diseaseinst: the 
non-disease-focused institutes’ total expenditures have increased more than their 
disease counterparts by 14.5%. 
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As hypothesized, the expenditures of disease-focused institutes are greater 
than that of their non-disease-focused counterparts. In model I, the disease-specific 
institute’s budget is about 10% larger than the non-disease institute’s budget. This 
indicates that the well-developed patients and advocacy groups along with the 
public’s keen awareness of disease issues put their agenda through the priority-setting 
process of the institutes and Congress, overcoming the problems in collective action 
in a democracy as discussed by Downs (1957, 1960), Buchanan & Tullock (1962), 
and Tullock (1969, 1970). 
Interaction terms indicate that there are differences in effects on an institute’s 
total expenditure between the disease-focused institutes and the non-disease-focused 
ones. Clearly, the effect of the institute director’s PSE is stronger for the disease-
focused institutes, as is the number of advisory boards. However, those effects are 
exhausted more rapidly for the disease-specific institutes, as shown by the negative 
signs of the interaction terms in Table 10.  
For the hypotheses regarding an institute’s total expenditures, the findings are 
summarized in Table 11. Most of the hypotheses are confirmed, but their relationships 
are much richer than hypothesized. 
 
 88
Table 11. Analytical Findings about an Institute’s Total Expenditures 
Hypothesis Findings 
Director’s PSE (H1) The director’s PSE increases an institute’s total expenditure. The relationship is curvilinear. Hypothesis confirmed. 
Disease-focused Institutes 
(H4) 
The disease institute’s expenditures are greater than its 
nondisease-focused counterparts by about 10%. With omnibus 
legislation, the non-disease institutes benefit more and the 
difference is reduced. Hypothesis confirmed. 
Advisory Boards (H5) Advisory boards increase an institute’s total expenditure. The relationship is curvilinear. Hypothesis confirmed. 
Disease Institutes and 
Advisory Boards (H5.2) 
Effect of advisory boards is greater for general science-focused 
institutes. Hypothesis not confirmed. 
Omnibus Legislation (H7) 
Without interaction terms, the omnibus practice has no impact 
on an institute’s total expenditures. However, with interaction 
terms with the other independent variables, omnibus legislation 
more than doubles an institute’s total expenditures. Hypothesis 
confirmed. 
Omnibus Legislation and 
Disease Institutes (H8) 
With omnibus legislation, non-disease institutes’ total 
expenditures have increased more than those of their disease 
counterparts. Hypothesis not confirmed. 
Omnibus Legislation and 
Director’s PSE (H9) 
Omnibus legislation makes the effect of the director’s PSE 
weaker and shorter. Hypothesis not confirmed. 
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Principle Investigator-Initiated RPG Expenditures50
The RPG mechanism is different from the other mechanisms in that the 
process is initiated by private scientists and grant applications are reviewed by their 
peers. Therefore, institute leadership may not care about RPG expenditures as much 
as it does about that of the other mechanisms, through which it can exert influence on 
types of research and diseases targeted.  
The main findings described in the previous section apply here with the 
expenditures through the investigator-initiated RPG mechanism (Table 12). However, 
there are also some differences. First, an institute director’s PSE increases the 
institute’s RPG expenditures at a decreasing rate as experience increases up to 21 
years. Unlike the total expenditures, omnibus legislation does not make a significant 
difference in the effect of the director’s PSE, shown by the interaction terms in the 
extended models. The effect of the director’s PSE at disease-focused institutes is 
weaker than at their non-disease counterparts. This may be explained by the fact that 
the disease institutes command well-developed advocacy and patient groups. They 
push their agendas toward key congressional actors and appropriations subcommittee 
members. In such a circumstance, the role played by directors of disease-focused 
institutes may not be as great as the one played by directors of non-disease institutes. 
Second, the number of advisory boards increases the institute’s PI-initiated 
project grant expenditures at a decreasing rate up to 9. However, with omnibus 
legislation, the effect turns negative: in model III, the coefficients on the number of 
advisory boards and the interaction term with omnibus indicate that after 1997 the 
number of advisory boards is adversely related to the institute’s RPG expenditures. At 
the disease-focused institutes, as the number of advisory boards increases, the 
institute’s RPG expenditures decrease. That is, the number of advisory boards 
                                                 
 
 
50 From this section on, the interpretation of the results will focus on the difference between those in 
the models with institute total expenditures as the dependent variable. 
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increased the RPG expenditures of the non-disease institutes before 1997. This 
finding may be explained by the nature of the research supported by the non-disease 
institutes and the discretion enjoyed by the director. The research supported by these 
institutes is focused on the general sciences, workings of human organs, and health 
needs of specific population groups. For this reason, interest groups in such research 
areas are not developed as well as in disease-combating research areas. In such cases, 
the institute directors may want to increase RPG expenditures by boosting 
participation from the research communities. This point is supported by the finding 
that the PSE of the non-disease institutes’ directors has a stronger effect on RPG 
expenditures than that of the disease-focused institutes’ directors. 
On the congressional appropriations subcommittee side, the effects from CC 
and NTU ratings and congressional experience do not seem as strong as they are with 
total expenditures as the dependent variable. In the basic model, a 10-point increase in 
CC ratings is associated with a 5% decrease in RPG spending, compared to 7% with 
total expenditures. The median of Senate NTU ratings is not associated with RPG 
spending levels in all four models. Senate experience increases RPG expenditures of 
non-disease institutes more than their disease-focused counterparts. Without the 
omnibus legislation, an additional year of Senate experience increases RPG spending 
by 17%, but this effect disappears with the omnibus practice. The House NTU ratings 
and the years of House experience significantly increase RPG spending while 
omnibus legislation and types of institutes do not mediate this effect.  
As in the models of total institute expenditures, the effect of omnibus 
legislation is not definitive in the basic model, but in the extended models with 
interaction terms the omnibus practice is found to increase an institute’s RPG 
expenditures by about two and half times. Given that its effect is more than a 200% 
increase in the models with total expenditures, it is likely that with omnibus 
legislation an institute’s expenditures through other mechanisms would increase more 
than RPG expenditures. As for the interaction terms, the practice of omnibus 
legislation is found to play a role of mediating the effects of the other independent 
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variables. There are also big winners with omnibus appropriations bills: non-disease 
institutes’ RPG expenditures increased about 270%, much bigger than their disease-
focused counterparts’ 77%. 
Overall, it appears that the determinant factors of an institute’s expenditures 
through RPG are not very different from those of its total expenditures. This may be 
due to the finding that the RPG expenditure mechanism uses about 46.5% of the 
institute’s total expenditures. 
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Table 12. Determinants of Private Principal Investigator-Initiated RPG 
Expenditures 
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
Director’s PSE 
(Director’s PSE)2
Number of Advisory Boards 
(Number of Advisory Boards)2
Number of Advisory Board Members 
 
NIH Director’s PSE 
(NIH Institute Director’s PSE)2
Number of NIH Advisory Boards 
Number of NIH Advisory Board Members 
 
CC Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
CC Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of House Appr. Subcomm. 
 
Republican Control of Presidency 
Republican Control of Congress 
Mixed Control of Congress 
Omnibus Legislation (omnibus) 
Disease-Focused Institutes (diseaseinst)  
Lagged Dependent Variable 
Log of Expenditures net of RPGs 
 
(Director’s PSE)*omnibus 
(# of Adv. Boards)*omnibus 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*omnibus 
(CC Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(Senate Exp.)*omnibus 
(CC House Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU House Rating)*omnibus 
(House Exp.)*omnibus 
.03131***
-.00072***
.02001**
-.00112***
.00003 
 
.11427***
-.00856**
-.02120***
.00004 
 
-.00528**
.00237 
-.01359 
.00017 
.00898***
.15725***
 
.15212**
.25612***
.12038 
.01686 
.09510***
.57206***
.31076***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.03441***
-.00078***
.01816*
-.00086**
-.00009**
 
.19202***
-.01811***
-.01924***
-.00014**
 
.00146 
-.00834 
.16000***
-.00030 
.00386 
.07847 
 
.01188 
-.02893 
-.07964 
2.6650***
.08345***
.58792***
.30603***
 
-.00120 
-.00931*
.00020***
.00999 
.00875 
-.17155***
-.00751 
.00356 
.01970 
.03741***
-.00081***
.00997**
 
.00003 
 
.18999***
-.01972***
-.01924***
-.00014**
 
.00130 
-.00807 
.16817***
-.00080 
.00362 
.08270*
 
.02090 
-.03381 
-.08355 
2.56160***
.88438***
.58659***
.29006***
 
-.00153 
-.01354**
.00024***
.00953 
.00869 
-.16534**
-.00756 
.00377 
.02168 
.04207***
-.00092***
.01690**
 
-.00009 
 
.17129***
-.01618***
-.01747***
-.00012*
 
.00054 
-.0075 
.16876***
-.00219 
.00478 
.07698*
 
.02501 
-.03251 
-.05453 
2.76793***
1.36307***
.56541***
,30334***
 
-.00482 
-.07168***
.00086***
.01003 
.00809 
-.17171***
-.00334 
.00026 
.00510 
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Table Continued.  
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
(Director’s PSE)*diseaseinst 
(# of Adv. Boards)*diseaseinst 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*diseaseinst 
(CC Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(Senate Exp.)*diseaseinst 
(CC House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(House Exp.)*diseaseinst 
omnibus*diseaseinst 
 
(Director’s PSE)*ODª 
(# of Adv. Boards)*OD  
(# of Adv. Board Members)*OD 
(CC Senate Rating)*OD  
(NTU Senate Rating)*OD  
(Senate Exp.)*OD  
(CC House Rating)*OD  
(NTU House Rating)*OD  
(House Exp.)*OD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.00589**
-.01118*
-.00014**
.00085 
-.00003 
-.02888***
.00189 
-.00031 
-.01009*
-.07296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.00539**
-.02621**
.00007 
.00107 
.00167 
-.06125***
.00523***
-.00375***
-.00624*
-1.70923***
 
-.00145 
.11979***
-.00079***
-.00239 
.00009 
.03436**
-.00635***
.00957***
.09876***
R-squared 
Rho 
.936 
.304 
.946 
.335 
.949 
.335 
.952 
.342 
• *** p<.01, ** p<05, * p<.10 
• a : omnibus*diseaseinst 
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Intramural Laboratory Research Expenditures 
 Since intramural research is conducted by government scientists who are 
governed by personnel management regulations and the bureaucratic reporting 
system, expenditures through intramural laboratories represent an agency budget in 
the Niskanen (1971) sense. These expenditures could be understood as an expression 
of bureaucratic production such that organizational slack may be included. Since 
intramural laboratories undertake research topics of high risk and uncertainty, in 
which private scientists are encouraged not to engage, intramural research may be 
truly of pubic interest. Therefore, regardless of whether bureaucrats at an institute are 
driven by self-interest or PSM, they are expected to increase intramural research. The 
issue at point is whether they prefer intramural research to extramural grant programs. 
 The regression outputs on intramural laboratory expenditures are provided in 
Table 13. The basic model without interaction terms reports that the PSE of the 
institute directors decreases their expenditures for intramural laboratories, and the 
relationship is curvilinear: as the director’s PSE increases up to 25 years, the 
institute’s Intramural Research expenditures decrease at a decreasing rate. Given that 
the mean value of the director’s full-time public experience is 17 years, it indicates 
that throughout their public careers directors care less about intramural research 
programs than about research expenditures through other mechanisms such as 
extramural grant programs. However, this needs elaboration. If an institute director is 
a senior scientist of the institute, it is likely that upon appointment as director, he or 
she will decrease intramural research programs unless his or her previous experience 
is greater than 25 years. Out of the 49 directors whose previous PSE was recorded, 
only 6 had served the government for 25 years or more. If the director is recruited 
from within, he or she leads the institute for about 8.2 years with 16.3 years of 
previous experience on average. Given the curvilinear relationship, the directors 
promoted from the institutes tend to try to protect, if not expand, the intramural 
research program. 
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 This does not apply to institute directors who are recruited from institutions in 
academic settings. Directors recruited from outside the institutes lead the institutes 
about 7.8 years on average. This means that if the director is new to the institute as an 
employee, he or she is likely to reduce intramural expenditures. There could be two 
reasons for this occurrence. One is directing resources from intramural laboratories to 
extramural programs. The other is increasing extramural grant expenditures more 
rapidly while keeping intramural programs relatively unchanged. However, the 
magnitude of this effect appears to weaken as time goes on. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the director who is new to the government organization may be 
undergoing organizational socialization, absorbing the values and norms of the 
bureaucratic organization and realizing the importance of maintaining significant 
capacity in intramural research.  
 The interaction term with omnibus legislation shows that the practice of 
bundling appropriations bills does not significantly change the effect of the director’s 
PSE. On the other hand, interaction with diseaseinst indicates that the turning point of 
the effect comes earlier, at about 17 years of experience for disease-focused institutes. 
If the director is recruited from within the institutes with 16 years of previous 
experience, he or she tends to increase Intramural Research funds. 
 One interesting finding is that the number of advisory boards is positively 
associated with expenditures through intramural laboratories. Given a curvilinear 
relationship in the basic model, advisory boards increase intramural spending until the 
number of boards reaches about 18. Given that the mean number of boards is 5.7, this 
tendency applies to almost all institutes. Moreover, advisory board membership 
consistently increases intramural expenditures. This unexpected finding decreases the 
significance of the role played by the advisory boards. Originally—and expectedly—
the advisory boards are regarded as a channel of input from scientific communities, 
interest groups, and the public. However, the boards themselves are found to serve 
Intramural Research activities. If they are representing the interests of private parties, 
their presence may run counter to intramural programs in favor of extramural grants. 
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This point will be picked up in the discussion of the proportion of Intramural 
Research in the next section. 
 As for the ratings of appropriations subcommittee members, it seems that a 
higher median score of NTU rating is positively associated with intramural 
expenditures at α =.01 in the basic model. Just as in the previous sections, the more 
experience the subcommittee members have, the more they support intramural 
programs. While in the basic model Senate experience does not increase intramural 
expenditures, the extended models with interaction terms report it clearly boosts 
intramural program spending. However, the CC ratings for subcommittees in both 
houses are found to be largely irrelevant in the levels of intramural expenditures. This 
is due to the fact that higher CC rating scores indicate the members’ support of 
business activities of private firms.  
 It appears that the major findings with regards to diseaseinst and omnibus in 
the previous sections apply to intramural expenditures. The Intramural Research 
expenditure of a disease-targeting institute is about 30% larger than that of more 
generally focused institutes in the basic model. The effect of the director’s PSE is 
significantly different between these two types of institutes. In the disease-specific 
institutes, the effect reaches its bottom at 17 years rather than at the 27 years of the 
non-disease institutes. The marginal effect of decreasing intramural expenditures is 
greater in the non-disease than the disease-focused institutes. Like the findings 
reported in the previous sections of this chapter, the findings of this section reveal that 
advisory boards at disease-focused institutes are less strongly associated with 
intramural research programs. Together with the finding that advisory boards in 
general increase total intramural expenditures, one consistent finding is that the 
advisory boards at the non-disease institutes increase expenditures more than at the 
disease-focused institutes. This is an indication that advisory boards themselves may 
not be representing external inputs from interest groups but the interests of the 
leadership of an institute. Since the directors have considerable discretion in 
establishing and manning advisory boards, this finding implies that they are driven 
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more by PSM than by self-interests. If they are mainly interested in expenditures, the 
advisory board effect should be greater in the disease-focused institutes. 
 In the basic model, the frequent use of omnibus appropriations bills does not 
make a difference in an institute’s intramural expenditures. When controlling the 
effects that omnibus legislation may have on the effects of the other variables, the 
omnibus practice increases intramural lab expenditures almost three times. The 
interaction terms between omnibus and the other variables reveal some interesting 
points. First, the effects of a director’s PSE, the number of advisory boards, and the 
advisory board membership do not change with the frequent use of omnibus 
appropriations bills. On the other hand, since 1997 the Senate CC ratings have 
adversely affected intramural spending, but the opposite relationship applies to its 
House counterpart.  
 One of the key findings of this section is that the director’s PSE decreases 
intramural expenditures. However, if the director is from within the institute with 
significant previous experience, he or she increases intramural lab spending. Another 
key finding is that advisory boards at non-disease institutes increase intramural 
budgets more than their disease-focused counterparts. This implies that the institute’s 
leadership may be driven more by PSM than by self-interests. These points will be 
further developed in the following sections.   
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Table 13. Determinants of Intramural Research Expenditures 
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
Director’s PSE 
(Director’s PSE)2
Number of Advisory Boards 
(Number of Advisory Boards)2
Number of Advisory Board Members 
NIH Director’s PSE 
(NIH Director’s PSE)2
Number of NIH Advisory Boards 
Number of NIH Board Members 
 
CC Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
CC Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of House Appr. Subcomm. 
 
Republican Control of Presidency 
Republican Control of Congress 
Mixed Control of Congress 
Omnibus Legislation (omnibus) 
Disease-focused Institutes (diseaseinst)  
Lagged Dependent Variable 
Log of Expenditures net of Intramural Exp. 
 
(Director’s PSE)*omnibus 
(# of Adv. Boards)*omnibus 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*omnibus 
(CC Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(Senate Exp.)*omnibus 
(CC House Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU House Rating)*omnibus 
(House Exp.)*omnibus 
(Director’s Pub. Exp.)*diseaseinst 
-.04123***
.00083***
.06181**
-.00173*
.00055***
.13656***
-.01198***
-.03776***
.00003 
 
-.00394 
.00364*
-.03119 
.00254 
.01371***
.25961***
 
.15066 
.14040 
.04172 
.02526 
.29566***
.58756***
.07422 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.04570***
.00088***
.01328**
 
.00056***
.17429**
-.02079***
-.02756***
-.00025**
 
.00941 
-.01320 
.23508***
.00193 
.00219 
.10004 
 
-.06079 
-.39596*
-.27876 
2.59640*
.27981***
.60714***
.10531*
 
.00560 
.05621*
-.00014*
-.00672 
.01922**
-.29839***
-.00343 
.01453*
.26264**
 
-.08189***
.00149***
.06483***
 
.00106***
.14072**
-.01792***
-.02289***
-.00025**
 
.00834 
-.01226 
.24109***
-.00063 
.00270 
.0781 
 
-.05579 
-.38635*
-.28966 
2.91316**
.92518*
.54094***
.10168 
 
.00429 
.01098 
-.00003 
-.01005 
.01797*
-.28588***
-.00233 
.01439*
.25195**
.029664***
-.09180***
.00165***
.06354***
 
.00108***
.13832**
-.01753***
-.02201***
-.00025***
 
.00951 
-.01006 
.27989***
-.00307 
.00163 
.06224 
 
-.05452 
-.38737***
-.30955 
3.10517**
2.45853***
.54405***
.08201 
 
.01422 
.06422 
-.00033 
-.01213 
.01656*
-.36516***
.00396 
.01774*
.32865**
.04050***
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Table Continued. 
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
(# of Adv. Boards)*diseaseinst 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*diseaseinst 
(CC Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(Senate Exp.)*diseaseinst 
(CC House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(House Exp.)*diseaseinst 
omnibus*diseaseinst  
 
(Director’s PSE)*ODª 
(# of Adv. Boards)*OD  
(# of Adv. Board Members)*OD 
(CC Senate Rating)*OD  
(NTU Senate Rating)*OD  
(Senate Exp.)*OD  
(CC House Rating)*OD  
(NTU House Rating)*OD  
(House Exp.)*OD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.06203***
-.00053*
.00380 
-.00154 
-.03492 
.00592 
-.00433 
-.00833 
-.20077 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.05984***
-.00053**
.00170 
-.00585**
-.12791***
.01203***
-.00403 
-.00054 
-.31668 
 
-.01883 
-.12859*
.00038 
.00434 
.00139 
.18747***
-.01341 
-.00868 
-.20905 
R-squared 
Rho 
.824 
.378 
.828 
.369 
.843 
.424 
.848 
.415 
• *** p<.01, ** p<05, * p<.10 
• a : omnibus*diseaseinst 
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Proportion of Intramural to PI-Initiated RPG Expenditures 
 Up until now, the analysis has focused on determinants of total, RPG, and 
Intramural Research expenditures without consideration of how each of these 
determining factors of expenditure affects differently RPGs and Intramural Research. 
To examine the relative influences from the independent variables, a variable 
measuring the percentage of Intramural Research has been created. In calculating the 
percentage, expenditures through mechanisms of Research Centers, Other Research, 
Research Training, R&D Contracts, and Research Management are excluded since 
these mechanisms tend to represent both bureaucratic and extramural interests. In the 
models estimating the relative effects of the determining factors, all of the major 
independent variables from the previous analyses are used. 
Self-Interestedness versus PSM 
 The first section of this chapter indicated that as an institute director’s PSE 
increases, the institute’s total expenditure increases as well. However, it was not clear 
if the directors’ self-interest of budget maximization or commitment to public service 
was more influential. If motivated by self-interest consideration, the directors will 
increase Intramural Research expenditures (Hypothesis 2.1). Alternatively, if they are 
primarily driven by PSM, they will not discriminate betwen the expenditure 
mechanisms (Hypothesis 2.2) because both mechanisms equally contribute to the 
advancement of medical knowledge.51  
  
                                                 
 
 
51 The directors may feel differently: they could argue that their preferred types of expenditures 
contribute more to the improvement of health.  
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Table 14. Determinants of Proportion of Intramural Research Expenditures 
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
Director’s PSE 
(Director’s PSE)2
Number of Advisory Boards 
(Number of Advisory Boards)2
Number of Advisory Board Members 
NIH Director’s PSE 
(NIH Director’s PSE)2
Number of NIH Advisory Boards 
Number of NIH Advisory Board Members 
 
CC Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
CC Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of House Appr. Subcomm. 
 
Republican Control of Presidency 
Republican Control of Congress 
Mixed Control of Congress 
Omnibus Legislation (omnibus) 
Disease-Focused Institutes (diseaseinst)  
Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
(Director’s PSE)*omnibus 
(# of Adv. Boards)*omnibus 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*omnibus 
(CC Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(Senate Exp.)*omnibus 
(CC House Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU House Rating)*omnibus 
(House Exp.)*omnibus 
 
(Director’s PSE)*diseaseinst 
-.37333***
.00955***
-.30971***
.01357***
.00130***
.01356 
 
-.00878 
-.00000 
 
.02252**
-.01063 
-.00332 
-.00709 
-.00880 
-.08528 
 
-.30256 
-.65295 
-.92524*
-.44840 
-.34020 
.81225***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.37289***
.00964***
-.53269***
.01964***
.00260***
-.09917 
 
-.00110 
-.00027 
 
.06774**
-.01752 
.19048 
.01531 
.05886*
-.25671 
 
.49822 
-1.24053 
-1.79189**
4.14482 
-.25312 
.81634***
 
-.01894 
.43283***
-.00250***
-.12120***
,01028 
-.32995 
.00190 
.07153**
.49954 
 
 
-.43676***
.01074***
-.38215***
.01051*
.00152*
-.09596 
 
.00113 
-.00027 
 
.05559 
-.01137 
.25077 
.00722 
-.05848*
-.37267 
 
.48173 
-1.21797 
-1.79366**
4.67605 
-4.36875*
.79444***
 
-.013118 
.45240***
-.00279***
-.12165**
.01128 
-.35292 
.00021 
.07503**
.55806 
 
.07847**
-.51030***
.01252***
-.25258**
 
.00239*
-.09225 
 
-.00426 
-.00042 
 
.07566**
-.00656 
.40690 
.00840 
-.07781**
-.41628 
 
.49054 
-.98769 
-1.89071**
6.11217 
2.72514 
.76049***
 
-02182 
1.12268***
-.00892**
-.15435***
.01555 
-.78623*
-.01236 
.14107***
1.23088*
 
.07233**
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Table Continued. 
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
(# of Adv. Boards)*diseaseinst 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*diseaseinst 
(CC Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(Senate Exp.)*diseaseinst 
(CC House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(House Exp.)*diseaseinst 
Omnibus*diseaseinst 
 
(Director’s PSE)*ODª 
(# of Adv. Boards)*OD  
(# of Adv. Board Members)*OD 
(CC Senate Rating)*OD  
(NTU Senate Rating)*OD  
(Senate Exp.)*OD  
(CC House Rating)*OD  
(NTU House Rating)*OD  
(House Exp.)*OD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.06132 
.00155 
.02421 
-.01657 
-.10262 
.01465 
.00620 
.191**
-.68448 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.30604**
-.00025 
-.017 
-.02876 
-.52532***
.01224 
.05645***
.29233***
5.60333 
 
.05066 
-1.58765***
.00824**
.06653**
-.02984 
1.10781***
.01437 
-.17687***
-2.27587***
R-squared 
Rho 
.791 
.296 
.802 
.278 
.797 
.299 
.788 
.332 
• *** p<.01, ** p<05, * p<.10 
• a : omnibus*diseaseinst 
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The results table provided (Table 14) reveals a series of important 
relationships between the institute director’s PSE and the percentage of intramural 
expenditures. First, the relationship is curvilinear in the basic model. The direct 
interpretation of the coefficients in the model with squared terms is that institute 
directors increase RPGs more than intramural program expenditures until their public 
service reaches about 19 years of experience. Their preferential treatment of RPGs 
gets increasingly tenuous as time goes on. At the same time, they develop an affinity 
to intramural programs that gets stronger as their PSE increases more than 19 years. 
While the average director PSE is 17 years, about half of the directors appear to care 
more about Intramural Research than about RPG expenditures to the end of their 
public career. 
To expand on the relationship, the following conditions are offered. First, the 
directors’ average length of charge at an institute is 7.7 years. If the director is from a 
non-governmental institution, he or she will prefer RPGs to intramural laboratories 
throughout his or her tenure at the institute. Before coming to the institute, the 
director-to-be-scientist has a large investment in science and technical human capital 
(Bozeman et al., 2001; Bozeman & Corley, 2004) developed through collaboration 
and communications among his or her fellow scientists in the private sector. It appears 
that the newly recruited directors are still embedded in their non-governmental 
communities, serving the interests of private scientific communities more than those 
of intramural research laboratories. 
Second, if the directors are promoted from positions at their respective 
institutes, they tend to increase intramural expenditures more than RPGs. Out of the 
49 directors whose previous PSE information was available, 31 were promoted from 
previous governmental positions with an average of 16.3 years experience. These 
directors from within institutes increase intramural research more than extramural 
research expenditures as their charge of the institutes exceeds 3 years. On average, 
directors with previous public experience lead the organizations about 8 years. Unlike 
the case of the directors with nongovernmental backgrounds, it is unlikely that these 
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from-within directors feel that intramural research is less qualified than research 
funded through RPGs. This implies that regardless of their PSE, the institute directors 
are complying with their respective self-interests: they may still be influenced by 
PSM in increasing research expenditures, but when it comes to resource allocation 
between two at-odds interests, they follow their respective interests. That is, the 
directors seem to act in accordance with their self-interests in resource allocation 
between intramural versus extramural research expenditures. This outcome rejects 
both Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2. 
However, there could be an alternative interpretation: directors coming from 
medical schools or universities may regard intramural programs as having lower 
quality than their academic counterparts. It is  pointed out that there is more variation 
in the research quality of intramural programs than of RPGs (Cohen, 1993). While 
intramural programs have produced research results of extremely high quality,52 they 
also have faced persistent criticisms. For example, the Klausner Report (1993) 
pointed out that intramural programs suffer from bureaucratic top-down management, 
small PI-dominated lab operations, recruitment difficulties, and inconsistent budget 
cuts. Given these problems, the institutes are limited in rewarding high-performing 
labs and penalizing low-performing ones. An awareness of these problems may 
prompt externally hired directors to hesitate when increasing expenditures on 
intramural programs. From-within directors may still regard intramural programs as 
capable of taking care of issues of high risk and uncertainty that many scientists may 
not want to get involved with. In such cases, it would be practically impossible to 
                                                 
 
 
52 The NIH intramural programs ranked really high in citation lists or in lists of the organizations with 
the top scientists in the world. For example, in the list of the Institute of Scientific Information’s 100 
most cited scientists in the world, 16 NIH intramural scientists were included along with the other 59 
U.S. scientists (Cohen, 1993). In addition, five scientists from NIH intramural labs won Nobel Prizes 
(NIH Almanac): Dr. Marshall W. Nirenberg (1968, NHLBI) for discovering the key to deciphering the 
genetic code; Julius Axelrod (1970, NIMH) for research into the chemistry of nerve transmission; 
Christian B. Anfinsen (1972, NIAMDD) for achievement in research of the structure of ribonuclease; 
D. Carleton Gajdusek (1976, NINDS) for discovering new mechanisms for the origin and 
dissemination of infectious disease; and Martin Rodbell (1994) for research into signal transmission. 
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discern between PSM and self-interests in supporting respective research 
mechanisms. However, if it is reasonable to regard expenditure amounts through 
specific mechanisms as representing interests of those involved in the process, the 
persuasiveness of this alternative interpretation is rather limited. 
Differential Private Influences on Intramural and RPG Expenditures 
 Hypothesis 5.1 predicts that the effect of private interested parties will be 
greater on expenditures through RPGs than on Intramural Research expenditures. 
Because of the limitations in the process of public service demand revealing and log-
rolling in a democracy, programs of hidden or remote/uncertain benefits, among 
which R&D programs would be included, tend to be undersupplied. However, if 
interest groups regarding these programs are well developed and allowed to get 
involved in the agenda-setting process, the obstacles may be overcome. As a result, 
the more private inputs are channeled to the decision-making process, the more likely 
government will support programs that benefit these interests. NIH extramural 
programs might be an example of this scenario. 
 The result from the analysis delivers an opposite message: the number of 
advisory boards and their memberships at the institute level increase the proportion of 
Intramural Research expenditures in the sum of RPGs and intramural expenditures. 
The regression coefficient on the number of advisory boards in the first model reports 
that as the independent variables increase up to 11, they increases the proportion of 
Intramural Research at a decreasing rate. Since on average there are 5.7 advisory 
boards at an institute, their effect on the proportion of intramural expenditures is very 
positive. This is clearly the opposite of the expectation. Moreover, at the institute 
level an increase in advisory board memberships leads to a higher portion of 
intramural expenditures. At the agency level, both boards and their memberships do 
not significantly influence the dependent variable. Obviously Hypothesis 5.1 does not 
secure support from the result. 
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 There could be a potential explanation to this result. First, the 
operationalization of the private interest representation in the priority-setting process 
may be flawed. Simply, the number of advisory boards may not be a measure of 
inputs from outside but of bureaucratic maximization. While some advisory boards, 
such as the National Advisory Council, are legally mandated in each institute, the 
institutes’ directors have the discretion of establishing advisory boards and appointing 
their members for advice on specific programs and scientific reviews. More advisory 
boards invite more administrative staff and budgets for operation: they could be a 
symbol of organizational power.53 It is still possible for the institute director to 
sideline the advisory boards by making them inactive. IOM (1998) reported a 
considerable number of such inactive advisory boards. This possibly refers to existent 
problems of NIH input mechanisms. 
Differential Congressional Influences on Intramural and RPG Expenditures 
 Hypothesis 6 predicts that as the appropriations subcommittee members are 
more favorable to special interest groups, they tend to increase extramural more than 
intramural research expenditures. The analysis disconfirms this prediction: only the 
coefficient on the median rating score of the Senate appropriations subcommittee is 
positively associated with the proportion of intramural research expenditures, which is 
the opposite of the hypothesis. Given that the median House rating of NTU votes and 
the median years of congressional service of the House subcommittee members 
increase an institute’s total expenditures, PI-initiated expenditures, and intramural 
expenditures, it is likely that the subcommittee members do not favor one type of 
expenditure over the other but want higher expenditures on biomedical research in 
general. 
                                                 
 
 
53 This point will be further developed in the discussion section. 
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Bureaucratic Risk Aversion, Mission Motivation, and the Herfindahl Index 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that being risk-averse or mission-oriented, institute 
directors may seek to diversify expenditures through various mechanisms with the 
result that expenditures through mechanisms other than the large portion of RPGs 
increase. In such a case, the proxy measure of concentration, the Herfindahl index of 
expenditures through multiple mechanisms, will be smaller.54 Another rationale for 
increasing expenditures through Intramural Research, Research Centers, Other 
Research, Research Training, and R&D Contracts is that they target research issues of 
specific relationships to the institute’s mission. If the director of the NIDDK is 
committed to dealing with diabetes, he or she is more likely to pursue specific 
diabetes-related research themes rather than to depend on private investigator-initiated 
research projects. Accordingly, this tendency will also lower the Herfindahl index of 
expenditure mechanisms. 
 The correlation coefficient (0.92) between the proportion of RPG expenditures 
and the Herfindahl index of an institute’s total expenditures (Table 15) reveals that the 
major driver of the index is RPGs, while expenditures through intramural laboratories 
significantly lower the index. Expenditures through the other mechanisms also drive 
down the index. Especially, the Other Research mechanism that takes care of 
education, clinical research collaboration, pilot studies of high risk/uncertainty, and 
supporting minority scientists is clearly negatively associated with the Herfindahl 
index. 
                                                 
 
 
54 If all of an institute’s expenditure is through RPGs, its Herfindahl index will be 1; if the expenditures 
are distributed equally through five mechanisms, the index will amount to 0.2. 
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Table 15. Correlation Coefficients between Herfindahl Index and Proportion of 
Expenditure Mechanisms  
Proportion of 
 
 
Herfindahl 
Index RPGs     Intramural   Centers     Contracts  Other  Management 
Herfindahl Index 
RPGs 
Intramural 
Centers 
Contracts 
Other 
Management 
 1.000 
 0.921         1.000 
 -0.803        -0.833       1.000 
 -0.359        -0.550       0.316          1.000 
 -0.254        -0.131       -0.071         -0.097       1.000 
 -0.545        -0.557       0.505          -0.133       -0.092      1.000 
 -0.275        -0.156       0.054          0.002         0.031       -0.106       1.000 
 
 
Table 16. Herfindahl Index of Expenditure Mechanisms: FFY 1983–FFY 2005 
Institute Mean            Std. Dev.            Min             Max 
NCI 
NEI 
NHGRI 
NHLBI 
.26407             .01059            .23529           .28559 
.49870             .05130            .43020           .59414 
.35010             .06565            .29665           .51574 
.43326             .04272            .36109           .50601 
NIA 
NIAAA 
NIAID 
NIAMS 
.42118             .03736            .36419           .47988 
.35580             .04939            .23247           .40785 
.44019             .05014            .30304           .50045 
.47733             .01890            .44993           .53410 
NICHD 
NIDA 
NIDCD 
NIDCR 
.37050             .03021            .31812           .41749 
.37299             .05045            .27726           .43998 
.53102             .04503            .49078           .64879 
.32973             .04848            .27803           .42591 
NIDDK 
NIEHS 
NIGMS 
NIMH 
.50406             .01286            .48491           .52950 
.24970             .00672            .24143           .26282 
.63700             .06433            .51276           .71123 
.31888             .03154            .25298           .36972 
NINDS 
NINR 
.51160             .04038            .41159           .56561 
.56344             .02996            .50969           .60229 
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Table 16 indicates a considerable variation in the Herfindahl index across time 
and institutes. For example, the mean value of the index of NCI is 0.264, with the 
difference between minimum and maximum values being 0.05. Figure 6 also confirms 
this point. The index increased during the second half of the 1990s but stabilized 
thereafter. In such institutes as the NHGRI, NIAID, and NIGMS, the variation is more 
impressive, with its range being almost 0.20. 
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Figure 6.  Herfindahl Index of Expenditure Mechanisms: NCI 
 
 
 The regression analysis (Table 17) indicates that the director’s PSE does not 
appear to increase diversity of expenditures through multiple mechanisms. Model I 
with squared terms reports a curvilinear relationship between the director’s PSE and 
the diversification of expenditure mechanisms, but the relationship is positive: the 
longer the institute director’s PSE, the more the expenditures of his or her institute are 
concentrated on only a few of the mechanisms. This effect reaches its peak at 21 years 
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of PSE. If a director is promoted from within the institute with substantial previous 
PSE, he or she tends to seek higher budgets for other support mechanisms than the 
RPGs. If a director is from outside institutions, the director’s public experience 
obviously does not increase his or her attitudes of risk aversion. 
 Making sense of this finding requires an understanding of the relationship 
between the director’s PSE and their preference for RPGs. As analyzed in the 
previous sections, as a director’s PSE increases, RPG expenditures increase but 
intramural expenditures decrease. This leads to more portions of an institute’s 
research support being expended through the RPGs mechanism. In the previous 
analysis, it is found that the gap between RPGs and Intramural Research expenditures 
gets even bigger when the directors are recruited from outside the institutes. 
Outsourced directors are not necessarily risk-averse in a bureaucratic sense upon their 
appointment. They may want to seek higher budgets for their cherished research areas 
or the research activities in their embedded sectors without an anticipation of drastic 
budget cuts. The directors who are promoted from within tend to be more favorable to 
increasing intramural expenditures than RPGs, in which case the Herfindahl index 
would decrease.  
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Table 17. Effects on the Composition of the Expenditure Mechanisms 
(Herfindahl Index) 
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
Director’s PSE 
(Director’s PSE)2
Number of Advisory Boards 
(Number of Advisory Boards)2
Number of Advisory Board Members 
NIH Director’s PSE 
(NIH Director’s PSE)2
Number of NIH Advisory Boards 
(Number of NIH Advisory Boards)2
Number of NIH Advisory Board Members 
 
CC Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of Senate Appr. Subcomm. 
CC Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
NTU Rating of House Appr. Subcomm. 
Experience of House Appr. Subcomm. 
 
Republican Control of Presidency 
Republican Control of Congress 
Mixed Control of Congress 
Omnibus Legislation (omnibus) 
Disease-focused Institutes (diseaseinst)  
Lagged Dependent Variable 
 
(Director’s PSE)*omnibus 
(# of Adv. Boards)*omnibus 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*omnibus 
(CC Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU Senate Rating)*omnibus 
(Senate Exp.)*omnibus 
(CC House Rating)*omnibus 
(NTU House Rating)*omnibus 
(House Exp.)*omnibus 
.00211***
-.00005***
.00138 
-.00008**
-.00001***
0.00023 
 
.00064**
 
.00000 
 
-.00007 
.00029**
.00000 
-.00024*
-.00016 
-.00415*
 
-.00177 
.00402 
.00938 
.00157 
.003 
.87779***
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00267***
-.00006***
-.00044 
 
-.00002***
.00183 
 
.00046 
 
.00001 
 
-.00035 
-.00042 
-.00374 
-.0004**
.00042 
-.00262 
 
-.00878 
.00238 
.01466**
-.19722***
.0023 
.87354 
 
-.00042*
.00127*
.00001 
.0006 
.00105**
.00418 
.00017 
-.00049 
.00427 
.00324***
-.00007***
-.0005 
 
-.00003***
-.02748***
.00193***
.01383***
-.00007***
.00002***
 
-.00118***
.00035 
-.00686*
-.00066***
.00127***
-.00102 
 
-.0319***
-.00864 
.03985***
-.13196***
.04351*
.86502***
 
-.00034 
.00153*
.0000 
-.00061*
.00031 
.00689 
.00242***
-.00243***
.00021 
.00392***
-.00008***
-.00028 
 
-.00004***
-.02967***
.00209***
.01473***
-.00008***
.00003***
 
-.00141***
.0006*
-.0071*
-.00073***
.00144***
-.00091 
 
-.03348***
-.0107 
.04224***
-.11061**
.06026 
.85269***
 
-.00085**
-.00264*
.00006***
-.00027 
.00007 
.00693*
.00245***
-.00284***
-.00008 
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Table Continued. 
Variable Model I: Basic 
Model II: 
Interaction 
with 
Omnibus 
Model III: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst 
Model IV: 
Interaction with 
Omnibus & 
Disease Inst. 
(Director’s PSE)*diseaseinst 
(# of Adv. Boards)*diseaseinst 
(# of Adv. Board Members)*diseaseinst 
(CC Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU Senate Rating)*diseaseinst 
(Senate Exp.)*diseaseinst 
(CC House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(NTU House Rating)*diseaseinst 
(House Exp.)*diseaseinst 
omnibus*diseaseinst 
 
(Director’s PSE)*ODª 
(# of Adv. Boards)*OD  
(# of Adv. Board Members)*OD 
(CC Senate Rating)*OD  
(NTU Senate Rating)*OD  
(Senate Exp.)*OD  
(CC House Rating)*OD  
(NTU House Rating)*OD  
(House Exp.)*OD  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.00055*
-.0001 
.00001 
-.00036*
.00022 
-.00121 
.00024 
-.00007 
-.00054 
-.00809 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.00074*
-.00106 
.00003***
-.00001 
-.00015 
-.00142 
.00036*
-.0004**
-.00109*
-.11265**
 
.00037 
.00875***
-.00007***
-.00085**
.00049 
-.00049 
.00028 
.00089**
.00622 
R-squared 
Rho 
.863 
.128 
.862 
.14 
.858 
.167 
.855 
.188 
• *** p<.01, ** p<05, * p<.10 
• a : omnibus*diseaseinst 
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 However, this is obviously not the case: the correlation coefficient between 
adirector’s previous PSE (director2) and the index is 0.14, significant at 0.01 level. 
On the other hand, how long a director leads the institute (director1) is not 
significantly associated with the index (r = .036). These correlation coefficients mean 
that directors promoted from within tend to increase the Herfindahl index of 
expenditures more than those recruited from external scientific communities, which is 
the opposite of Hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 18. Correlation Coefficients between Director’s PSE and the Herfindahl 
Index of Expenditures 
 direct1           direct2             Herfindahl Index 
direct1 
 
direct2  
 
Herfindahl Index 
 
1.000 
 
0.1248         1.000 
0.0162 
0.0361         0.1403               1.0000 
0.4745         0.0069 
 
 
 To explicate this puzzle, it is important to understand how much budgetary 
risk the directors have been confronted with. During the study period, FFY 1983–FFY 
2005, the NIH budget increased from $6.1 billion to $37.7 billion, with an average 
annual rate of increase of 8.7%. Over this period, the NIH was never subject to budget 
cuts. This is because the NIH enjoys support from key members of Congress as well 
as from well-developed patient and advocacy groups and scientific communities, 
including the Ad Hoc Group. Between 1998 and 2003, its budget doubled, thanks to 
key players in Congress such as Senators Arlen Spector and Connie Mack. Even when 
the President requesteda NIH budget with only a minor incremental increase, 
Congress responded with a big increase (Greenberg, 2001). Put simply, NIH 
leadership has not been vulnerable to budgetary uncertainty or risk of budget cuts. 
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 Under these circumstances, the best strategy for public officials who are 
motivated by either self-interest or organizational mission would be budget 
maximization, not risk diversification. In the correlation coefficient table (Table 18), 
directors’ previous experience is shown to actually increase the proportion of RPG 
expenditures in the institutes’ total budgets while decreasing its intramural portion. 
With previous experiences in the institute, the director from within favors a greater 
budget than mitigating the risk of budget cuts since there is essentially no such risk. 
Therefore, the finding, opposite to Hypothesis 3, reveals that the directors of the NIH-
comprising institutes are faced with a different risk situation than other agencies 
whose budgetary vicissitudes undergo annual fluctuations. With strong support groups 
in Congress as well as in the scientific communities, the NIH directors come to expect 
budget increases. The only strategy to pursue has been to increase the budget 
irrespective of which expenditure mechanisms are to be used. 
 However, there could be an alternative explanation to this unexpected finding. 
The real issue in budget-cut politics may be about types of diseases that are targeted, 
for example, AIDS and cancer. There has been criticism that the NIH has allocated 
funds to AIDS-related research more than the disease deserves while simultaneously 
short-changing cancer research. The rationale of the criticism is that cancer affects 
more Americans than AIDS does. Under such a circumstance, institute directors may 
diversify expenditures in terms of targeted disease types, not of expenditure 
mechanisms. This consideration may not be captured by the model developed here 
and is beyond the scope of this research. However, this alternative explanation seems 
to apply better to the agency level than to the individual institute level, since each 
institute has unique areas of concentration. 
A second set of summary of findings about the hypotheses is provided in 
Table 19.  
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Table 19. Hypotheses and Findings about Differential Effects between 
Intramural and RPG Expenditures 
Hypothesis Findings 
Self-interest 
Maximizations 
vs. PSM (H2.1 
and H2.2) 
Directors tend to increase expenditures in relation to their relevant 
backgrounds: if the director is recruited from the outside scientific 
communities, he or she is more likely to increase extramural RPG 
expenditures. Hypotheses not confirmed. 
Diversification 
(H3) 
A director’s PSE tends to increase the concentration of research 
expenditures to a few expenditure mechanisms. This applies better to 
internally promoted directors; it is because of consistent budget 
increase over the study period. The leadership of the institute does not 
need to consider avoiding budget cuts. Hypothesis not confirmed. 
Advisory Board 
Effects (H5.1) 
Advisory boards increase intramural more than extramural RPG 
expenditures. This raises a question about the role of advisory boards: 
it seems they represent the spending preferences of the institute 
leadership rather than those of private scientific communities and 
advocacy groups. Hypothesis not confirmed. 
Interest Group 
Affiliation of 
Subcommittee 
Members (H6 
and H6.1) 
No significant relationships were found between congressional voting 
scores (experience) and the proportion of intramural research 
expenditures. Hypotheses not confirmed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Summary of Key Findings 
 This study originated from an observation that there is a missing link between 
studies of distributive policy-making and R&D policy. While the former focus on the 
political nature of distributive policies and their efficiency implications, the latter 
deals with annual budgetary trends when it comes to budget and expenditure decision-
making. Considering political actors in the decision-making process of medical 
research supported by the NIH, this study tries to show that each of the NIH 
expenditure mechanisms invites a unique set of influences from its beneficiaries and 
legislators. This study also provides evidence that although the benefits from a 
distributive program may have an externality effect, the relevant actors seek to 
increase their respective interests. 
 Given that the process of NIH research expenditure decision-making involves 
various actors such as the directors of the institutes, bureaucrats, external scientific 
communities, and patient and advocacy groups, the study measured their influence in 
the process, such as the director’s PSE at the institute and agency levels and the 
number of advisory boards and their memberships. At the same time, since Congress, 
especially the appropriations subcommittees with jurisdiction over NIH funding, has 
been a major actor in the process, this study also measured ideological orientation and 
interest group affiliation of the members of the appropriations subcommittee 
members. Moreover, following the literature of congressional decision-making rules 
(Baron & Ferejohn, 1989; Dharmapala, 2006; Ferejohn & Krehbiel, 1987; Fréchette et 
al., 2003; Krutz, 2000; Primo, 2003), this study examined the effect of omnibus 
appropriations bills frequently used since 1996. 
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 Based on the literature of economic theories of bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1968, 
1971), recently developed theories of public service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990; 
Perry, 1996), and theories of political clout in the budget process (Wildavsky & 
Caiden, 1997; Meyers, 1994), this study predicted that the PSE of institute directors 
would increase total institute budgets. With longer years of public experience, 
directors are expected to absorb prevalent values in the public organizations 
regardless of whether they are self-interest, PSM, and/or mission orientation. They are 
also expected to absorb practical information and skill of maneuvering the labyrinth 
of the budget process. The rationales behind this hypothesis are that if the directors 
are self-interested they will seek higher budgets for their own benefits, that if they are 
primarily motivated by PSM they seek higher budgets to improve the quality of health 
of the American people, and that if they have a knack for the budget process and gain 
considerable political clout it is easier to secure a higher budget. The analytical 
findings support this hypothesis, reporting a curvilinear relationship. It was found that 
the marginal positive effect from the director’s PSE decreases at a decreasing rate up 
to a certain point then it turns into a negative factor. 
 Drawing on assumptions about the motives of public officials, this study 
expected that if they were self-interested, they would increase Intramural Research 
expenditures more than RPGs and that if they were PSM-driven, they would not 
discriminate in favor of one type of expenditure over another (Hypotheses 2.1 and 
2.2). The findings reveal a reality much richer than the hypotheses predicted: if 
directors are recruited from outside the institutes, they tend to increase extramural 
research more than intramural research expenditures throughout their public career. 
The findings indicate newly recruited directors tend to decrease intramural laboratory 
spending. On the other hand, if the directors are recruited from within the institutes 
with a considerable amount of experience in the governmental setting, they are likely 
to increase intramural expenditures more than extramural RPGs. These findings 
reveal that institute directors are driven by their self-interest although they may seek 
public values. But, in this case, self-interest is not used in the Niskanen sense but in 
 118
the sense that the directors want to represent the interests of the institutional sectors 
from which they come and in which they command substantial networks of 
collaboration. If the newly recruited director has developed a substantial collaborative 
and informational network in his or her previous setting and is thus embedded in the 
interests of that community, he or she tends to seek the interests of this reference 
community. If the director is from an academic institution, his or her behavioral 
values and norms will most likely be those of the institution and of the institutional 
setting in which his or her home institution is embedded. These norms and values 
might be very different from those prevalent in the institutes. While absorbing the 
values of the institutes, directors recruited from external entities grow increasingly 
less favorable to expenditures through extramural RPGs. Directors promoted from 
within the institutes grow increasingly more favorable to expenditures by intramural 
laboratories. 
 Instead of seeking higher budgets, an institute director, it is expected, would 
diversify the agency’s expenditures through multiple mechanisms either to avoid the 
risk of budget cuts or to seek institute-specific missions. The findings of this study tell 
a story opposite of this expectation, however: the longer the director’s PSE, the more 
he or she concentrates the institutes’ expenditures on only a couple of mechanisms, as 
indicated by the Herfindahl index of expenditures through different mechanisms. This 
increasing tendency of the directors toward only a few mechanisms can be explained 
by the support the institutes have gotten from Congress and their respective 
constituent groups. During the study period, the NIH budget increased at an annual 
rate of 8.7%. In a nutshell, the NIH budget has never been subject to budget cuts, 
which turns the politics of the NIH budget process into that of increasing budgets, not 
of avoiding the risk of budget cuts. The tendency of concentrating expenditures on a 
few mechanisms is greater for directors who are promoted from within the institutes 
than for those who come from the outside. If the directors are more committed to the 
values and norms of the institutes from the start of their directorship, they tend to 
increase the Herfindahl index more than those from the outside medical research 
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communities. This indicates that within-recruited directors more aggressively seek 
budget increases than their counterparts recruited from without. 
 The former two points indicate that whether or not the institute directors are 
recruited from the public setting makes a difference in both the allocation of research 
funds between intramural and extramural RPGs and how aggressively the directors 
seek higher budgets. Directors from within tend to seek both higher expenditures for 
intramural research and higher total institute budgets by increasing extramural RPGs. 
The most effective way of securing higher budgets for the institutes is to increase 
support through the biggest expenditure mechanism, RPGs. Just a small, incremental 
increase of RPGs has a much greater impact on the institute’s total budget than a big 
hike in expenditures through the other minor mechanisms. Because expenditures 
through RPGs take up almost half of the institutes’ budgets, only slightly increasing 
the RPGs will lead to a higher Herfindahl index, even when the percentage increase 
rates are greater for expenditures through the other mechanisms. In other words, a 
budget maximizing strategy used by directors from within is increasing RPG 
expenditures. Directors from without do not seek this strategy; they tend to increase 
the proportion of expenditures through R&D Contracts but not those through RPG. 
 Since disease-specific institutes are expected to be more vulnerable to 
advocacy and lobbying efforts of patient and advocacy groups, research expenditures 
of these institutes would be greater than those of the other institutes. The former 
institutes get support from relatively better-developed patient and advocacy groups 
than the other institutes do. The analytical result conforms to this prediction: the 
disease-focused institutes’ total expenditures are greater than their nondisease-focused 
counterparts by as much as 10%. However, there are some variations in the difference 
between these two groups depending on the expenditure mechanisms. The 
expenditures through RPGs by the disease-focused institutes are about 9.5% greater 
than those of the nondisease institutes. The former institutes maintain intramural 
research laboratories almost three times greater than the latter institutes. It is found, 
however, that the disease-targeting institutes’ proportion of intramural programs to 
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PI-initiated RPG expenditures is not considerably higher than that of their nondisease 
counterparts. This is because the total budget size of the former institutes is much 
greater than the latter institutes’. This study also reports that there is no difference 
between these two types of institutes when it comes to diversifying their expenditures. 
 This study also predicted that the participation of private interested parties in 
the priority-setting process measured by either the number of advisory boards or 
advisory board members would increase total institute expenditures, that this effect 
would be greater for extramural RPGs than for Intramural Research, and that the 
effect would be greater for disease-specific institutes than for the other institutes. For 
the budgetary influence of the advisory boards and their members, the result is rather 
mixed: the advisory boards and their memberships clearly increase the institute’s total 
expenditures, but the effect is greater for the nondisease institutes than for their 
disease counterparts. On the other hand, there is no difference between these two 
types of institutes in the effect of the advisory board memberships. The number of 
advisory boards increases intramural expenditures more than extramural RPGs, thus 
increasing the proportion of intramural expenditures. This finding also indicates that 
the number of advisory boards may not be a proxy for inputs from outside but instead 
an indicator of a means by which the institute director enforces his or her expenditure 
preferences. With more advisory boards, the institutes may seek higher budgets for 
supporting their administration and operation. The effects of the advisory board 
memberships are different between different channels of support. For example, the 
number of advisory board memberships increases intramural lab expenditures but not 
extramural RPG expenditures. Thus, the advisory board membership increases the 
proportion of intramural expenditures, indicating that private participants in the 
budgeting process favor intramural expenditures at the expense of extramural 
research, which is clearly not what is expected from the advisory boards at face value. 
This interpretation may be supported by the fact that only a couple of the advisory 
boards are legally mandatory and the majority of them are established at the discretion 
of the institute directors. Thus, these boards may serve the interests of the institute’s 
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leadership, not serve to channel input from the scientific community or the general 
public. 
 To examine the potential difference in the effects of input from outside 
between disease-focused institutes and nondisease-focused institutes, this study used 
interaction terms between the input variables and the variable of disease-focused 
institutes in models III and IV. The output reports quite a different story than the 
predicted one. For total institute expenditures, the advisory board effect is greater in 
the nondisease institutes than in the disease-specific institutes. In addition, advisory 
memberships decrease private PI-initiated RPG expenditures of disease-specific 
institutes. While advisory board memberships increase Intramural Research 
expenditures, they do so more for nondisease-focused institutes than for disease-
specific ones. These findings refer to possible problems in the input mechanisms of 
the NIH. The majority of the advisory memberships are from academic settings such 
as medical schools and research universities, which are the main beneficiaries of 
research funds. Only a couple of members from patient and advocacy groups and the 
general public are on the boards that advise institute directors. Thus, the interests of 
these groups are not effectively funneled into the budgetary and priority-setting 
process by the individual institutes. Accordingly, these groups might find it more 
effective to lobby members of Congress, pushing them to seek legislative mandates 
for specific programs, expenditure mechanisms, or set-aside funds. 
 This study hypothesized that if the members of the appropriations 
subcommittees with jurisdiction over the NIH are ideologically more favorable to 
special interest groups, an institute’s expenditures on RPGs will increase more than its 
intramural expenditures and that the effect of the appropriations subcommittees 
members’ affinity to special interest groups will be greater for the specific disease-
focused institutes. To measure the concept, this study used three indicators: the 
median of the Chamber of Commerce vote ratings, the median of the National 
Taxpayers Union vote ratings, and the median years of congressional experience. The 
results from the regression analysis are mixed, reflecting the mixed nature of NIH 
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research support: NIH research support is a type of distributive policy but benefits the 
general public with a high degree of non-excludability and non-rivalry. It serves the 
interests of scientific interest groups in medical schools and research universities 
since the NIH grants, through multiple mechanisms, allow scientists in these 
institutions to maintain their laboratories and train doctoral and post-doctoral students. 
At the same time, even though the relationship between medical research and benefits 
from the research in terms of health quality is getting increasing tenuous (Sarewitz, 
1997; Bozeman & Sarewitz, 2005), it is not difficult to argue that medical research 
has hugely contributed to the health of the American people. Regardless of whether 
they supports special interests, members of Congress have to bear considerable 
damage if they decide to curtail budgets for medical research. That is why they 
persistently increase NIH budgets more than presidential requests (Greenberg, 2001). 
As predicted, longer experience as a representative leads to higher spending at the 
institutes, which indicates that the NIH support serves organized groups. The House 
NTU ratings are found to increase NIH spending as well. This means that the more 
concerned about budget deficit and taxpayer monies the representative is, the more 
likely he or she is to support higher spending by the NIH. It seems this is because of 
the nature of funded research as a public good. On the other hand, according to the 
basic model, the relationship between the measures of affinity of legislators to special 
interests in the Senate and the levels of institute expenditures is not established as 
good as the one in the House. 
 Lastly, this study hypothesized that the frequent use of omnibus appropriations 
bills since 1996 has made a positive difference in the expenditures of the institutes 
under the NIH, that the disease-focused institutes’ total expenditures have increased 
more than their nondisease counterparts, and that with the omnibus legislation the 
effect of the institute director’s PSE have increased. The basic model reports that the 
omnibus appropriations practice does not change the level of an institute’s 
expenditures. However, it is found that the practice has changed the way the other 
independent variables affect the institute’s expenditures. When controlling these 
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mediating effects, the omnibus legislation has indirectly increased the institute 
expenditures as much as three times. This should not be a surprise, because the NIH 
has enjoyed strong support from Congress, who doubled its total budget  between 
1998 and 2003. 
 When assuming that the omnibus legislation and the types of institutes do not 
jointly mediate the effects of the other variables, the nondisease-focused institutes’ 
budgets have increased more than their disease-specific counterparts with omnibus 
legislation. Unlike the prediction in Hypothesis 8, the omnibus legislation benefited 
the nondisease-oriented institutes more than the disease ones. However, when the 
possibility is considered that omnibus legislation and the institute types jointly affect 
the effect of the other independent variables, there is no difference between these two 
types of institutes. As for its mediating role, the omnibus practice has dampened the 
marginal effect of the director’s PSE. Another interesting finding with the practice of 
omnibus legislation is that it does not favor extramural research projects expenditures 
vis-à-vis intramural research. 
 These findings indicate that when the expenditure mechanisms involve 
different actors to a varying degree and the budgeting process is decentralized, the 
specific level of expenditures through a particular mechanism depends on the 
motivations of the actors involved, the type of agency, and the institutional 
arrangement for the budget process. 
Implications of the Study 
 Much of the current discussion of the decline of the U.S. scientific advantage 
has budgetary implications for increasing R&D spending and changing funding 
priorities (National Academies, 2005; Lemonick, 2006). However, the discussions of 
public R&D investments beg the question of the institutional and political nature of 
R&D budgeting and expenditure decision-making. As implied by the literature on 
R&D policies, the real problem may not be the level of expenditures but the 
institutional settings for R&D-related incentives and activities. With a focus on NIH 
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budgets, this study has provided an empirical answer to the question regarding how 
different actors in the process affect expenditure levels through different support 
mechanisms. 
 Thus, one of the major contributions of this research to R&D policy studies 
and the literature of distributive politics is that it makes clear the political nature of 
the expenditure decision-making process of medical research. It is found that institute 
and agency leadership, input channels from the outside communities, ideological 
orientation, and interest group affinity of members of Congress affect the decision 
outputs. Along with Gist (1981), this research also reports that congressional rules 
have an implication in the expenditure levels of a research agency. 
 To make sense of the role assumed by the directors in the determination of 
expenditure levels through particular expenditure mechanisms, this research draws 
upon theories of motivations of public officials and of political clout of agency heads 
in the budget process. The analysis of this study confirms the utility of the political 
clout theory in the sense that with more public experience the institute heads develop 
connections and obtain on-the-job information about the organization and the policy 
process. They utilize such clout to seek higher budgets. However, the “marginal 
product” of political clout is diminishing at a decreasing rate, as is shown by the 
curvilinear relationship between the director’s PSE and the institute’s expenditure 
level. On the other hand, the study found the utility of theories of bureaucratic self-
interest maximization and PSM is limited. Regarding bureaucratic budget 
maximization, this study reported that directors with significant amounts of PSE still 
decrease their institutes’ intramural expenditures. If the directors are self-interested, 
they will increase Intramural Research more than RPGs because the former represents 
a true example of bureaucratic production function and because the expenditure 
through this mechanism is mainly controlled by the insiders of the institutes. On the 
other hand, although the institute leadership are seriously PSM-driven, this can not 
explain why the directors more strongly support research performed by the private 
institutions from which they come with connections, networks, and collaborators. 
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Directors tend to increase intramural research more than extramural research grants if 
they are promoted from within the institutes with considerable experience. The 
opposite applies to directors who are outsourced from the academic sector. 
 This research has policy implications. One of the major findings is that the 
appointment of institute directors either by the President or the Secretary of the HHS 
has a profound impact on institute expenditures irrespective of total expenditures or 
those through specific mechanisms. For example, if a director is from the outside 
scientific community, he or she tends to increase extramural RPGs and to decrease 
Intramural Research expenditures. Therefore, it would be important during 
appointment considerations to consider which research mechanism needs more 
support than the others. If the government faces higher uncertainty in predicting 
which research fields the academic medical research community will pursue, if it 
wants to nurture a swift response to newly arising medical issues, or if it seeks 
research in highly risky and uncertain fields, it may want to strengthen intramural 
research capacity by appointing a government scientist with substantial previous 
public experience. On the other hand, if the government wants to channel more 
resources into medical research fields in terms of education and personnel, 
strengthening America’s medical research infrastructure, it would be better to invite 
academic scientists to the directorship.  
 The second major finding of this study is that the role of advisory boards and 
their membership might be problematic in channeling input from outside 
communities. First of all, the advisory boards may in fact serve the interests of the 
institute leadership and bureaucrats, not the outside scientific communities, due to the 
fact that institute directors can exert their discretion in establishing advisory boards 
and appointing members who will seek their interests. It might be a wise decision for 
the institute leadership to limit the number of advisory boards and to streamline their 
advisory roles vis-à-vis the leadership of the institutes. In addition, it is likely that 
when advisory board members do represent input from the outside communities they 
are more favorable to the research interests of the scientific communities, not 
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necessarily those of the patient and advocacy groups and the general public. To 
mitigate this problem, it would be better for directors to seek more advisory board 
members from advocacy groups and the general public. 
 The third major finding is that the distinct types of funding mechanisms used 
by the NIH not only entail different mechanisms of management and levels of 
government involvement (Salamon, 2002) but also have distinctive channels of 
spillovers. The knowledge transfer processes from intramural research and extramural 
research are different. There is a well-established finding that universities are more 
active in invention disclosures, patent applications, and patent licensing than 
government research agencies (Heisey et al., 2006). Research findings from both 
types of research might be reported by publication, but university scientists are more 
likely to be actively involved in the utilization of their findings for a profit purpose. 
Biotechnology firms that are prosperous in regions such as California, Texas, and 
Massachusetts have in large part originated from university scientists’ active 
engagement with business enterprises as consultants, CEOs, etc. The U.S. 
biotechnology industry is dependent on highly recognized scientists who have been 
funded by the National Science Foundation and/or the NIH (Zucker et al., 1998; 
Zucker & Darby, 1999). Such an active interaction between members of the research 
community and those in the business community is not readily available for NIH 
intramural research. Therefore, the process of knowledge transfer from internal 
government labs to the industry may take more time, unwittingly sacrificing those 
who suffer from the diseases being researched by these internal labs. For these 
reasons, the decision regarding which types of research to fund is critical to the 
contribution of NIH funded research to the economy. This study reports that factors at 
the institute and agency levels, the ideological orientations of members of Congress, 
and the political control of the Congress and the presidency all affect research support 
expenditures through different mechanisms. 
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Limitations of the Study 
 The findings of this research clearly indicate that R&D expenditure decisions 
are closely interwoven with actors and institutional arrangements, as discussed by the 
literature of motivations of public officials and distributive politics. Each constituent 
group is found to provide specific influences with regard to expenditures through 
specific mechanisms. However, these findings should be qualified when considering 
the critical limitations of this research. Of the limitations, the methodological ones are 
noteworthy. 
 First, there could be endogeneity problems in the models, as was pointed out 
in the methodology section. Directors who are better at securing higher budgets may 
be more likely to enjoy longer years of success as the leadership of their institutes. 
This might be especially true when securing a stable stream of research funds for 
academic and medical institutions is the first-order priority. Moreover, institutes with 
a higher level of total expenditures would have more discretionary resources to 
establish additional advisory boards. Thus, with the possibility of two-way flows of 
influence, the dependent variable may also affect the independent variables. In such a 
case, the t-tests of the models are not as reliable as those without such problems. 
Realizing them, this study could not effectively resolve them without any plausible 
instruments.  
 Second, when summing the numbers of advisory boards and their 
memberships, for the purpose of simplicity this study does not make a distinction 
across different types of advisory boards. For example, the National Advisory Council 
at an institute advises its director, while special emphasis groups focus on initial peer 
review of grant applications. These two different advisory boards may have very 
different effects on expenditure decisions. However, this study does not take this into 
account, assuming that the magnitude of this problem would be constant across 
different institutes. This may limit the interpretation of the effect of advisory boards 
and their memberships. 
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 Third, when reporting the significant effects of different constituent groups 
and institutional arrangements, it is still not clear how different actors interact 
throughout the process. The interpretation of the coefficients is based on marginal 
changes, holding the other variables constant. Therefore, they do not allow this 
researcher to determine how one type of actors reacts to the actions of another type of 
actors. Institute directors may be able to manipulate the process of advisory board 
membership to represent their own agendas, not seeking input from outside, or, 
conversely, they might choose board members who are supportive of intramural 
research to seek higher expenditures for intramural programs—the data collected and 
analyzed for this study do not reveal which way the directors or the advisory board 
members will act. 
 Lastly, this study might be overemphasizing the role of institute directors in 
the expenditure decision-making process. The significant role in planning and 
budgeting at the program level is played by the division directors, which would be 
comparable to the role assumed by the institute directors. Playing the role of bureau-
shaping (Dunleavy 1986, 1991), the institute directors may allow division directors to 
take care of which expenditure mechanisms to use to support specific programs. 
While this argument has some validity,55 the role played by the director is still 
important in the sense that it is the responsibility of the institute director to choose 
division directors, that the institute directors defend the institute’s budgets in front of 
congressional committees, and that the institute directors coordinate programs 
administered by different divisions. A more serious problem may stem from the fact 
that this study does not explicitly measure the extent to which the directors are driven 
by self-interests or PSM. The director variable measures the amount of political clout 
the directors have developed and how much the directors identify themselves with the 
                                                 
 
 
55 This study could not provide in-depth qualitative knowledge about the internal processes of 
budgeting and expenditures, which could be its major limitation. 
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values and norms of the institute. Thus, if the bureaucrats at the institute are driven 
mainly by self-interests, the director is expected to be socialized to seek self-interests. 
If the degrees of self-interestedness or PSM could be measured, the hypotheses 
regarding the institute directors’ motivations and the budgetary consequences could 
be more directly tested. 
Further Research Agenda 
 The limitations of this research themselves provide agenda for further 
research. In the subsequent research, some measures of bureaucratic self-interests and 
PSM might be devised. Such measures might resolve the endogeneity problem. 
Moreover, the validity regarding advisory boards and their members may be improved 
by more specified coding. On top of these, this research topic could be sought further 
along the lines of the following. 
 First, a qualitative study of budgeting and expenditure decisions with a special 
focus on the relationship between institute directors and division directors would 
complement the current study. It is a very competent argument that the division 
director’s role in the process is not insignificant. It is likely that they are more 
entrenched in organizational values and missions but less political in their decision-
making than the institute director. Second, this study does not examine intensely the 
effects from political control of the presidency and the Congress. Given that the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services is responsible for appointing institute 
directors, the political control of the presidency who appoints department heads may 
factor in the other independent variables, making differences in their effects. 
Presumably, there might be differences in the effects of public service experience 
between directors appointed by a Democratic president and those chosen by 
Republican one. Third, the findings about the variables measuring political ideology 
and interest group affiliations of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee members 
did not lend significant patterns. This might be because of potential problems in the 
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measurement. A more clear-cut measure may prove to be more useful in predicting 
expenditure outcomes. 
 It is expected that all of these research agendas will enrich the research into 
the dynamic process of Research and Development expenditure decision-making 
since they focus on the incentives of the relevant actors in the process. Being based on 
the political interests of the actors, this line of study will provide a new perspective in 
examining the political characteristics of public budgeting for distributive R&D 
programs, which remains largely untouched in the relevant literature.
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